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This study examined the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) on the economies ofthe Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
The study was based on the premise that the implementation of NAFTA would
have negative consequences for the CARICOM economies. This was the prediction
advanced mainly by political theorists, government officials and economic analysts
primarily from the Caribbean region, who suggested that it would be in the best interest
of both the economies in the subregion and of the United States, if NAFTA parity were
granted to the former in order to alleviate or offset the problems they were likely to
experience as a result ofNAFTA.
A case study analysis was used to analyze the textile/apparel industry in Jamaica,
the sector which was most vulnerable to the consequences of NAFTA. A number of
indicators/variables were utilized to evaluate the pre- and post-NAFTA impact on the
industry. Evaluations of these variables were made based on data collected primarily
from government sources in Jamaica and the U.S., and from interviews conducted with
Jamaican government and industry officials.
The researcher found that there were existing problems within the industry in
Jamaica prior to the implementation of NAFTA, that in some cases escalated after the
passage of the Agreement. The conclusions drawn from the findings suggest that
NAFTA could not be held accountable for the decline in performance of the industry,
although it could have contributed to the worsening of the preexisting problems.
The results of the study suggest areas that the CARICOM nations need to pay
particular attention to in their efforts to survive in an environment where trade
liberalization and globalization will increasingly play an important role in global trade.
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At the 1998 North East Regional Caribbean Students Conference held at Brown
University in Rhode Island, the Prime Minister of Jamaica, P.J. Patterson, suggested
that the "Caribbean faces three challenges in the New World Order - development aid to
the 3rd World from industrialized countries, the economic marginalization of the
Caribbean caused by NAFTA [composed of the United States (U.S.), Canada and
Mexico], and the increasing'technological bias'of the world."1 These concerns were
echoed by other Caribbean leaders such as the Prime Minister of Grenada. Dr. Keith
Mitchell, who suggested that the "greatest challenge facing the region" is the ability of
the countries to effectively manage the transition from an environment of preferential and
protected markets, to one which encompasses a globalized market for goods, services and
capital, the formation of large trading blocs, and the decline in official capital trade
flows.2 The Grenadian leader further elaborated on the issue of preferential access by
pointing out that "the exclusion from the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) parity places the Caribbean region in a disadvantageous position, both with
1 The Herald Sphere, April 13, 1998. From a speech by P.J. Patterson delivered to the North East
Regional Caribbean Students Conference at Brown University in April 1998.
2 The Grenadian Voice [newspaper on-line]; taken from a speech made to the Caribbean
American Summit at Central State University, 1998. Available from http://www.spiceisle.com/svoice;
Internet; accessed May 2000.
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regard to market access to the U.S.. and to the diversion of direct foreign investment
from our region to other areas."3
In addition to the implementation of NAFTA, a number of other developments
have provided the impetus for Caribbean leaders to rethink the manner in which they
conduct trade with larger, more industrialized countries. These developments include
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations along with the establishment of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the enlargement of the European Union (EU). and the
replacement of the Lome Convention with a new partnership agreement.
These issues were addressed by the West Indian Commission (WIC) which the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Heads of State established in 1990 to make
recommendations for advancing the goals and objectives of the Treaty of Chaguaramas.
In its report, Time for Action, the WIC called for the region to become more mindful of
the emerging globalization movement, and to take action to prevent the likelihood of the
subregion becoming marginalized in the process. The report included, among other
issues, recommendations for the CARICOM governments to take the necessary steps to
allow for the "free mobility of capital within the region"; for the countries to remove all
antiexport biases that may exist; and for the economies to aggressively seek the same
concessions as Mexico but without reciprocity. The report also called for the private and
public sector interests to organize themselves in order to maintain the region's viability in
3 Ibid.
certain key areas such as garments, electronics, and other labor-intensive export
industries4. Much emphasis was placed on trade issues by the WIC.
The importance of international trade as an integral component of economic
activity in the Caribbean has long been recognized and cannot be overstated. This is
reflected by the region's volume of trade (exports plus imports of goods and services) as
a proportion of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For the Caribbean, the volume of
trade as a proportion of the GDP was about 60% during the early 1900s,5 and the ratio
between the volume of trade and total GDP grew from 0.62 in 1970 to 0.68 in 1980.6
For example, in 1988 ratios of foreign trade to GDP were as high as 61% in Trinidad and
Tobago, 105% in Barbados, and 118% in Jamaica,7 which are three of the largest among
the small economies in CARICOM.
These economies8 depend on trade for their growth and survival to a greater
extent than large economies. Classical theory suggests that participation in international
trade contributes to economic growth, by facilitating improvement in productivity
4 The West Indian Commission, Timefor Action (Christ Church, Barbados: Cole's Printery,
1992), 159.
5 Irma Tirado de Alonzo, ed., Trade Issues in the Caribbean (Philadelphia: Gordon and Breach
Science Publishers, 1992), 5.
6 Ibid., 15.
7 Ibid., 74.
8 Small economies and less developed countries (LDCs) are terms which will be used
interchangeably with developing countries, third- world nations, and underdeveloped countries throughout
this work.
through the specialization in exports in which countries have comparative advantage.9
When small economies produce for the world market, they are able to achieve the
economies of scale which are generally difficult to generate if they were producing only
for their small domestic market.
This type of open, multilateral trading system has been promoted as a stimulant
to economic growth both through the static gains from increased efficiency in the
utilization of existing resources, and the dynamic gains from the opportunities to expand
productive capacity through the acquisition of new technology, investment, and
innovative entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, although they are incorporated into this
"free and open" global trading pattern, CARICOM countries, like most other small,
developing economies, have enjoyed a special and differential treatment within this
global trading system beginning in the immediate post colonial years.
Preferential trade arrangements based on nonreciprocity, have provided assured
markets for CARICOM exports in the developed countries, and protection from
competition from other exporting countries. These preferential trade programs which
have been the cornerstone of the trade relations between developing countries and
industrialized nations, were geared to enable the former to develop their economies
without having to face competition from the more industrialized nations. However, these
arrangements now appear to be in jeopardy as the twenty first century unfolds; and their
9 JohnPincus, Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich and Poor Nations (New York-McGraw
Hill Book Company, 1967), 97.
likely demise poses serious threats to the economic survival of the CARICOM
economies which have come to depend largely on the arrangements for their survival.
The Challenge Facing CARICOM
The participation of Mexico in NAFTA is perceived as a potential threat to
CARICOM members, particularly the least developed members of the group. This is so
primarily because of the importance to the islands' economies of the U.S. protected
market, one which CARICOM leaders predict they will lose to Mexico as a result of
NAFTA. In the past decade, the U.S. has increasingly replaced the EU as the main
trading partner ofCARICOM states, particularly as a market for the latter's manufactured
goods. Total CARICOM exports to the U.S. amounted to US $2,052 million in 1991,10
which comprised just over 50% of their world exports." The U.S. provided the largest
market for the Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda, Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Trinidad
and Tobago in 1990, absorbing 50% or more of their total merchandise exports.
CARICOM's economic future is closely intertwined with the U.S. economy in other
ways. The U.S. is the "largest source of CARICOM's tourists, the main market for its
oil, bauxite, manufacturing and data services, the principal source of foreign direct
10 GSR Associates, Report on the North American Free Trade Agreement: Study Preparedfor the
CARICOMSecretariat (Port of Spain, Trinidad, n.d.),8.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 49.
investment and the main source of remittances and other transfers. The U.S. is also the
main source of imports."13
The assumption that NAFTA will have a disastrous negative impact on this
volume of trade between the U.S. and CARICOM stems from the belief that trade and
investment will be diverted from the region to Mexico as a result ofthe agreement.14 The
concern is that the benefits that the Caribbean countries enjoy under the preferential
arrangements with the U.S., namely the General System of Preferences and Trade (GSP)
and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), will erode as a result of Mexico's enhanced
position with the U.S. under NAFTA.
CARICOM leaders claim that NAFTA has given Mexico certain advantages
which most likely will increase its competitiveness vis-a-vis the CARICOM states.
Mexico and CARICOM compete for the North American market in the tourism industry,
manufacturing, and data services.15 Under NAFTA, Mexico will be able to enhance its
advantages relative to the CARICOM countries, especially since the former already
benefits from its inexpensive labor, cheap energy, lower transportation costs, and
economies of scale.16 Mexico can now export the same products as the Caribbean
13 DeLisle Worrell, "CARICOM and the North American Free Trade Area." Paper prepared for
the Overseas Development Council (n.p., February 1992): 2.
14 "The View from Washington: A Report on the NAFTA Discussions at This Year's Miami
Conference on the Caribbean," CANABUS1NESS: The Financial Magazine ofthe Caribbean Community
5, no. 4 (December 1993): 23.
15 Worrell, "CARICOM and the Nor* American Free Trade Area ,n 6.
16 Richard Bernal, "The Caribbean Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA and the Caribbean Basin
Initiative," Caribbean Forum 1, no. 1 (1993): 6.
countries to the U.S. at reduced rates or duty free. This ability by Mexico wipes out the
advantage provided by the CBI to the region, since the provisions governing duty
elimination are superior under NAFTA than under the CBI, prior to the passage of the
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) in May 2000. which will be discussed
fully in later chapters.
In addition to investment and trade diversion. Caribbean leaders have suggested
that other likely effects of NAFTA on the subregion include import penetration,
worsening of trade deficits and relocation of productive capacity to Mexico, which all
may combine to result in the contraction of economic activity for the economies.1 It is
believed that if these conditions were to occur, there is the potential for the situation to
escalate into serious economic, social, and political upheaval in the subregion.
There is increasing realization that because the Caribbean and the U.S. are in
close proximity to each other, the effects of NAFTA in the former will most likely have
an impact on the latter. Furthermore, economic problems in the Caribbean can also
affect continuing degradation of the environment, ethnic, class and political conflicts
within and among states in the region, and the spread of poverty-related diseases to other
countries. In addition, an economic crises for the small economies can impede the
economic development of other Caribbean states. For those who share the view that
NAFTA poses a threat to the economic survival of the small Caribbean nations, the
Ibid.
foregoing are some of the results they proffer as being inevitable consequences of the
agreement.
Meanwhile, Canada's accession to NAFTA is not seen as likely to pose the same
threat to the CARICOM countries as does Mexico's. A 1988 study conducted by the
Conference Board of Canada concluded that concluded that trade under CARIBCAN -
the free trade agreement (FTA) between the CARICOM countries and Canada - will not
be altered by the then existing Canada/US Free Trade Agreement because of the
uniqueness of the goods coming into Canada under the Program.18 Besides, it is reported
that the expansion in trade resulting from US/Canada FTA will have a positive impact on
personal income and corporate profits, which in turn will result in greater import demand
in other areas. Thus, it is suggested that if CARICOM countries were to maintain their
level of Canadian imports, as that figure increases, so will the level of exports from
these CARIBCAN countries.19
In addition, CARICOM sells ten times as much to the U.S. as it does to Canada.
Based on 1990 figures, at least 43 % of CARICOM exports wind up in the U.S.,
compared with 4.5% for Canada.20 As a consequence of these reasons, CARICOM
leaders did not place much emphasis on Canada's accession to NAFTA as they did with
Mexico's, which they saw as a threat to Caribbean interests particularly in certain
18 The Conference Board of Canada, "Impact of Canada-United States Free Trade on CARIBCAN
Countries," A Report prepared by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada (October 1988).
"Ibid.
20 "The View from Washington," 23
strategic industries such as textile and apparel. These are areas in which CARICOM
does not enjoy total duty free access to the U.S. market,21 even with the additional
benefits provided in the March 2000 legislation signed by the U.S. Congress.22
It has been suggested that the primary sector that will feel the negative effects of
NAFTA within CARICOM will be the textile/apparel industry.23 This sector has
developed to become an important source of foreign exchange for many member states.
The industry experienced significant growth during the 1980s and 1990s in part as a
result of the CBI which was implemented in 1984. The CBI has been credited for a
"decade of unparalleled growth in trade between the U.S. and the Caribbean, acting as a
catalyst for exports, investments and employment creation in the economies of the U.S.
and the Caribbean nations, such as Jamaica."24
As a CBI designated country, Jamaica made significant progress in attracting new
investors, particularly in the textile industry. Between 1980 and 1995, Jamaica's garment
exports, primarily underwear and hosiery, rose from less than US $10 million a year to
nearly US $600 million annually, yielding an average annual growth rate of 28%.25 In
1989, apparel products led the way among the top manufactured product exported to the
21 Worrell, "CARICOM and the North American Free Trade Area," 6.
22 This legislation will be discussed more fully in later chapters.
23 GSR Associates, Report on the North American Free Trade Agreement, xii.
24 Bernal, "The Caribbean Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative,"
1.
25 Larry Rohter, "Impact ofNAFTA Pounds Economies of the Caribbean," The New York Times,
January 30, 1997.
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U.S., accounting for 52% (up from 9%) of Jamaica's manufactured goods exports to the
U.S.26 By 1994, textiles were responsible for 25% of the island's labor force, and
constituted the largest non-traditional product. The industry grew to a $400 million a
year business and the nation's second fastest growing economic sector.27
Other CARICOM countries that are expected to experience some negative effects
in their textile/apparel industry as a result of NAFTA include Belize, Barbados, St. Kitts-
Nevis, St. Lucia, and Grenada. CARICOM leaders have warned that it will not be in the
best interest of the islands, and also of the U.S. and the rest of the hemisphere if these
negative effects ofNAFTA were allowed to occur. They suggest that the economies will
experience further deterioration, a situation which can impact other nations in the
hemisphere, and one from which they have yet to recover as a result of the structural
adjustment programs beginning in the early 1980s.
As the world becomes more interdependent, it is increasingly difficult for other
neighboring states to remain insulated from what is occurring in the rest of the
hemisphere. One study by the InterAmerican Development Bank showed the effect of
growing interdependence among economies in the hemisphere by concluding that the
economic downturn in the Caribbean and Latin America during the 1980s had a negative
impact on the U.S. economy, particularly as a result of the dramatic reduction of the
26 Gregory K. Schoepfle and Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, "Export-Oriented Assembly Operations in the
Caribbean," Trade Issues in the Caribbean : 150.
27 Robert Selwitz, "CB1 Nations Cry Foul When It Comes to NAFTA," Global Trade and
Transportation 14 (August 1994) : 6.
11
region's imports from the U.S. The Bank estimated that while the Caribbean's and the
Latin American's loss of purchasing power during the period was about US $ 500 billion,
consequential reduction in U.S. exports to the region during that same period ranged from
between US $ 50 billion to US $ 130 billion, which may also have resulted in the loss of
about one million jobs in the U.S.28
Thus, CARICOM leaders warn that economic disaster for the Caribbean brought
about by NAFTA could also have far reaching effects for the U.S. They predict that the
U.S. could lose a valuable market resulting from the decline in Caribbean demand for its
goods. American jobs could be lost, emigration from the Caribbean to the U.S. could
increase, and so could the illegal drug trafficking industry between the islands and the
North American mainland. Caribbean leaders also believe that there could be other
social and political consequences which could increase instability and cause security
problems for the U.S.
Prime Minister Patterson made the point that "it is in the interest of the U.S. to
pay close attention to the effects of NAFTA, because of the need for continuing and
consistent economic and social stability in the region."29 One of the ways the leaders in
the region think the situation could be helped is through the granting of a NAFTA parity-
like arrangement, an issue that will be discussed in detail later.
Although there has not been total agreement with this viewpoint concerning the
28 UNECLAC, "The Caribbean and the North American Free Trade Agreement," Caribbean
Development and Cooperation Committee (December 1992): 4.
29 "The View from Washington," 23
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effects that NAFTA will have on the economies in the region, some important non-
CARICOM sources in the U.S. seem to support the view that there could be negative
consequences. Preliminary studies by the World Bank concluded that NAFTA will have
relatively minor effects on the Caribbean, but the sectors most likely to be affected
would be textiles and clothing. The Bank has predicted that "after the end of 10 years,
the annual loss could be in the region of $ 5 - 7 million (US) and that Jamaica could
bear the brunt or about 80% of the loss", which would be about US $ 4 - 6 million per
year.30
Nevertheless, in 1995 in a later report by the Bank, it was estimated that the total
losses of the Caribbean countries resulting from NAFTA were most likely to be between
US $35 million and $53 million; and economies to be affected would be the Dominican
Republic, Jamaica and Haiti, with up to 45 - 60% of their exports displaced by Mexico.31
In a later study, the Bank estimated that more than one third of the US $ 12.5 billion
worth of goods (1997 figures) exported to the U.S. annually from the Caribbean islands
could be replaced by Mexican imports if the existing trade rules remain intact.32
A report commissioned by the United States International Trade Commission
(USITC) on the potential effects of NAFTA on apparel investment in the Caribbean
30
Cited in Report on the North American Free Trade Agreement, xii.
31 "If You Can't Beat Them., [sic] The Threat to CARICOM from NAFTA, " Caribbean and
Central American Affairs, May 1995, 10.
32 Rohter, "Impact ofNAFTA Pounds Economies of the Caribbean."
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Basin countries, found that NAFTA "will improve the relative costs competitiveness of
Mexican producers compared with their counterparts in the Caribbean and Central
America", and that it will introduce incentives that will tend to favor shifts in apparel
investments from the Caribbean countries to Mexico.33 This issue will be further
examined in greater detail under "The Threat That NAFTA Poses to CARICOM" in a
later chapter.
Significance. Rationale and Purpose of the Study
This study will examine the impact of NAFTA on the textile/apparel industry in
Jamaica. This country has the largest apparel industry in the CARICOM group, and is
the one that benefited most from the CBI. Jamaica also wields a significant amount of
political and economic influence in the region as one of the largest economies in the
grouping. Additionally, there are relatively few studies conducted on the impact of
NAFTA on the textile/apparel industry in the Caribbean Basin. David Lewis observed
that in the early stages of NAFTA discussions, all analyses and references to NAFTA
have concentrated on its likely impact on the North American economies (U.S.A,
Canada, and Mexico). He found that "other than the Puerto Rican Resident
Commissioner Jaime Fuster's November 21, 1990 ... statement for the record to the
Subcommittee on Trade ... there have been no references to the impact of NAFTA on
" USITC Publication 2451. "Potential Effects of a North American Free Trade Agreement on
Apparel Investment in CBERA Countries" (Washington, D.C.: USITC, July 1992).
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the economies of the Caribbean Basin.""i4 Since his observation, there have been studies
and reports on the "potential" impact and effects of NAFTA on the CARICOM states.
However, in-depth studies of the effects on the textile and apparel industry in
CARICOM are somewhat limited. This sector within CARICOM benefited most from
the CBI, and is the one in which Jamaica had the largest and most significant level of
investment. Additionally, since Jamaica is one of the largest and most politically
influential members of the CARICOM group, it is appropriate to examine the impact of
NAFTA on that island's industry.
This study will attempt to determine the validity of the concerns, predictions, and
fears expressed by CARICOM leaders and others regarding the negative impact on
CARICOM economies, and investigate whether these predictions are materializing more
than five years after the signing of the Agreement. If this is indeed the situation, then a
valid case can be made in support of the recently passed CBTPA, that grants the CBI
countries' textile/apparel industry access equivalent to Mexico's. This focus on Jamaica
will help to provide an insight into how other countries could deal with a similar situation
within their industries.
The study can also provide an insight into what these small economies are likely
to confront if and when they are integrated into the larger Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), the proposed hemispheric trading bloc encompassing all the
countries in the Americas (excluding Cuba), by 2005. It will provide an understanding
'4 David E. Lewis, "The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Its Impact on the
Caribbean Basin Economies," Caribbean Studies 24, no. 3-4 (1991): 102.
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of how the economies can strategically position themselves to compete in an increasingly
globalized and liberalized world trade system, where preferential arrangements are
gradually being eliminated.
Premise of the Study
The implementation of NAFTA in 1994 is being credited by some segments of
Caribbean and U.S. policy makers and industry spokespersons as having had, and
continuing to have a negative impact on the textile/apparel industry in Jamaica. It has
been charged that the free trade agreement between Canada, Mexico and the U.S., has
decreased the rate of growth in the island's textile/apparel sector, one in which growth
was promoted and encouraged through the establishment of the CBI. This decrease in the
rate of growth is supposedly manifested through the decline in the industry's levels of
U.S. investment, foreign exchange, contribution of its earnings to the island's GDP
(Gross Domestic Product), exports, employment, and in the number of plants in operation
and that have been opened. Furthermore, the decline is also reported to be marked by an
increase in the number of textile/apparel plants relocating to Mexico from the island, and
in the number of plant closings.
The growth of the textile/apparel industry in Jamaica was a direct result of the
country's focus on an export-oriented trade strategy adopted in the 1970s, and stimulated
by the enactment of the preferential trade agreement between the U.S. and the countries
of the Caribbean Basin. An important aspect of this program was the intent to stimulate
the flow of U.S. foreign investment to the region, and to spawn the growth of export
oriented industries. However, with the implementation ofNAFTA, it has been predicted
16
that a reversal in the rate of growth of the sector will and has occurred. Six years after
NAFTA, this issue is being examined in the present study.
Hypotheses
• Free trade generates economic development
• Preferential trade is appropriate for small economies
• NAFTA is both free trade within a bloc and preferential trade against those countries
outside the bloc
• NAFTA has had a negative impact on the textile/apparel industry in Jamaica
Research Methodology
The study will essentially be an investigative exercise to find out whether the
effects that had been predicted by many Caribbean government officials, some U.S.
lawmakers and textile/apparel industry officials regarding the establishment of NAFTA
and its impact on CARICOM countries, are indeed occurring. It will begin by providing
an overview of the relationship between free trade and economic development with a
comprehensive review of the classical argument that free trade promotes economic
development. The discussion will focus on why the classical theory that justifies free
trade and a liberalized global trade system is pertinent to small economies, and in this
case, the CARICOM nations.
However, since the CARICOM countries' trade relations with developed
countries have been historically conducted under a system based on preferential
arrangements, the study will explore the rationale for this type of trade regime as a
necessary element for the development and survival of these countries within the context
17
of the classical theory. The discussion will therefore, examine NAFTA as an
arrangement that promotes free trade, while at the same time possessing some attributes
of a preferential agreement.
Finally, the study will conclude with an investigation of NAFTA's impact on the
CARICOM economies and in particular on the textile/apparel industry in Jamaica. The
analysis will examine the importance of trade for CARICOM economies, and the
preferential arrangements which govern trade between the U.S. and CARICOM, mainly
the General System of Preferences (GSP) and the CBI. (While some other preferential
arrangements that are important to the CARICOM states will be briefly mentioned, the
main thrust will be on the CBI). Since the CBI has been credited with contributing to
the growth of the manufacturing sector in CARICOM during the period leading up to
NAFTA, a detailed study of the CBI will be conducted to determine its contribution to
the development of the textile/apparel industry in Jamaica. The growth of the industry
will be tracked, beginning from the pre CBI period to the late 1990s, covering the years
from the early 1980s to 1999. Data from government sources (both U.S. and Jamaican
governments) will be collected on the following dependent variables/indicators, and will
be used to illustrate the growth (or decline) patterns in Jamaica's textile/apparel industry:
• level of U.S investment in the Jamaican textile/apparel industry
• foreign exchange earned from the textile/apparel industry
• contribution of earnings from the textile/apparel industry to Jamaica's GDP
• level of textile/apparel exports to the U.S
18
• number oftextile/apparel plant openings in Jamaica
• number of textile/apparel plants in operation in Jamaica
• number of textile/apparel plant closings in Jamaica
• percent of the population workforce employed in the textile/apparel industry over the
period considered.
These variables/indicators will be collected from data obtained from sources including
government agencies, national and international organizations such as:
• the United States Department of Trade and Commerce
• the United States International Trade Commission (USITC)
• the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
• Office of U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
• The U.S. Labor Department
• The U.S. State Department
• the Jamaican Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Technology
• Jampro (the Jamaican export promotion agency)
• The Statistical Institute of Jamaica
• The Planning Institute of Jamaica
• The Organization of American States
• The Inter-American Development Bank
• The World Bank
• NAFTA Secretariat
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• The CARICOM Secretariat
• The Textile and Apparel Institute in Jamaica
• The American Apparel Manufacturers Association
• The American Textile Manufacturers Institute
• The Jamaican Gleaner (newspaper).
An analysis of the variables/indicators would be conducted utilizing graphs and
tables to illustrate growth and development in the industry in the pre CBI period, the CBI
period up to the signing of NAFTA, and the post NAFTA period up to 1999. Growth
and development in the industry will be calculated by the percentage change (PC) in the
variables/indicators35 which will be displayed by year in a graphical and tabular format
for interpretation and analysis of the results. Both percentages and absolute numbers will
be utilized in the analysis of the variables.
The study will also take a brief look at the increase in U.S./Mexico trade and the
growth in the textile/apparel industry in Mexico in terms of exports and export earnings
during the same period examined for Jamaica.
The Time Frame
The period under examination for the study will span from 1980 to 199936. The
data collected will be analyzed based on 3 periods:
35 Percentage Change (PC) will be calculated as (V2 - V1)/V1 x 100, where V2 and VI are the
ending and beginning values respectively of the different variables.
36 Where figures for 1999 are unavailable, the latest documented figures will be presented.
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1) 1980 to 1984, which will be considered the pre-CBI period. This time frame will
provide an insight into the status of the industry prior to the implementation of the
CBI;
2) 1984 through 1994, which represents the post CBI period. This span will allow an
analysis of the industry as a result of the preferential agreement. It would show the
increase in the rate of growth of the textile/apparel sector,
3) 1994 through 1999, which will be the period in which the effects of NAFTA will be
examined. The changes in the dependent variables during this period will assist in
providing a possible answer to the question of whether NAFTA did indeed have a
negative impact on the island's textile/apparel industry.
The entire period from 1980 through 1994 will show the growth pattern or trend in the
industry which had occurred before and after the implementation ofNAFTA.
The results of the study will help to confirm or refute the claim that NAFTA has
had a negative impact on the textile/apparel industry in Jamaica. A negative impact will
be represented by either a negative PC or a decline in the pattern of growth exhibited by
the following indicators in the post NAFTA period as compared to the pre NAFTA years:
• level of U.S. investment in the textile/apparel industry
• foreign exchange earned from the textile/apparel industry
• contribution of textile/apparel industry earnings to Jamaica's GDP
• level of textile/apparel exports to the U.S.
• number of textile/apparel plant openings
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• number of textile/apparel plants in operation
• percent of population workforce employed in the textile/apparel industry
In addition, a positive PC or an increasing growth trend in the post NAFTA period in the
number of textile/apparel plant closings, would be interpreted as a negative impact on the
industry:
However, if the results indicate that these trends or pattern of increase/decline
began prior to the implementation of NAFTA, then the study will conclude that NAFTA,
while it could have played a role, cannot solely be held responsible for the decline
currently being experienced in the industry in Jamaica. If the analysis shows the former
- that the decline in the industry coincided with the implementation of NAFTA and thus
was most likely as a result of the FTA, ceteris paribus - then the claims that CARICOM
leaders and others have made will appear to be credible ones. Such results provide the
basis for these advocates to validate the need for the enhanced CBI trade package -
one that allows the CBI beneficiaries to utilize the arrangement to increase their
competitiveness in the world market, while maintaining the arrangement until such time
that they can diversify their economic bases, and develop alternative strategies that will
allow them to compete more effectively with more developed economies.
Such results will also add legitimacy to the concerns of the CARICOM leaders
and others who predicted that the socioeconomic and political fallout on the economies of
the subregion could be disastrous for the nations in terms of rising unemployment,
reduced social services, increase in the level of emigration from the region to the more
prosperous North American states, increased crime, growth of the narcotrafficking
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industry, a decrease in the demand for U.S. exports, and an overall increase in economic
and social hardship for the islands. This situation could also lead to political instability
in the region if an enhanced trade arrangement was not implemented.
Limitations and Explanations
As is the case with many developing countries, complete sets of data and
information were not be readily available or accessible for all of the dependent variables
being examined. An effort was made, however, to obtain all necessary data from various
sources.
The analysis of the effects of NAFTA on the textile/apparel industry in Jamaica
was somewhat complicated by the issue of how to separate causality from association,
and how to eliminate the effects of multiple influences on the industry. However, in
regards to assessing the impact, it was possible to employ different alternative approaches
to analyzing the issue, two of the most frequently used for this type of study being the
"before-after" approach, and the "with-without" approach.37
The "before-after" approach will be the one utilized in this study because it will
better facilitate the analysis and comparison of the industry's performance before and
after the implementation of NAFTA. While it is a simple instrument to apply, its major
limitation is that it will attribute all observed changes after NAFTA to the
implementation ofNAFTA, and can therefore bias the results. In order to minimize the
37 These are two approaches identified, described and utilized in a study of the impact of structural
adjustment, described by C. Kirkpatrick in "Does Trade Assist Third-World Industrial Development?
Experience and Lessons of the 1980s." International Review ofApplied Economics 9, no. 1 (1995): 28.
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risk of this occurring, the study will assume ceteris paribus conditionalities. In addition,
due to the nature and number of the indicators employed, the impact of the limitation
inherent in this approach is lessened. Additionally, any external circumstances that can be
identified during the period under investigation that may impact or bias the results will be
addressed during the analysis.
The "with-without" approach is less suitable for this study since the method will
compare the performance of industries affected by NAFTA with one that may not appear
to be. The problem here is that in the case of the industry that may not be affected by
NAFTA, other outside forces or programs may influence the performance of that
industry.
Outline of Chapters
The first chapter includes the introduction and an overview of current global
economic developments and the challenges that face the CARICOM economies,
particularly in the area of trade. Chapter 2 provides the conceptual framework and
discusses the classical free trade model and the contribution of free trade to economic
growth and development. The literature also deals with the importance of trade to small
economies such as the CARICOM states. Chapter 3 gives a historical perspective of the
CARICOM economies, and the socioeconomic and political challenges they face in light
of the global economic changes occurring in the last two decades. Chapter 4 looks at the
major preferential trade arrangements which govern CARICOM trade, and discusses the
various ones that CARICOM countries have enjoyed for the last two decades. A detailed
discussion of the CBI is provided in this section. Chapter 5 goes into much detail on
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NAFTA, and the challenge it poses for the CARICOM states in reference to the
textile/apparel industry and the erosion of preferential benefits to CARICOM. An
analysis of NAFTA as a preferential arrangement within a bloc, and as a free trade
arrangement outside the bloc is provided. In Chapter 6, the Jamaican economy is
reviewed in detail, especially the development of the manufacturing sector, including the
textile/apparel industry. Chapter 7 analyzes the data collected about the industry in
Jamaica, and how it is being affected by NAFTA. It summarizes the findings and
comments on recent developments that have occurred that are germane to the study.
Chapter 8 , the conclusion, provides possible alternative strategies for development that
CARICOM economies can pursue in the changing international trade environment.
CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The Classical Free Trade Model: Free Trade Generates Economic Growth and
Development
The importance of trade as an instrument for economic growth and development
has long been espoused by both classical and neoclassical theorists. The earliest model
of international trade is based on the principle of comparative advantage developed in the
early 18th century by a group of English economists, the most renowned being David
Ricardo, whose name is frequently associated with the theory. Comparative advantage
has been the foundation of the theoretical rationale for the development of international
trade structures, as well as how trade should be determined.1 According to the theory of
comparative advantage, world trade is increased and countries gain when they specialize
in products in which they have greatest the relative efficiency, and export them in return
for goods in which their relative advantage is least.2 This case for increased international
specialization and trade based on the principle of comparative advantage relied on a
simple static model involving basically two countries, two commodities, one or more
1 Irma Tirado de Alonso, "The Structure of Caribbean Trade: A General Overview, " Promoting
Investment and Exports in the Caribbean Basin: Papers and Proceedings, ed. George P. Montalvan
(Washington, D.C.: OAS, 1989), 143.
2 Peter H. Lindert, International Economics (Boston: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1991), 41.
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factors of production, constant returns to scale, full employment, and perfect
competition.3
In the early part of the 20th century, Swedish economists Eli Hecksher and Bertil
Ohlin, further elaborated on the Ricardo version of trade theory and comparative
advantage. Their model reiterated that it was possible for all countries to gain by
engaging in free trade. As each nation specializes in production according to its
comparative advantage, each can "enlarge its consumption capacity without technical
change or an increase in resources".4 This theory played an important role in third
world countries' focus on production of primary products for export, while serving the
political interests of "colonizing nations searching for raw materials to feed their
industrial expansion and for market outlets for their manufactured goods."3
The classical theory suggests that free trade promotes competition, allocates
resources in a more efficient and effective manner, and stimulates economies of scale in
areas where the less developed countries have a comparative advantage. All these
factors will combine to result in increased productivity.6 Consequently, there will be a
3 Bruce Herrick and Charles Kindleberger, Economic Development (New York: McGraw Hill
Books Company, 1983), 412.
4 Charles P. Oman and Ganeshan Wignaraja, The Postwar Evolution ofDevelopment Thinking
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991 ), 69.
5 Michael Todaro. Economic Development (New York: Longman Press, 1994), 422.
6 Ibid., 506; C. Kirkpatrick, "Does Trade Liberalization Assist Third-World Industrial
Development? Experience and Lessons of the 1980s," International Review ofApplied Economics 9. no. 1
(1995): 25.
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lowering of production costs and subsequently prices, and the incentive to improve
quality will increase.
Classical theorists thus emphasize the importance of free trade involving an open
and outward-looking international trade policy as a requirement for non-industrialized
countries to achieve growth and development.8 The earlier proponents of this trade
policy usually emphasized the static benefits that could be derived from engaging in such
a strategy. Some of the earlier proponents of free trade such as economists Adam Smith,
David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, and John Stuart Mill have been credited with
contributing to laying the foundation for what is now considered the most acceptable and
popular trade theory of modern growth and development. Adam Smith wrote about the
static gains from trade as being a source of profits which could facilitate capital
accumulation and growth. According to Smith, trade stimulates productivity which leads
to economic growth by widening the market, permitting greater division of labor and a
higher level of domestic productivity.9 John Stuart Mill's contribution to the body of
literature centers around the way in which trade allows for a more efficient use of world
resources:
... A country which produces for a larger market than its own , can introduce a
more extended division of labour, can make greater use of machinery, and is
more likely to make inventions and improvements in the process of production
7 Todaro, Economic Development, 506.
8 Ibid., 425.
9 John Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich and Poor Nations (New York: McGraw




However, criticism of this model had been recorded in recent years in that it is viewed as
having focused primarily on the static gains, that it "presents only a timeless 'cross-
section' view of comparative costs and fails to take into account dynamic elements.""
As the body of work on trade continued to expand, economists began to espouse
other benefits that result from a free trade policy - these they referred to as dynamic
benefits. As a result, trade has been promoted as an agent for growth and development
through both the static and dynamic benefits that accrue to an economy, in particular to
those of the small non-industrialized nations with which this study is concerned.
With the emergence of the neoclassical school, the benefits of trade have
expanded beyond static gains which the classical model promotes, to include the dynamic
benefits which are considered to be significant, particularly as they relate to the small
non-industrialized economies. In recent years, it is dynamic gains on which the focus is
placed as far as the issue of trade benefits are concerned. In the neoclassical model,
exports are considered as the key stimulus to
greater capacity utilization, greater horizontal specialization, increased
familiarity with and absorption of new technologies, greater learning by doing
as a result of expanded output levels, and the stimulation effect of having to
achieve international price and quality levels
It has been suggested that since trade increases the national incomes of all
participants, it allows a higher level of savings, capital formation, and income growth
" Gottfried Haberler, "International Trade and Development," in Economic Trade and
Development, ed. James D. Therberge (New York: John Wiley & Sons. Inc., 1968), 104.
12 Kirkpatrick, "Does Trade Liberalization," 26-27.
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than would not be possible without trade. 13 Proponents of free trade cite a number of
dynamic benefits and advantages of the free trade model. Trade facilitates the transfer
and provision of essential capital goods, raw and semifinished materials required for
increasing output; it stimulates competition and thus increased productivity; and it
attracts capital through international investment. In addition, it helps to overcome the
disadvantage of small domestic markets.1
Trade also plays an important role in the dissemination of technological
knowledge , the transmission of ideas , "the importation of know-how, skills, managerial
talents and entrepreneurship."15 Proponents also consider trade as "the best
antimonopoly policy" guaranteeing the maintenance of a healthy degree of free
competition, and limiting the activities of inefficient monopolies.1
International trade is considered to play a more important role in small countries'
economies than in larger ones. This is due to the fact that exports constitute a small
proportion of outputs in most industries in large economies while the opposite is true for
small ones:
. countries which are small in population and national output do not have the
range of industries to provide the services of engineering and design which aid the
development of internationally marketable commodities
13Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, 109.
14 Ibid., 123.
15 Haberler, "International Trade and Development," 109.
16 Ibid., 110.
17 Yosra A. Amara, "Externally Traded Services and the Development of Small Economies,"
External Linkages and Growth in Small Economies, ed. David L. McKee (Westport, CT.: Praeger
Publishers, 1994), 8.
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In most small underdeveloped economies, a large percentage of income is spent on
imports, with even a larger portion of their output being exported. This occurs to a
larger extent with developing than with developed countries.18
Trade as a Catalyst for Development in Small Non-Industrialized Economies
According to the classical theory of trade and development, developing countries
are considered to have a competitive advantage in primary products. The model further
suggests that these less industrialized nations can develop by concentrating on producing
"labor intensive goods and land intensive primary products", and exchanging them for
more capital intensive imports from the more developed economies.19 As a result of the
gains that could be achieved, trade could stimulate economic development in these
countries by enabling the import and export sectors "to furnish vital inputs to
development, provide revenues to eliminate the debt problem, and ultimately promise a
better standard of living."20 In developing countries which suffer from lack of foreign
capital and technical expertise, trade is therefore seen to play an important role in
attracting these invaluable resources to the countries. Another important benefit
associated with free trade to developing countries is the generation of much needed
foreign exchange which these nations need for socioeconomic development programs
within their societies.
18 Haberler, "International Trade and Development, " 104.
19 Oman and Wignaraja, The Post War Evolution, 70.
20 Devanand Ramnarine, "The Philosophy of Development Prospects for the CBI," Imperial
Power and Regional Trade: The Caribbean Basin Initiative, eds. Abigail A. Bakan, David Cox and Colin
Leys (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993), 84.
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The case for export led growth in developing nations appears to be somewhat
convincing. Access to the rich countries' markets enables small, non-industrialized
economies to overcome the handicaps of a limited home market which is constrained by
inefficient purchasing power.21 Trade allows these nations to access the mix of capital,
technology and know-how of transnational corporations, and the earnings gained from
exports constitute a source of much needed foreign exchange used for financing
development.22
From an historic perspective, trade appeared to have acted as an engine of growth
in the 19th century for the present industrialized countries.23 It can therefore be
understood why some developing countries in the immediate post World War II period
embarked on their aggressive path to achieve socioeconomic development, utilizing the
principles of comparative advantage and free and open trade as their road map. For some
time during the 1950s and 1960s, many Third World countries began posting impressive
growth rates, thereby adding credence to the classical and neoclassical trade theories.
However, as these countries began facing declining growth rates a few years later, and as
social conditions in many of these nations showed no signs of improvement (in some
cases, they declined), the euphoria about free trade and its contribution to development
began to dissipate in some regions of the Third World.
21 Wolfgang Hager, "North-South Trade and Socioeconomic Autonomy: A Peace Formula,"
International Trade and Third World Development, ed. Pradip K. Ghosh (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1984), 81.
22 Ibid.
23 Herrick and Kindleberger, Economic Development, 411 - 412.
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The principle of comparative advantage began coming under increasing scrutiny
and skepticism from different quarters, particularly from theorists from the developing
countries. These theorists began to uncover several shortcomings in the classical model
as it related to small developing economies, most of which had been tied in a colonial
relationship with the industrialized nations for many years. Questions were being asked
as to why trade had not transmitted the type of growth patterns in the Third World as it
had been credited with in the industrialized nations.
Among the shortcomings in the model that these detractors established were:
short term instability, long run costs, and the irrelevance of the two-country,
two-factor, two-commodity model in a real world of international factor movements,
capital accumulation, changing technology, and intermediate goods ....
Another criticism that was directed towards comparative advantage was that factor
endowments are not fixed :
physical capital, human resources, and even natural resources change with time
and with technological advance...
Bruce Herrick and Charles Kindleberger offer some further explanations as to
why the static model of comparative advantage is limiting:
While land and natural resources may remain relatively unchanged in the short
and intermediate run, capital stock and labor force grow at steady and usually
disparate rates ... thus at any given time, a country may lose its comparative
advantage in a product as time passes...
24 Ibid., 414.
25 Pincus, Trade, A id and Development, 126.
26 Herrick and Kindleberger, Economic Development, 413.
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These two authors further posit that comparative advantage can be changed by
international movements of capital and labor:
... since diffusion of technology occurs only slowly, trade may be explained at
any given time not solely by differences in factor proportions but by differences
in technology as well .. .technological change may undermine a country's basis
for specialization . . .27
Raul Prebisch, an economist with the United Nations Commission for Latin
America (UNCLA) in the 1950s, became an eminent detractor of the classical model of
trade. Along with others challengers such as Gunnar Myrdal, he proposed several
reasons why the classical model of trade was not working for these small developing
nations. Myrdal also questioned the classical model concerning trade as an agent for
development, and suggested that there were systematic forces at work in the developed
world that tend to diminish the benefits of trade to the small underdeveloped nations.
These economies are profoundly different from the industrialized countries in various
ways, including socially, politically and culturally.
It was suggested that the failure of free trade in boosting sustained economic
growth in the underdeveloped economies was partly as a result of societal circumstances,
(for example land tenure, and credit systems), that together maintained the prevailing
economic pattern and were resistant to change.29 Myrdal also elaborated on the fact that
27 Ibid., 421.
28 Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, 126.
29 Ibid., 123.
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the growth in free trade had not narrowed the income gap between industrial countries
and the underdeveloped nations, but that this trade tended to widen the gap:
... if left unregulated, international trade and capital movement would thus often
be the media through which the economic progress in the advanced countries would
have backsetting effects in the underdeveloped world ...30
Myrdal arguments against trade as an agent for long-term growth were based on "low
price and income elasticities of demand for primary exports".'! The small economies'
dependence on primary commodities for exports was seen to have several drawbacks
such as the instability of returns from exports and the difficulty to adapt quickly to
changing events.32
One of the most forceful arguments that was used to explain the failure of the
classical model in promoting sustained growth levels in the underdeveloped economies,
particularly those in the Latin American and Caribbean region, was the terms-of-trade
theory most closely associated with Raul Prebisch. He offered that the problem the
developing countries faced when trading their primary products for manufactured goods
from industrial countries was structural.33 He explained that the Third World economies
were being hurt by the downward tendency in the prices of primary products34; and that
30 Ibid., 126.
31 Ibid., 127.
32 Amara, "Externally Traded Services," 8.
33 H.W. Singer, "Terms of Trade and Economic Development," Economic Development,
eds. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman (New York: W.W. Nonon, 1989), 323.
34 Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development ofLatin America and Its Principal Problems
(N.Y.: UNECLAC, 1950).
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the underlying economic argument that facilitated the downward trend in the terms of
trade for developing countries involved the "differing elasticities of demand for primary
commodities and manufactured goods",35 and the failure of the underdeveloped
economies to benefit from technological progress.36
Another problem with the trading relationship between the developed and the
underdeveloped economies that was cited was the fact that the underdeveloped countries'
exports were priced competitively while the developed countries enjoyed monopolistic
markets.37 Prebisch went on to predict that the demand for primary commodities was
likely to experience less of an increase than the demand for manufactured goods, due
partly to the lower income elasticity of demand for the primary agricultural products, and
to the technological advancement of the industrial countries exporting the
manufactures.
By the late 1960s, most developing countries facing declining socioeconomic
conditions became disillusioned with the free trade model and reliance on their
comparative advantage in producing and trading primary exports. They began to look at
alternate models of development and the challenge for them was to come up with a
model that took into consideration their unique circumstances. They were faced with
basically three options:
35 Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, 129.
36 Ibid.
"Ibid.
38 Singer, "Terms of Trade and Economic Development," 326.
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1) relying on primary product exports, 2) developing manufacturing industries that would
produce for protected home markets (import substitution industrialization - ISI), and 3)
developing manufacturing industries producing for export to the industrialized countries
(export oriented policies.)39
Many developing countries came to believe that continuing to specialize in the
production ofprimary commodities, while it may
maximize welfare in the short run, would relegate them to a subordinate position
vis-a-vis developed nations, and keep them from reaping the dynamic benefits of
industry, and therefore maximize their welfare and growth in the long run.40
The countries wanted to access some of the dynamic benefits from embarking on
industrial production which included a more trained labor force, more innovations, higher
and more stable prices for the nations1 exports, and higher income and employment for
the citizens.41 They therefore made a deliberate effort to industrialize rather than
continue to specialize in the production of primary commodities - food, raw materials,
and minerals - for export, as was prescribed by the traditional free trade model.42
The ISI option thus gained popularity and was embraced by many developing
countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean as an alternative to the export of
primary products.
39 Lindert, International Economics, 255.
40 Dominick Salvatore, "International Trade Policies, Industrialization and Economic
Development," International Trade in the 2&h Century, ed. K. Fatemi (Tarrytown, N.Y.: Elsevier
Science Inc., 1997), 249.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
The ISI Model Adopted bv Developing Countries in the Late 1960s as a Model for
Development
Prebisch had advocated a model of development based on ISI, where developing
countries would initially substitute domestic production for previously imported
consumer goods.43 In this first stage of ISI, the countries concentrated on simple, labor-
intensive consumer goods, such as clothing, shoes, radios, bicycles, and other household
goods.44 The second stage of this development model was designed so that domestic
product would replace a wider range of more advanced manufactured items. Therefore,
imports of intermediate goods such as steel and petrochemicals, as well as producer and
consumer durables which are capital intensive and require large economies of scale, were
substituted by domestic production. These goods however, do not create employment.
Replacing imports of these products with domestic production also required much higher
protection and generally led to much greater inefficiencies.45 An integral part of this
inward looking strategy that was aimed at developing a modern industrial sector, was the
protection of the new infant industries through high tariffs and quotas, government
planning and other direct incentives which, when combined, had a very strong anti-export
bias effect.46
43 Oman and Wignaraja, The Post War Evolution , 77.
44 Salvatore, "International Trade Policies," 250.
45 Ibid.
46 Oman and Wignaraja, The Post War Evolution, 11.
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ISI strategy had both political and economic appeals for developing countries. It
was felt that producing domestic goods to replace imports could reduce the balance of
payments, and also lead to industrialization. Politicians were also able to utilize the
process of granting licenses to trade in certain imports to reward political allies and
punish foes.47 Another political appeal was based on the nationalistic political
environment at the time, particularly throughout the countries of Latin America.
As advocates of the free trade model attacked this newly embraced strategy by
many developing countries, ISI proponents countered that the leading industrial countries
at one time also utilized a form of this model during a phase of their industrialization
process, citing as examples the cases of the United States and Japan. They pointed out
that the U.S. practiced ISI from the Civil War until the end of World War II, after which
time most American firms no longer needed protection against imports.48 In the case of
Japan, the country embarked on its path to becoming the world leader in steel,
automobiles and electronics beginning in the 1950s, by employing heavy government
49
protection against imports.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the verdict on ISI was beginning to be
recorded throughout the world. The ISI strategy, promising much, seemed to be an
overall failure. Various reasons were advanced for the less than sterling performance of
the program. It was argued that that ISI industries became overly secure as a result of
47 Herrick and Kindleberger, Economic Development, 423.
48 Lindert, International Economics, 269.
49 Ibid.
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the protective tariff walls and immune from competitive pressures, enabling them to
remain inefficient in both cost and production.50
Inefficient domestic industries were spawned resulting in high prices for the
domestic consumers. Many infant industries were afforded unusually high levels of
protection which caused them to become overly capital intensive with relatively little
labor absorption.51 In these countries where there is an abundance of labor, this situation
served to aggravate the problem of unemployment. In many countries, overurbanization
became a serious problem as thousands of agricultural and rural workers migrated to the
cities in search of jobs in these newly emerging industries. However, since these
factories were geared to be more capital than labor intensive, mass unemployment in the
cities resulted, often giving rise to deteriorating living and health conditions and in some
cases, escalating into explosive social situations.
The efforts to industrialize through ISI also led in many cases to the neglect of
agriculture and other primary sectors, resulting in the decline of earnings from traditional
exports. Various developing countries, for example Brazil, which embarked on a very
aggressive ISI policy, were forced to begin importing food products which they had
previously exported.52
50 Todaro, Economic Development, 494.
51 Salvatore, "International Trade Policies," 250.
52 Ibid., 251.
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Another problem associated with the ISI policy was the overvaluation of domestic
currency. This only served to encourage imports while discouraging exports, and often
resulted in a chronic shortage of foreign exchange aggravating the balance of payment
problems. To address the lack of foreign exchange resources, governments turned to a
policy of rationing which not only favored the importation of machinery and other
required inputs such as fuel, food and other raw materials, but also led to black markets,
corruption and greater efficiencies.53
It was further argued that one of the main reasons why the ISI strategy failed was
due to the fact that the main beneficiaries of the process were the foreign firms that were
able to circumvent the tariff walls and take advantage of liberal tax and investment
incentives.54 Part of the ISI strategy involved the governments subsidizing the
importation of capital goods and intermediate products by foreign and domestic
companies.55
Developing countries that focused on import substitution, for example many in
Latin America and Africa, were seen to have fared worse than those which followed an
export oriented policy, as the ones in Asia. By the mid 1980s, the inward looking
strategy of import substitution was being blamed for creating dual economies, negatively
impacting the agricultural sector, worsening the balance of payments deficits, and
53 Ibid.




causing rapid urban growth with accompanying political instability in many countries.57
Neoclassical theorists indicated that ISI had interfered with the natural process of
economic development based on comparative advantage.58 The disenchantment with the
ISI strategy and the failure of the Soviet system as an alternative model, led to the
resurgence of the neo-classical approach as the dominant school of development
beginning from the 1980s onwards,59 with an emphasis on export promotion as the
strategy to development.
Export Promotion; Another Option to Promote Third World Development
The export led strategy adopted by most of the developing countries that began
abandoning the failed ISI model, focused on new exports of manufactured goods to the
industrialized countries.60 Advocates of export promotion of both primary and
manufactured goods, espouse the benefits of this policy by citing the efficiency and the
growth benefits of a free trade policy and its resulting competitive tendencies. They also
emphasize the importance of and gains from substituting large world market for small
domestic ones.61 "The distorting price and cost effects of protection, and the tremendous
success of the East-Asian export-oriented economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore
57 Abigail B. Bakan, David Cox, and Colin Leys, eds., Imperial Power and Regional Trade: The
Caribbean Basin Initiative (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993), 84.
58 Oman and Wignaraja, The Post War Evolution, 67.
"Ibid.
60 Lindert, International Economics, 272.
61 Todaro, Economic Development, 485.
42
and Hong Kong" (which to a large extent outperformed the followers of the ISI model)
were also evidenced as reasons why this strategy was highly recommended.62
This newly adopted strategy involved replacing quantitative restrictions with
tariffs, reducing and simplifying import tariffs and import taxation, reducing
impediments to exports, as well as eliminating or reducing currency over-valuation.63
These measures were geared to stimulate economies of scale, and serve as a catalyst for
the flow of investment and advanced technology from abroad.64 This shift to export led
promotion was part of the trade reform process that neoclassical theorists urged
developing countries to adopt and stick with following their experimentation with ISI. In
the neoclassical analysis, protection of industries has a minimal role as an instrument for
promoting economic development. The view is that import competition "disciplines"
domestic producers, forcing them to improve their efficiency performance, and "results in
the contraction of inefficient sectors and the expansion ofnew efficient ones."65
The lowering of tariff barriers would also serve to shift incentives in production
towards tradables and exports and in the process lead to an improvement in the way
resources are allocated.66 P.M. Romer explains this strategy for development in his
Endogenous Growth Theory which calls for trade liberalization rather than trade
62 Ibid.
63 Salvatore, "International Trade Policies," 252.
64 Ibid.




restrictions.67 The Endogenous Growth Theory explains the relationship between
international trade and long-run economic growth and development by advancing that
lowering trade barriers will speed up the rate of economic growth and development in the
long run.68 The theory further asserts that developing countries will be able to absorb
technology developed in advanced nations at a faster rate than if they had a lower degree
of openness, and the benefits that could be received from research and development
would be greatly increased.69
It has been acknowledged by traditional trade theory that the late-comers and
successors in the process of development and industrialization will have the advantage in
that they can learn from the experiences, successes as well failures, and mistakes of the
more industrialized nations. They believe that today's non-industrialized nations have a
constantly growing store of technological know-how that they can benefit from.70
Romer explains that this type of trade system will generate larger economies of
scale in production, and will reduce price distortions which will result in a more efficient
use of domestic resources across sectors.71 Other benefits from the process include a
greater specialization and more efficiency in the production and use of intermediate
67 P. M. Romer, "New Goods, Old Theory, and the Welfare Costs of Trade Restrictions," Journal
ofDevelopment Economics 43, no.l (February, 1994).
68 Salvatore, "International Trade Policies," 255.
69 Ibid.
70 Haberler, "International Trade and Development," 109 - 110.
71 Salvatore, "International Trade Policies," 255.
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inputs, which will subsequently result in a more rapid introduction of new goods and
services.72
Export led promotion policies and strategies have thus been increasingly adopted
as the model to be followed by developing countries. However, the course has not been
without roadblocks for the small exporting countries. Industrial nations have not fully
accommodated the efforts of developing countries with smaller economies to raise their
exports. The larger economies have used non-tariff barriers on a greater percentage of
goods coming from developing countries than on those coming from other industrial
nations.73 It is also worthwhile to note that the highest tariff rates which are applied, are
on products in which the developing countries enjoy the most comparative advantage as
are the cases with textiles, apparel and footwear.74
These type of practices contributed to the developing countries' campaign for a
"new international economic order" (NIEO), an effort which formally began at the June
1974 General Assembly of the United Nations. The NIEO encompassed a number of
issues including international agreements to raise and stabilize primary product prices,
greater ease in technology transfer, and easier access to the markets of the larger
economies for manufactured goods from the smaller nations.75 Another important
initiative that was taken by the smaller developing countries was the call for the
72 Ibid.




preferential arrangements, which these nations had established bilaterally with their
industrialized trading partners, to become a formalized part of the global international
trading system, as those that had been recognized in GATT.
Preferential Arrangements or Special and Differential Treatment: Is It Necessary
for Small Developing Economies?
Since the early 1960s when most of the former colonies began gaining their
independence from European nations, the issue concerning special and differential
treatment has been at the forefront of discussions concerning how foreign trade can be a
more effective instrument of development. The push by these developing countries for
preferences from the industrialized countries escalated at the first United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva in 1964, when a group of
developing countries stressed the need for more equitable treatment in international trade.
Developing countries advocated preferential treatment for exports of their products to
more advanced countries as a matter of justice and equity - that countries of unequal
levels of development cannot be treated in the same manner.
The idea of establishing a global framework of trade preferences and other trade
promoting measures to facilitate the expansion of trade among developing countries had
as its objective "promoting the development of national production and mutual trade".76 It
is felt that such arrangements will quicken industrialization by offering the Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) "the near equivalent of a protected infant industry market in
76 Nassau Adams, "Towards a Global System of Trade Preferences Among Developing
Countries," International Trade andThird World Development, ed. Pradip K. Ghosh (Westport, CT.:
Greenwood Press, 1984), 57.
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the North , as well as the possibility of economies of scale in production arising from the
size of the market."77 The LDCs considered the principle of nondiscrimination or most-
favored nation treatment in international trade as unfair and inequitable.
Special and differential arrangements, however, had been in existence for many
years dating back to the imperial preference system among countries such as those of the
former British Empire, the French Union, the Netherlands, Belgium and the U.S. and their
colonies or dependencies.78 These arrangements were part of the global trading system
that emerged in the latter part of the 1940s in an effort to design a new international
trading system after World War II.79 They were also incorporated into the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) with regard to Portugal, in the European Community with
respect to some Mediterranean countries. In the case of France, for example, as its
associated overseas territories or colonies began gaining political independence during the
early 1960s, their unique trading arrangements with France included these type of
arrangements and were formalized in the Yaounde Convention.
Thus preferential arrangements have been an important element of trade relations
not only between industrialized and poor countries, but also among developing countries
themselves, for example in various African integration schemes, and among members of
"Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, 198.
"ibid., 7.
79 OAS Trade Unit, "Small and Relative Less Developed Economies and Western Hemisphere
Integration" (n.p., April 1997): 24.




most integration groupings as in those throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
These two types of preferential systems - between industrialized and developing countries,
and among developing countries - encompass respectively preferences by industrialized
countries to developing economies on a non-reciprocal basis,82 customs unions and free
trade areas which offer duty free entry to members only.
By the 1960s, the call for preferences and special and differential treatment in trade
took on a new dimension. The newly independent countries began to assign to trade a
special role in the process of development for themselves. Preferential treatment as
promoted by the developing nations was presented as a means of assisting these countries
to "catch up" with the advanced nations by expanding their exports and thus increasing
earnings. The arrangements were also presented as a way of enabling them to establish
infant industries by giving the preferential access to larger markets so that economies of
scale could be achieved.83 The less developed countries sought nonreciprocity in trade
negotiations, and preferences for their manufactured, semimanufactured, processed and
semiprocessed goods.84
Through the advocacy of the developing nations, a system of trade preferences
and special and differential treatment was incorporated into the GATT under the General
81 OAS Trade Unit, "Special and Differential Treatment in International Trade," Submitted to the
FTAA Working Group on Smaller Economies (n.p., November 17, 1995): 2.
82 Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, 197.
83 Ibid.
84 Sidney Weintraub, NAFTA at Three: A Progress Report (Washington, D.C.: The Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 7.
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System of Preferences (GSP) and approved by consensus during the United Nations
Commission on Trade and Development II (UNCTAD) held in New Delhi in 1968. It
"constituted the most important application of differential treatment in international
trade."85 Until 1979, these arrangements were considered to be deviations from the most-
favored-nation norm, but with the adoption of the Enabling Clause during the Tokyo
Round of negotiations, a legal basis for preferential treatment was established within
GATT.86
The basic principles governing the GSP are that it is generalized, being applied by
all preference-giving countries to all developing countries; that it is non-discriminatory
with all developing countries being covered and treated equally under the schemes; and
that it is non-reciprocal, meaning that beneficiaries are not required to give corresponding
concessions in exchange for being granted GSP beneficiary status.87
The preferential arrangements between developed and developing countries are
mainly of two types: 1) those that provide special protection to the developing countries'
markets, and 2) those that give special access to the markets of the developed countries.
Non-reciprocity of tariff negotiations belong under the first category. The second group
encompasses the various schemes implemented by the advanced countries to provide
beneficiary developing nations with duty-free or preferential access to the former's
85 OAS, "Special and Differential Treatment in International Trade," 47.
86 OAS Trade Unit, "Small and Relatively Less Developed Economies and Western Hemisphere
Integration," 24.
*7 OAS, "Special and Differential Treatment in International Trade," 48.
49
markets. Examples of some of these arrangements are the GSP, the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI), CARIBCAN, and the Lome Conventions.88 The basic idea of these
schemes is that products from developing countries that are imported into an
industrialized nation will be subject to a tariff or quota rate by the importing country that
is less than the rate applied to products from countries other than beneficiary developing
nations.89
In recent years, there is a growing sentiment that preferential arrangements may
not have been totally beneficial to the countries they were intended to assist.90 It has been
suggested that the programs perpetuate undesirable policies and more importantly, foster
a high degree of non-competitiveness in some exports of developing countries depriving
them of the ability to compete on the open market with similar exports from other
developing and industrialized countries. Proponents who do not want to see the
dismantling of these arrangements continue to assert that they are the only way that
developing countries will obtain relatively free access to the world's major markets,
particularly since these poor nations have little bargaining power in reciprocal
negotiations.91 Another argument to retain the arrangement is based on the benefit that
88 OAS Trade Unit, "Small and Relatively Less Developed Economies and Western Hemisphere
Integration," 24.
89OAS, "Special and Differential Treatment in International Trade," 2.
'"'Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, 198.
" J. Michael Finger and L. Alan Winters, "What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries,"
The WTO as an International Organization, ed. Anne O. Krueger (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1998), 385.
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industrialized countries receive from the schemes. Since preferences are geared to boost
foreign exchange earnings by developing countries, they will subsequently lead to
increased imports from industrialized countries. '
The proponents also suggest that preferential arrangements serve to nurture export
consciousness in the developing nations which subsequently enable them to better utilize
existing resources and seek to attract foreign investment.93 Preferences from the North to
the South are also considered to be an alternative means of resource transfer or aid. As
stated by Pomfret:
... the income transfer involved in making price concessions to the South is small but
is more acceptable politically to donor and recipient than the equivalent foreign aid
subsidy...9
Although in recent years proponents have been mounting a serious case for the
continuance of these arrangements suggesting that any device to encourage export
promotion is desirable96, most of them are resigned to the possibility that the
arrangements have a slim chance of retaining the form in which they presently are carried
out, particularly in this era of trade liberalization. Advocates of trade liberalization point
to the undesirable features of preferential arrangements as the rationale for their
discontinuance, suggesting among other things that the arrangements, instead of
92 Weintraub, NAFTA at Three, 203.
93 Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, 217.
94 Weintraub, NAFTA at Three, 101.
95 Pincus. Trade, Aid and Development, 198.
96 Ibid.
51
improving North-South relations, would only serve to exacerbate them.97 They claim that
these special and differential treatment foster inefficient resource allocation in developing
Oft
countries and also discriminate against some LDCs. This is an ongoing debate in trade
negotiations between industrialized and developing countries.
In "What Can the WTO Do For Developing Countries," the authors offer several
reasons why these arrangements should be discontinued. They argue that preferences
transfer to developing countries the "production distortions inherent in developed
countries' tariff structures," that is they permit and even encourage producers to maintain
costs above those of the nonpreferred competitors." In addition, they attack the
prevailing GSP schemes as being so wrapped up with exclusions, quantitative limits and
rules of origin, that they have only limited coverage, while the excluded imports which
include products such as clothing, footwear and leather, are typically the most important
items from the point of view of development purposes. The programs viewed in this
way, thus have the effect of diverting resources away from these products.100
Another argument against preferential arrangements that is proffered is based on
the fact that many preferential schemes are unilateral and can therefore be withdrawn at
any time by the granting industrial country. This uncertainty, the authors claim,
encourages a level of "short-termism" on the part of entrepreneurs, whose decisions are
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Finger and Winters, "What Can the WTO Do," 385.
100 Ibid.
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likely to be based on the quick fix rather than on the long term, and therefore hinder both
business and governments from focusing on more long-term, productive activities.101
Preferential arrangements are also criticized on grounds of creating obstacles for
furthering trade liberalization.102 Finger and Winters argue that beneficiary countries in
trying to maintain preferences, are discouraged from investing in rounds of negotiated
trade liberalization and do not undertake effective efforts to be integrated into the world
economy. They criticize the programs for exacerbating the difficulties of pursuing
satisfactory policies in the developing countries and for these reasons, they insist that
preferential arrangements should be "phased out as soon as possible."103 Other reasons
given for ending this system of preferences include the belief that it creates a type of
economic dependence on northern concessions, that it is also an inferior way to grant aid,
and that it leads to an inequitable distribution of aid costs.104
Conclusion
Developing countries are increasingly coming to grips with the reality that the
protected markets they once had access to in industrial countries, may no longer be
available to them in this new century, nor would the foreign exchange that accrued to
them from the preferential arrangement which provided a safety net, be assured.
Preferential arrangements could provide a breathing room that would enable them to
101 Ibid.
102Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, 198.
103 Finger and Winters, "What Can the WTO Do," 390.
IO4Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development, 198.
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develop alternative strategies geared to developing their competitiveness in the open
market.
On the other hand, if developing countries choose to be overly complacent and
continue to rely on these arrangements as the backbone of their development strategies
without exploring new ways of conducting trade, then their future would be
unpromising. The evidence that has been provided so far is that the free trade model is
the one that is durable and that has proven to be credible for most developed countries.
Developing countries now moreso than in previous decades, seem to have very few other
options to exercise than to embrace the free trade model in their quest for attaining
economic development.
CHAPTER 3
THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM): TRADE PATTERNS AND MAJOR
CHALLENGES FOR THE TWENTY- FIRST CENTURY
Background
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) can be considered as a sub-region of the
Caribbean Basin and includes the islands of Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas,
Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St.Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, the South American mainland
territories of Guyana and Suriname, and the Central American nation of Belize. These
economies vary significantly in terms of economic size, levels of development, patterns
of trade, and the degree of trade dependence on their major trading partners, the United
States, The European Union and Canada. At the same time, their economies are to a
large extent highly undiversified, making them extremely vulnerable to external market
conditions. Because of their geographic size and location, they are also easily affected by
environmental disasters such as hurricanes and floods.
CARICOM countries, like the majority of developing nations, found themselves
in a state of economic decline in the 1980s, after periods of marked sustained growth in
the 1960s through the 1970s. During the 1960s the countries enjoyed increased
standards of living, and favorable market conditions for their main exports. During this
time, the world economy and the industrialized nations also experienced strong
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economic growth. With the onset of the 1970s, a combination of internal economic
management problems and a series of unfavorable external events in the world economy
affected the countries' export and import prices. These events culminated in a significant
slowdown in economic growth, particularly in countries such as Jamaica, after the mid
1970s.1 In addition to the reduced demand for, and the decline in the prices of export
commodities, the oil shocks of the late 70s and early 80s, and the inappropriate response
by governments in the region to these external developments, further accelerated and
exacerbated the economic slowdown.2 By the early 1980s, Caribbean governments
placed a high emphasis on agricultural diversification as one of the region's best hope for
achieving economic growth.3
The 1980s saw little improvement for these countries and in most cases, the
situation worsened. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at the end of the 1980s
was lower than it was in the late 1970s in some of these countries, and real per capita
income lower in 1988 than in 1980.4 The governments responded to the severe balance
1 Richard Bernal, "Influencing U.S. Policy Toward the Caribbean: A Post Cold War Strategy," The
Caribbean: New Dynamics in Trade and Political Economy, ed. Anthony T. Bryan (Miami: The
University of Miami North-South Center, 1995), 211.
2 Devanand J. Ramnarine, " The Philosophy and Developmental Prospects of the CBI," Imperial
Power and Regional Trade: The Caribbean Basin Initiative, eds. Abigail B. Bakan, David Cox, and Colin
Leys (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993), 82.
3 Kathy McAfee, Storm Signals: Structural Adjustment and Development Alternatives in the
Caribbean (Boston: South End Press, 1991), 23.
4 Ibid.
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of payments crises with stabilization measures which substantially reduced import
capacity, and which in turn led to a reduction in growth and export production.5
While fifteen Caribbean countries exported more commodities in 1986 than they
did in 1980, earnings increased in only five of them because of the drop in world market
prices for their exports.6 Prices for most Caribbean commodity exports continued to fall
during the years 1987 - 1990, contributing to a widening gap between the countries'
expenditures on imports and their earnings from exports.7
As inflation rates soared and real interest rates increased, the shortage of foreign
exchange worsened, and the countries were forced to depreciate their currencies. One
of the factors that contributed to the worsening situation was the servicing of the external
debt at the same time that private investment and aid flows were being reduced. The debt
to service ratio, which is the share of foreign exchange earnings from exports of goods
and services required for debt payment, continued to increase during this period and
stifled economic growth. The debt of the Caribbean region as a whole more than
doubled from approximately $6.1 billion in 1980 to $14.3 billion in 1988.8
By the early 1990s, the Caribbean economies were burdened with a combination
of sluggish growth, weak balances of payments, relatively high unemployment, and
underemployment. The governments embarked on a number of macroeconomic
5Bernal, "Influencing U.S. Policy, " 211.
6 McAfee, Storm Signals, 21.
7 Ibid.
"Bernal, "Influencing U.S. Policy, " 212.
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measures such as trade liberalization, investment promotion, debt reduction,
privatization and fiscal self reliance.9 In addition, they increased their efforts to
encourage nontraditional exports such as textiles and winter vegetables, and to expand
the regional tourist industry.10 These structural adjustment reforms and macroeconomic
policies carried out by the governments were not altogether willingly implemented, but in
most cases were necessitated by the global economic environment, including the
stipulation by international and financial institutions as a condition of their assistance."
Characteristics of CARICOM Economies
One characteristic feature of the CARICOM economies has been their traditional
dependence on a limited number of agricultural and industrial commodities, and their
heavy reliance on one or two metropolitan countries for their economic and financial
survival. Britain, which had been the main trading partner for most of the islands for
much of the twentieth century, began to lose ground to the United States in the aftermath
of World War II, particularly with the four larger economies of Trinidad and Tobago,
Jamaica, Barbados and Guyana. This shift in trading relations was accelerated during
the 1960s as large amounts of U.S. investments were channeled into certain sectors in the
region.12
9 Dennis Gayle, "The Evolving Caribbean Business Environment," The Caribbean: New
Dynamics in Trade and Political Economy, ed. Anthony T. Bryan (Miami: University of Miami North-
South Center, 1995), 139.
10 Ibid.
11 Bryan, "Coping with the New Dynamics," 246.
12 Ransford Palmer, "Caribbean Dependence on the United States Economy," The Repositioning
of US-Caribbean Relations in the New World Order, ed. Ransford Palmer (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers,
1997): 1.
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CARICOM countries have traditionalh exported agricultural and mineral
products to their industrialized trading partners, with these exports making up a
significant portion of foreign exchange earnings. The agricultural sector is still the most
economically important to the majority of the smaller islands, which depend on exports
such as bananas, cocoa, nutmeg, mace and winter vegetables for a significant part of
their foreign exchange earnings. In the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS). a subgroup of most of the smaller economies within CARICOM, bananas
which enjoy preferential arrangements in the European market, continue to be one of the
major foreign exchange earnings, particularly for Dominica and St. Lucia, and to a lesser
extent, Grenada and St. Vincent. Sugar, which had once been a major export from the
Caribbean, has continued to decline in overall output, employment, and profitability and
as a major source of foreign exchange earnings for the region. Although traditional
agricultural exports still account for a significant part of total U.S. imports from the
Caribbean, light manufactures are beginning to have an increasing share of U.S. imports
from the area and are the fastest growing sector for new investments.1
U.S. multinationals began investing heavily in the mineral industries in
CARICOM during the 1960s expanding the mineral output in the region and contributing
13 Elena M. Suarez, "The Caribbean in Economic Transition, " Choices and Change: Reflections
on the Caribbean, ed. Winston C. Dookeran (Washington. D.C.: lnteramerican Development Bank,
1996): 126.
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to the dramatic growth of Caribbean trade with the U.S. This helped to make the U.S.
the most important trading partner for the region, particularly for the larger economies of
Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica, which had substantial mineral industries. In Trinidad
and Tobago, petroleum and petroleum products account for about 60 to 70% of
exports.14
Another source of income, in some cases, the leading source, for CARICOM
countries is tourism. Since the 1980s, this sector has grown to a level of great
significance for both the smaller and larger economies accounting for 26% of the region's
GDP by 1993.15 By 1990, the industry generated and provided employment for over
400,000 people. In 1993, earnings from tourism amounted to $950 million for Jamaica,
which represented a 10% increase over 1992. In Antigua and Barbuda, the sector
accounted for over 70% of total receipts, and in the Bahamas and Barbados each for more
than 50% of receipts in the early 1990s.16 Many Caribbean countries consider the
development of the tourist industry as a viable alternative to some agricultural exports as
a means of generating foreign exchange.
The import substitution policy implemented by the Caribbean economies in the
1970s gave rise to a manufacturing sector. In their efforts to diversify also, many
CARICOM states began moving away from agriculturally based monocultures and
venturing into the export market for manufactured goods. The manufacturing sector in
14 Ramesh Ramsaran. "Challenges to Caribbean Economic Development in the 1990s," in The
Caribbean: New Dynamics in Trade and Political Economy, 15.
15Gayle, "The Evolving Caribbean," 139.
16 Ibid., 144.
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the CARICOM nations also received a boost from the countries' attempts to
increase the production of non-traditional exports, and to take advantage of preferential
trade regimes such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative.17
The Manufacturing Sector
The manufacturing sector in CARICOM is composed of two segments - one
producing for the local and regional market, and the other usually operating in "enclave-
type free zones intended for assembling component parts of goods," which are reexported
mainly to the U.S.18 This sector was developed as a result of the encouragement and
incentives provided to foreign investors to engage in production for both the local and
export markets.19 Many CARICOM countries such as Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad,
in an effort to attract foreign investment, established free trade zones (FTZs), also called
export processing zones (EPZs), that are not subject to the same taxes, tariffs and
regulations that apply to factories outside the zones.20 They are provided with tax
holidays of up to 20 years on profits, exemption from import licensing and duties on
goods imported for use within the zone and from taxes on stock dividends. They are also
allowed to repatriate profits of up to the amount of the original investment.
17 George P Montalvan, Promoting Investment and Exports in the Caribbean Basin: Papers and
Proceedings (Washington, DC: General Secretariat, OAS, 1989), 32.
18 Irma Tirado de Alonso, ed., T/ade Issues in the Caribbean (Philadelphia: Gordon and Breach
Science Publishers, 1992), 7.
19 Ibid.
20 McAfee, Storm Signals, 84.
2lGayle, "The Evolving Caribbean," 139.
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In addition, they are provided with factory shells and utilities at rates below their actual
costs.22
These EPZs have emerged on account of a dual need by both the developing
countries and manufacturers in the industrialized nations - by the former to increase their
earnings from exports and by the latter to reduce their costs of production.' Exports
from these zones receive preferential treatment not only in the local country where
production takes place, but also in the destination country, which is, in the majority of the
cases, the United States.24
With its crucial need for foreign exchange, its close proximity to the U.S., and its
cheaper labor costs than in the U.S., the Caribbean is considered as an ideal location for
the establishment of these EPZs.25 These factory enclaves which are highly labor
intensive and export oriented, are promoted in the Caribbean as a strategy to expand
employment. They are usually set up in urban areas and tend to hire primarily unskilled
and semi-skilled production workers. They have been a growing source of employment
particularly among young women between the ages of 16 - 25.26 In some countries as in
Barbados and Haiti, tax incentives, cash grants or other subsidies are offered to assembly
22 McAfee, Storm Signals, 84.
23 Tirado de Alonso, Trade Issues in the Caribbean, 9.
24 UNECLAC, Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee, "The Caribbean and the
Outcome of the Uruguay Round in the Context of NAFTA and FTAA," 16* Session of the CDCC (St.
John's. Antigua and Barbuda: n.p., 1996), 12.
25 Tirado de Alonzo, Trade Issues in the Caribbean, 9.
26 Ibid.
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operations that provide professional education and worker training programs to their
employees.27
Table 3.1 gives an indication of the significance of EPZs as a source of




















































Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, ILO Yearbook of Labor
Statistics 1989-1990 (Washington, D.C.: ILO, 1990).
In Barbados, assembly operations accounted for about 3,000 jobs and provided
over 20% of employment in the manufacturing sector in 1975. However, by 1986, the
number had more than doubled to 6,865 jobs which made up over 60% of employment in
manufacturing. By 1984, women made up 94% of the workforce in this sector.28 Export
assembly activities in Dominica reportedly employed 850 workers out of a total labor
27 Gregory K. Schoepfle and Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, "Export Oriented Assembly Operations in the
Caribbean," Trade Issues in the Caribbean, 141.
28 ILO, Yearbook ofLabor Statistics 1989 -1990, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of International
Labor Affairs (1989).
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force of about 35,000 to 40,000 in 1989;29 in St. Lucia, the figure was 2,780 workers
out of a total labor force of about 54.000;30 and in Belize, 1,060 workers out of a total
workforce of 58,000, the great majority ofwhom were women.3'
In addition to direct employment, these assembly operations have also been
credited with generating indirect employment from the purchase of local inputs and
through the multiplier effect from local expenditures by assembly workers. 32 A study
done by Dominican economists estimated that each direct job in assembly operations
generate 1.5 indirect jobs in the economy at large. As a result, EPZs in the Dominican
Republic in 1988, for example, generated 85,000 direct jobs and 127,500 indirect jobs for
a total of212,500 jobs.33
For a growing number of CARICOM countries, the manufacturing sector which
includes the EPZs is becoming the main source of foreign exchange earnings for their
economies^ During the 1983 - 1989 period, manufactured goods particularly assembled
products, accounted for an increasing share of these Caribbean nations' exports to the




32 Tirado de Alonzo, Trade Issues in the Caribbean, 9
"Ibid.
have either grown less rapidly or contracted,34 as is shown in the following table:
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TABLE 3.2
Leading Primary Product Exports and the Value of Assembled Product Exports from
Selected Caribbean Nations: 1983-1989 ($ Millions of U.S.I
Leading Year
Country Products 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Barbados Sugar 18.7 26.3 25.0 26.1 28.3 28.0 23.4
Assembled Products 43.3 44.0 24.4 10.2 8.7 7.9 6.2
Belize Sugar 34.2 32.5 22.9 31.5 27.0 35.0 n/a
Citrus 6.8 9.8 12.1 11.1 15.5 17.7 n/a
Assembled Products 1.7 4.1 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.8 3.6
Grenada Nutmeg 2.9 2.1 4.2 9.7 14.6 n/a n/a
Cocoa 6.0 4.2 5.0 4.2 4.0 n/a n/a
Bananas 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.7 4.1 n/a n/a
Assembled Products 0.0 0.0 .1 0.0 .3 1.3 1.5
Jamaica Alumina 337.1 333.0 208.1 210.8 199.8 243.1 436.9
Bauxite 113.7 149.9 84.8 97.5 114.3 105.4 1257
Sugar 58.2 43.6 45.4 43.7 61.6 78.4 63.3
Assembled Products 7.0 9.5 12.3 19.3 30.4 41.7 47.4
St. Kitts/
Nevis Sugar 10.0 11.6 8.8 11.8 n/a n/a n/a
Assembled Products 2.4 2.6 1.6 3.1 3.7 2.3 1.4
St. Lucia Bananas 18.6 23.8 30.2 55.5 n/a n/a n/a
Coconut Oil 2.1 2.4 1.2 .1 n/a n/a n/a
Assembled Products 1.1 1.2 2.4 2.4 3.1 4.0 3.6
St. Vincent/
Grenadines Bananas 11.0 11.9 16.9 19.4 n/a n/a n/a
Assembled Products 1.8 .9 1.8 .9 1.4 .9 i.i
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1990 (Washington, D.C: 1990)
34ILO, Yearbook ofLabor Statistics (1989- 1990).
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In some Caribbean countries, assembled product exports have displaced certain
traditional commodity exports as the major sources of foreign exchange. In Haiti,
St. Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, and Montserrat, assembled products accounted for 50%
or more of exports to the U.S. in 1987.35 Manufacturing currently makes up a significant
part of the economy in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and
Tobago. In fact, the main exporters of manufactured goods from CARICOM to both
extra regional markets and those within the CARICOM are from Barbados, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago. In 1975, manufacture's contribution to GDP was 16% for Jamaica,
over 7% for Trinidad and Tobago, 5% for Guyana, and about 11% for Barbados.36 By
the mid 1980s the economies of these countries accounted for approximately 94% of the
manufacturing GDP of the region.37
The principal manufacturing exports from the assembly plant operations in
CARICOM have been assembled electronic components, textiles and apparels. Since
1983, about 90% of all imports under the U.S. Code 807.00 from the Caribbean region,
have consisted of assembly apparel and electronic items.38 For countries such as
Jamaica, Belize, Grenada and St. Lucia, textiles and apparel are the principal component
35 Tirado de Alonzo, Trade Issues in the Caribbean, 9.
36 Palmer, "Caribbean Dependence," 1.
37 Kempe Ronald Hope, Economic Development in the Caribbean (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers,
1986), 40.
38 ILO, Yearbook ofLabor Statistics (1989 - 1990).
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of their manufactured exports.39 Apparel accounts for 71% of Miami's imports from the
Caribbean, with 90% of this apparel coming from the Dominican Republic and Jamaica.40
As certain non-assembly export oriented manufacturing activities such as food
and primary metals have declined in relative importance, exports of assembled apparel
have grown significantly.41 For the Caribbean Basin as a whole, which includes the
Central American nations, together with CARICOM nations, apparel and textile exports
rapidly expanded accounting for $2 billion of the region's total $6.2 billion in exports to
the U.S. in 1991.42 In 1994, textiles and apparel exports increased to 1.58 million square
meters equivalent, which represented a 16% rise in volume over that of 1993.43
According to the Textile and Apparel Institute, an industry lobby located in Jamaica,
earnings from exports in textile and apparel from the Caribbean Basin region during that
period expanded 13% to $4.53 billion.44 In 1994, the U.S. Department of Commerce
reported that U.S. imports of textiles from the Caribbean Basin in that year increased by
12.7% compared with the previous year to $4.6 billion.
The increase in the U.S. demand for clothing has had a significant positive impact
39 G.S.R. Associates, Report on the North American Free Trade Agreement: Study Preparedfor
the CARICOM Secretariat: Implicationsfor the CARICOM Regions and the Proposed Response (Port-of-
Spain, Trinidad:, n.d.), 49.
40Gayle, "The Evolving Caribbean," 137.
41 ILO, Yearbook ofLabor Statistics, 1989 - 1990 .
42Gayle, "The Evolving Caribbean," 146.
43 Interpress Service. "Caribbean Textiles: Export Earnings Fail to Keep Pace with Volume" (n.p.:
Global Information Network. March 1995).
44 Ibid.
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on the Caribbean in terms of export earnings. Between 1980 and 1986, U.S. imports
from the world and the Caribbean grew at 17% and 18% per annum respectively.45 By
1986, clothing accounted for over one third of the Caribbean's earnings from
manufactured exports.46 Most of the clothing imports from the Caribbean enter the U.S.
under its 807 program, which exempts U.S. inputs in the finished product from tariffs.
Not all Caribbean countries however, have benefited from the shift in production
from traditional agricultural products to manufacturing exports. Although the growth of
non-traditional exports in the manufacturing sector has been a great boost to earnings in
some countries, in others, losses in foreign exchange earnings from declining commodity
prices and reductions in U.S. sugar quotas have not been offset by these non-traditional
exports. The manufacturing sector, in particular the assembly type operations, have been
criticized for not creating more forward linkages, which are jobs associated with
domestic distribution of assembled products.48 The lack of linkages to other economic
sectors means that the zones have little or no effect in creating additional jobs outside the
export factories.49 The work force is usually made up of low skilled workers with little
45 The World Bank, "Caribbean Countries: Economic Situation, Regional Issues, and Capital
Flows," a World Bank Country Study (Washington, D.C.: 1988), 5.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
481LO, Yearbook ofLabor Statistics, 1989 - 1990.
49 McAfee, Storm Signals, 87.
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training. Most of the jobs created in the industry are also temporary, and the skills
learned by workers are typically not transferable to other productive activities.50
Other weaknesses identified by critics with the assembly type operations include
their non-permanent feature. These plants tend to be leased factory shells where second
hand machinery is utilized with most of the parts and components imported.51 These
features lend themselves to industries that are highly transient, with no deep investment
roots established in the host country, and are therefore, free to move wherever lower
production costs can be negotiated.52
These industries develop no deep commitment to the local economy. Countries
playing host to these type of operations are therefore exposed to the risks of the
companies withdrawing their investment at very short notice, and throwing the local
economy into disarray. Despite these criticisms, a USAID memorandum on Caribbean
development noted that "the countries that have benefited the most from the CBI are
those that have established Free Trade Zones."53
One of the handful of Caribbean Basin countries that has made great progress in
developing that sector is Honduras, which ranks 5th in worldwide assembly plant (also
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been very aggressive in pushing for the construction of industrial parks equipped with
advanced technology and modern infrastructure that are attractive to foreign investors. "
In addition, the Honduran authorities make deliberate efforts to keep bureaucracy in the
free zones down to a minimum.
Internal transportation in Honduras has been efficient, and the country maintains a
suitable Atlantic port, one of the best in the Caribbean/Central American region, Puerto
Cortes, which the rest of the countries in Central America use. Other Central American
countries find it easier to transport merchandise to Honduras for export. To the foreign
investor, it makes economic and business sense to establish factories in Honduras, or in
any other locale where the support from the local authorities and private sector exists, and
where the local government facilitates a hassle free environment for doing business.
Caribbean Trade Relations; Need to Attract Foreign Investment
The CARICOM governments share a number of common goals regarding the
development of their economies. It is generally recognized that among the most pressing
concerns are the needs to achieve sustained economic growth and development and to
create jobs for the region's growing young population. The economies are also constantly
seeking alternative ways to increase exports and foreign exchange while reducing net
capital outflows. Another major goal is to reduce their economic vulnerability through
economic diversification.
55 Ibid.
56 Montalvan, Promoting Investment and Exports, 94.
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One of the major efforts that has been put forth by CARICOM governments to
achieve these goals is the strategy to attract foreign investment to the region. The
earliest interest of foreign investors in the islands centered around the plantation and
mining sectors. This was followed by a major interest in tourism, then later the service
and manufacturing sectors.57
A recent trends in foreign investment in the Caribbean Basin is the increasing
growth and interest of Asian investors, particularly those from the Asian newly
industrializing countries (NICS) of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. These
investors are usually either with U.S. companies having Asian subsidiaries or
subcontractors used to supply the U.S. market and elsewhere; or Asian owned companies
producing for export to the U.S. This growing interest for investment in the Caribbean
Basin is spurred by the fact that both the U.S. and Asian countries are being faced with
increasing costs of production and political pressures that threaten their competitiveness
in, and (in the case of the Asian exporters) access to the U.S. market.59
In the Asian NICS, a combination of rising wages, loss of GSP status, and
stronger currencies have all increased the costs of production, particularly in the type of
labor-intensive assembly operations that are being established in the Caribbean Basin.60
Moreover, there has been a growing protectionist attitude in the U.S. toward the Asian
57 Ramesh Ramsaran, U.S. Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends and Issues
(N.Y.: St. Martin Press, Inc., 1985), 139.




NICS, and locating their operations in the Caribbean may be a tactic to circumvent
existing and potential trade barriers.61
Meanwhile, this trend is a good fit for the CARICOM growth strategy of
attracting foreign investment. Foreign investment is considered to be not only a "non-
debt-creating flow" for the region, but also a mechanism for gaining access to foreign
markets and new technology.62 CARICOM governments view foreign investment as a
way to create jobs and increase export earnings, and to help fill the "capital gap" with
which they are all faced.63
The CARICOM nations possess a number of attractive features that appeal to U.S.
investors as a good place to do business. In addition to its close proximity to the U.S.
market, the countries have reasonably priced labor and an educated and trainable
workforce who in the majority share with the U.S. a common language, English.64
However, this commonality of features can pose a challenge for the countries in that the
CARICOM states produce more or less the same commodities and seek to attract the
same foreign investors.65 This feature may serve to foster stiff competition among them,
to the disadvantage of the smaller, less developed members. This was one of the
problems that the CARICOM leadership tried to address in ensuring that all participating
61
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members share equitably in the benefits of being in an integration bloc. As in
groupings that consist of countries at different stages of development and infrastructural
modernization, there is a tendency in CAR1C0M for foreign investment to be attracted to
the more developed members of the group.66 Although they incorporated provisions to
prevent this from occurring. CARICOM states still found themselves competing with
one another by offering increasingly generous incentives to foreign investors - incentives
which proved to be self defeating in that they encouraged the use of capital intensive
techniques which lessened the number ofjobs that could have been created.67
In spite of the fact that CARJCOM states offer many incentives to attract foreign
investment, there still remains a plethora of obstacles to increasing and expanding
production in the region. A series of surveys conducted by the U.S. Department of
Commerce in the late 1980s of U.S. companies, revealed that the companies shared
several concerns about investing in the region. Among these concerns were their ability
to repatriate profits, the various levels of governmental bureaucracy they may have
encountered, and the availability of sound infrastructure including such things as the
reliability of utilities (electric power), and the communications system.68 Companies
are frequently confronted with delays in processing investor applications, administrative
bottlenecks, interventions from government agencies, and other requirements and
66 Ramsaran, U.S. Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 137.
67 Ibid., 139.
68 Montalvan, Promoting Imestment and Exports 108.
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problems related to taxation, exchange rates, currency convertibility, legal processes
and banking regulations.69
Foreign direct investment in the CARICOM, and the Caribbean Basin as a
whole, is often criticized for not being a catalyst to real development because of its bias
towards the assembly type manufacturing operations. Business sectors that tend to
benefit the host country with more permanent capital resources and the training of skilled
workers such as information and technology areas, do not receive the type of incentives
that the assembly type operations receive. This had led some to conclude that the type of
foreign direct investment (FDI) that CARICOM receives could not lead to high
productivity growth given the distorted incentive system.70
CARICOM Trade Relations with Extra-Regional Partners
The main trading partners for the CARICOM states are the United States, the
European Union, and Canada. Most of the region's exports are marketed and exported to
these industrialized countries under preferential arrangements namely the Caribbean
Basin Initiative, the Lome Convention which up until early 2000 was replaced by the
Partnership Agreement, and CARIBCAN respectively. Although these large markets
provide non-reciprocal access for the exports from CARICOM, the economies' limited
size and resources, the pervasiveness of non-tariff barriers particularly in non-traditional
69Suarez, "The Caribbean in Economic Transition," 133.
70 Surath Rajapatirana, "The East Asian Experience and its Relevance to the Caribbean Within the
NAFTA Environment, " Paper prepared for the Investment Conference organized by Development Finance
Limited (Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago: March 1994), !6.
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export areas in these large countries, make CARICOM incapable of exploiting these
arrangements to the fullest.71
While the LDCs in CARICOM depend more on the EU for the bulk of the trade,
their more developed counterparts rely on the U.S. as their most important trading
partner, supplying the largest share of the value of the region's imports, and providing a
market for the major part of U.S. exports.72 CARICOM trade with the EU has
increasingly been affected by the growing number of Southern European states being
incorporated into the bloc and also by the general global trend towards reduction of trade
barriers.73 Another important feature that has buttressed the growing US/Caribbean trade
relations is the changing production structure of Caribbean economies. Products such as
tourism, oil, bauxite, offshore services, and assembly type manufactured products are
sold mainly to North America displacing agricultural staples that had been previously
exported to the United Kingdom.74 In addition, the economic and political trends of the
1980s nudged the region to pursue a policy of export-led growth within the markets of
the Americas and towards closer integration into the U.S. system.
71 DeLisle Worrell, "Caricom and the North American Free Trade Area," Paper prepared for the
Overseas Development Council (n.p., February 1992), 9.
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U.S.-Caribbean trade relations are also influenced by the large volume of U.S.
private investment in the region, making the economies highly dependent and vulnerable
on the U.S. which is now the region's principal source of foreign investment. This
dependence is reflected by the dominance of raw materials and semiprocessed goods in
the flow of trade from CARCOM states which are incapable of exerting any significant
power in influencing the market prices.76 U.S. multinational corporations' investments in
CARICOM countries are in areas such as oil production and distribution, the hotel
industry, information services, shipping, agricultural exports, semiprocessed
manufactures, and bauxite production.
By the early 90s, the U.S. provided about 60% of the tourists, purchased about
49% of merchandise exports, and supplied about 58% of CARICOM's imports.
CARICOM's exports to the U.S. amounted to $4.8 billion in 1990, an increase of about
24% from 1987.79 At the same time, exports from the U.S. to the region grew even more
rapidly to about $5.6 billion in 1990, a 33% increase from 1987.80 This burgeoning trade
relationship has also contributed to the Caribbean's status as being one of the few areas
where the U.S. enjoys a favorable trade balance reflected in its trade surplus with the
76 Ransford Palmer, "Caribbean Relations with the U.S. in the 21st Century, " Caribbean Forum 1,
no. 1, issue 11 (Winter 1994): 41.
77 Ibid., 4.
78 Worrell, "Caribbean and the North American Free Trade Area," 3.
79 Bernal, "Influencing U.S. Policy Towards the Caribbean: A Post Cold War Strategy," 211.
80 Ibid.
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region.81 Business America reported that in 1987, U.S. exports to the region increased
almost 17% over 1983 figures, but during that same period, imports from the region
declined.82
In recent years, U.S. investments in the manufacturing sector in the Caribbean
have grown to overtake investments in other areas, with the U.S. also progressively
overtaking Europe as a market for merchandise trade. Over half of these exports are to
the U.S. market.83 The growth in U.S. based manufactures engaging in offshore
assembly operations in the Caribbean region stems from the implementation of several
tariff provisions by the U.S. government which make it economically feasible for these
investors. These special provisions allow for low duties on U.S. goods. Import duties are
assessed only on the foreign value-added on products that are further processed or
assembled abroad and which are made from materials or components produced in the
U.S. These provisions have been a major stimulus for the growth of CARICOM's export
manufacturing sector.84 Formerly known as TS 806.30 and TS 807.00 in the Tariff
Schedules of the U.S. (TSUS), and in effect since 1963, these special provisions are now
referred to as Items 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80 in the New Harmonized System
nomenclature introduced in January 1989.85 In addition, CARICOM countries also
81 Gayle, "The Evolving Caribbean Business Environment," 137.
82 Business America (April 25, 1988> : 42 - 43.
83ILO, Yearbook ofLabor Statistics, 1989-1990.
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enjoy access to the U.S. market through the General System of Preferences (GSP)
provisions. Several CARICOM countries have also signed double taxation treaties with
the U.S., with the goal of enticing more investment to the region.86
One industry that has benefited more than any other from these provisions in the
region is the textile and apparel sector. Under the then 806 and 807 provisions, the U.S.
granted special access to its market for textile/apparel imports from Caribbean Basin
countries that use fabrics which are made and cut in the U.S. By the mid to late 1990s,
textile and apparel products were the leading U.S. imports from the Caribbean region,87
with other major exports being petroleum products, agricultural products such as
An
bananas, coffee, sugar cane, cocoa, and aluminum ore products. For certain CARICOM
nations such as Antigua, Montserrat, St. Lucia, Haiti and Jamaica, products as >embled
from U.S. sourced components for export to the U.S. market represent a major portion of
all products exported to the U.S.89
86 Worrell, "Caricom and the North American Free Trade Area," 5.
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TABLE 3.3
Clothing Imports from CARICOM by U.S. for years 1992 and 1993: The Major
Significant Exporters (US $000)




































Source: Special Category Report Prepared for Embassy of Trinidad and Tobago by Trade
Monitoring Service (Washington, D.C., June 2, 1994).
The manufacturing sector, including the textile and apparel industry, is not only
important to these Caribbean exporters, but also to that industry within the U.S. Stephen
Lamar, Government Relations Director for the American Apparel Manufacturers
Association, recently reported that the U.S. apparel and related industries in many cases
rely on partnerships with manufacturers in the Caribbean. The Association estimates that
"15 apparel jobs in the U.S. are created by every 100 jobs in 807 (offshore) production in
other industries." 90 Furthermore, by 1996, it was reported that Caribbean trade in
products from the manufacturing sector supported more than 300,000 jobs in the U.S.91
An official in the Jamaica's government investment promotion agency also supported
90 "AAMA Official Testifies to Congress that Trade is Crucial to Rebuilding Countries Damaged
by Hurricanes Mitch and Georges," available from http://www.Onlinetextile news.com/news; Internet;
accessed March 29,1999.
91 Richard Bernal, "Changing Trade Trends Confronting the Caribbean," CAIC Magazine 1.1,
no. 16 (4th Quarter, 1996): 1
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this observation by suggesting that "for every US $100 exported by Caribbean export
assembly industries, only US $20 remain in the Caribbean, and US $80 go to the U.S.
industry.92
Although the textile/apparel sector and the overall manufacturing sector grew
tremendously in the major CARICOM exporting countries of these products during the
1980s, certain global developments in the 1990s have threatened to curtail that growth
and cause major problems for the economies that have developed a major dependence on
the manufacturing industry. Preferential market access that were being enjoyed in the
U.S. and European Union markets are increasingly being eroded with the implementation
of NAFTA, the extension of U.S. trade preferences to the Andean nations, the expansion
of the European Union, and the replacement of the Lome Conventions. Compounding
these problems for CARICOM states is the aid fatigue syndrome which many
industrialized countries face, particularly with the attention given to the former Eastern
bloc nations' conversion to western style capitalism, and their intense efforts to
restructure their economies and societies. Other areas that will detract resources and
attention from the Caribbean region will be the ongoing issue of Middle East peace and
security, and the unfolding relations with trading partners in Europe and the Far East.
Another major occurrence that is already having quite an impact on developing
countries including the CARICOM states is the completion and implementation of
decisions reached at the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations including the establishment
92 McAfee, Storm Signals, 87.
93 Georges A. Fauriol, "U.S.-Caribbean Relations Into the 21a Century: Policy Papers on the
Americas" (Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 12.
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of the World Trade Organization (WTO). These developments will provide major
challenges to the CARICOM nations and the developing world as a whole, as these
countries are faced with the challenge of making the transition from an environment in
which they enjoyed special trade arrangements to one which is wholly governed by the
94
principles of free trade and reciprocity.
Maior Challenges Facing CARICOM:
Outcome of the Uruguay Round and Establishment of the WTO
Up until the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, many developing countries
insisted on or aggressively sought special and differential treatment as an important part
of their multilateral negotiations,95 as a result of certain provisions in GATT which
controlled international trade since its formation as part of the Bretton Woods System.
Article XVIII of the 1947 GATT allowed developing countries to impose quantitative
restrictions either for development purposes or for balance of payments reasons.96 Part
IV of the GATT on Trade and Development established the principle of non-reciprocity
in trade negotiations between developed and developing countries, and provided for the
former to adopt special measures to promote the expansion of imports from the latter.
94 Suarez, "The Caribbean in Economic Transition," 127.
95 J Michael Finger and L. Alan Winters, "What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries?"
The WTO as an International Organization, ed. Anne O Krueger (London: The University of Ch.cago
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Additionally, the Enabling Clause emerged from the Tokyo Round and included a
number of provisions which permitted GATT contracting parties to grant differential and
more favorable treatment to developing countries, "notwithstanding the non-
discrimination requirement of Article 1 of the General Agreement."
This policy provided the legal framework for trade concessions granted to
developing countries under the General System of Preferences (GSP), and also allowed
such treatment to regional or global arrangements among developing countries for the
reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-tariff measures." These arrangements were
specifically designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries without
raising barriers to or creating "undue difficulties for the trade of other contracting
parties".100 It was argued that since developing countries possessed little bargaining
power in reciprocal negotiations, one of the few ways that they could obtain relatively
free access to the world's major markets was by granting them these preferential
arrangements.101
The Uruguay Round Agreements reduced the scope of the special and differential
treatment that the GATT system had made allowance for to most developing countries
and eroded GSP margins of preference.102 The Agreement sought to promote global trade
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measures, including reductions in trade barriers in areas such as agriculture, textile
and apparel. The Multifiber Agreement, which was signed as part of the negotiations
and deals with textiles and clothing, specified that restrictive trade measures including
Voluntary Exports Restraints (VERs), would be phased out.103 Additionally, safeguard
measures which were allowed under GATT were made more transparent and subjected
to progressive liberalization. The negotiations also included antidumping measures
which were sometimes used as barriers to trade. These were also made more
transparent.104 These provisions allowed for reducing tariffs on a phased basis, to an
extent where tariffs will no longer be a major obstacle to the movement of goods among
trading partners.
The progressive reduction of non-tariff barriers, export subsidies and other
distortions to trade, are all expected to have a negative effect on CARICOMl05and other
developing countries. The likely results of the lowering and reduction of tariffs is that
they would be an erosion of the margin of preference from which many CARICOM
countries' exports benefit. The following exemplifies the extent to which some
Caribbean countries rely on special preferences relating to tariffs with the U.S.:
103 John Whalley and Colleen Hamilton, The Trading System After the Uruguay Round
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, July 1996), 46.
104 UNECLAC, "The Caribbean and the Outcome ofthe Uruguay Round in the Context of
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TABLE 3.4
CARICOM's Reliance on Special Tariffs Rates with the U.S.
(Selected Countries)
Country: % of Exports not Facing (0%) Tariff




Source: World Bank Report 1281, LAC; Coping With Changes in the External
Environment (Washington, D.C., April 1994).
The lowering of tariffs affords non-preference receiving countries and low cost
producers improved access to previously restricted markets to which the Caribbean
countries have special treatment. Many of the former are in a better position than the
latter to compete in these large markets.107 However, the Uruguay Round Agreement
contained negotiated provisions which allowed the developing countries longer periods
for implementing obligations, more favorable thresholds for undertaking certain
commitments, and greater flexibility in the implementation of agreements and
procedures.108
The liberalization of trade in agriculture and the phasing out of the MFA are of
special concern to the region, particularly as they relate to the preferences given to
CARICOM exports such as banana and sugar where they have already begun facing
107
Ibid.
108 OAS Trade Unit, "Small and Relatively Less Developed Economies and Western Hemisphere
Integration" (Washington, D.C.: OAS, April 1997), 25.
84
increased competition. The reduction in domestic support and export subsidies for
agricultural products under the Uruguay Round Agreement will likely enable efficient
agricultural producers to compete freely for market share. CARICOM producers, who
are considered to be not very cost efficient in production, will be at a disadvantage. To
worsen the situation for CARICOM members, it is suggested that the implementation of
the agreement as it pertains to agricultural products will cause prices of heavily
subsidized commodities such as wheat, rice, meat, and dairy products, which CARICOM
countries import in large quantities, to rise, and in the process increase their overall
import bill.109
There is growing concern among many groups in developing countries that these
societies may end up as losers as a result of the Uruguay Round. Christian Aid, a non
governmental organization, reported that certain categories of developing countries -
net food importers, countries benefiting from trade preferences, commodity exporters,
and countries that are too underdeveloped to take advantage of new trading opportunities,
will experience losses and face major structural adjustment problems due to the result of
the negotiations.110 The organization cites studies which predict that world food prices
will increase as a result of liberalization in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries that reduce or eliminate production subsidies,
109 Ibid., 13.
110 Whalley and Hamilton, The Trading System After the Uruguay Round, 63.
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causing a loss for the agricultural importing countries, particularly in the developing
world.1"
Another area covered by the Uruguay Round that concerns the CARICOM
countries is the Agreement dealing with standards for the acquisition and protection of
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). There is some level of concern that the Caribbean,
being importers of technology, may experience an increase in the costs of acquiring and
transfer of technology.112 The agreement reached at the end of the Uruguay Round also
eroded the right of countries to keep measures that stipulate, for example, that a foreign
investor must use local labor or supplies. This allows investors to buy their labor and
supplies in the cheapest possible market,113 which may not necessarily be the country in
which they are setting up business. CARICOM countries also see this issue as a potential
loss for them. The Uruguay Round initiated a trend in international trade relations
marked by a move away from a "two-tiered multilateral trading system encompassing a
preferential tier for developing countries, toward a trading system in which all trading
partners are bound by the same rules and obligations under an MFN framework.114
The Final Act of the Uruguay Round and the Marrakesh Agreement also
established the World Trade Organization (WTO) with its firm commitment to advancing
global trade liberalization. The organization which embodies some "50 years of
111 rbid.
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multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT," "5 is in effect the legal and institutional
foundation on which the multilateral trading system is to be developed. The agreement
which established the organization declares that members should conduct their trade and
economic relations with a view to:
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the
production ofand trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal
use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective
needs and concerns at different levels of development."6
One of the main principles of the WTO is to encourage development and
economic reform, by encouraging industrial countries to assist trade in developing
countries. However, critics of the organization claim that its stated goals are
incompatible with its policies regarding the development of non-industrialized countries.
Questions are beginning to be asked as to why the effects of the organization's free trade
policies on the livelihoods of people in developing countries are being ignored,117 as
jobs and economic growth are being jeopardized.1118
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In regards to market access, WTO rules require developing countries to meet
the same standards as the industrialized countries - reciprocity in tariff negotiations.119
The "single undertaking" feature of the WTO agreement requires WTO members to
accept all of the obligations of the GATT and its side agreements that were part of the
Uruguay Round. This means that developing countries are now required to follow or
undertake more trade obligations than they were previously required to do under the
GATT regime.120 Developing countries that once enjoyed the benefits of some GATT
rules without having to join and take on new obligations must now end their "free
ride."121
In addition, becoming a member by assuming the full obligations is very
burdensome and has the potential to expend disproportionate amounts of resources122 for
some less developed countries, including CARICOM members. Also, the transition
period given to less developed countries to become full members is relatively short,
allowing them little time to continue enjoying the "free rider" benefits.123
In 1998, NGOs from developing countries formed a "global alliance of people's
movements " to coordinate resistance against free trade, globalization and the WTO.124
119
Finger and Winters, "What Can the WTO Do," 366.
120 Jeffrey J. Schott, ed., The World Trading System: Challenges Ahead (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics, December, 1996), 3.
121 Jeffrey J. Schott, WTO 2000: Setting the Coursefor World Trade (Washington, D.C.: Institute
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Activists from India spoke at the WTO meeting in Geneva in 1998, proclaiming that
globalization, especially lower tariff barriers on food imports into the country, had
severely damaged many people's lives.125 To some critics of the WTO, globalization is
viewed as a set of polices which allows the weaker members of the global society,
peasant farmers, to be put into the same economic stream as the most powerful actors in
the world trading system, transnational corporations.126
At the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) 1999 meeting, representatives from
some of the member states became outraged when some members of the EU insisted that
the Lome Convention needs to be changed in regards to the granting of preferential
access to the ACP countries' exports in the European markets. The Deputy Prime
Minister of Barbados, Billie Miller, suggested that the:
WTO is not the master but the servant of human welfare.. .negotiations must not be
conducted as if WTO rules are written on tablets of stone. Rather, the rules should
be applied on the basis of flexibility, to make them compatible with the basic
objectives of development. If not, they will have to be revisited.127
Critics would like to see WTO policy change, making free trade compatible with social
and economic development.
However, the organization does enjoy some support in both developed and
underdeveloped countries. Advocates of the WTO's free trade policies claim that
developing countries can benefit from the organization's polices in a number of ways.






technology, even the poor in these countries can buy cheap imports rather than rely on
poorly made, over-priced goods produced by local monopolies.
Supporters claim that the organization may in fact help the poorer, developing
countries based on the premise that it is founded on a system of rules where the weak and
the strong states have an equal say. Thus whenever a country feels that another is
breaching the rules, it can appeal to an impartial panel whose rulings are binding, even on
the larger more powerful resource rich members.129 As an example, they cite one ruling
against the U.S. where the WTO ruled that the U.S. had to lift its restrictions on imports
of Costa Rican underwear. In 1995, the U.S. set quotas to prevent imports of men's and
women's underwear from some Caribbean and Central/Latin American countries from
growing beyond their 1994 levels. Some countries, including Costa Rica, threatened to
take their case before the WTO, causing the U.S. to back off and offer the countries more
generous deals.130
There are also those who feel that developing countries should become more
proactive and less reactive to the multilateral negotiations within the WTO. As a group
that comprises close to three quarters of the membership in the WTO, by uniting their
efforts they may be able to focus negotiations more on issues that they want discussed,
and less on extraneous issues such as the enforcement of labor and environmental
128 Legrain, "Not an Ogre, But a Friend to the Poor," 17.
129 Ibid.
130 Howard Banks, "Uncle Sam's Underwear Deals," Forbes 156, no. 3 (July 31, 1995): 37.
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standards that the WTO seems bent on pursuing.131 It is also suggested that these
countries should become prepared to exchange liberalizing trade concessions on a most-
favored-nation basis in exchange for improved access to the markets of their trading
partners; and that these efforts should focus on establishing realistic transition periods
and technical assistance to compensate for their limited institutional capacity and
resources.132
One of the primary ways that the WTO has chosen to advance trade liberalization
is to challenge the protectionist and preferential policies that have been pervasive in, and
impactful on developing countries' trading systems. Under the GATT, developing
countries were not overly concerned when these policies were challenged. However,
under the WTO, indications are that it will not be business as usual. One such example
involves the on-going banana dispute between the U.S. and the EU in regards to the New
Banana Regime which affects the fruit being exported from the CARICOM states.
Nevertheless, the WTO in an effort to repair its image and rebuild confidence in
the organization in the aftermath of the Seattle conference fiasco where large
demonstrations against the organization disrupted meetings and presented negative public
relations problems in November 1999, urged the Quad Group (the EU, U.S., Canada and
Japan) to come up with a proposal aimed at launching a new round of global trade talks.
These talks are intended to make progress in allowing greater market access for imports
131 T.N. Srinivasan, "WTO and the Developing Countries," Journal ofSocial and Economic
Development 2, no.l (January-June 1999): 1-31.
132 Constantine Michalopoulos, "Developing Country Goals and Strategies for the Millennium
Round," Paper Provided by World Bank Series, Working Papers - International Economics, Trade,
Capital Flows (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, July 1999).
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from the LDCs, and to push for greater funding for the WTO technical assistance and
training programs for developing countries estimated at $US 6 million annually.
Although the Quad Group supported the assistance program in the proposal they
submitted to the WTO, they failed to commit adequate resources to it. l33 The developing
countries strongly criticized the proposal by the Quad Group as meaningless, citing that it
failed to give assurances that greater access to the developed countries' markets will be
extended to developing countries, particular in the areas of agriculture and textiles.
These products are considered sensitive to the developed countries, but they are also
very important sources of foreign exchange for the LDCs.
Other Challenges Facing CARICOM
CARICOM countries are already beginning to feel the effects of the ongoing
expansion of the EU and the creation of the Single European Market (SEM). The
production capability of some of the southern members of the EU put them in direct
competition with some CARICOM states which enjoy certain preferential treatment
within the EU markets. This situation has already begun to cause much debate both
within the EU and among countries in the ACP in which CARICOM is an integral part.
In addition to the structural repositioning of the EU, another market which is vital
to CARICOM and which is beginning to show signs of a shift in focus is Canada. The
country has begun to realign its political and economic interests in the Western
Hemisphere to include many more countries in Latin America and Mexico, and also to
133 "Quad's Confidence-Shattering Trade Package: TRIMS Extensions Undefined," Bridges




include many more products.135 Many of the products which CARICOM countries
supplied or can supply to the Canadian market are also produced in Mexico and other
Latin American countries at lower costs of production. CARICOM's small market size
also make it "strategically less important" than the larger Latin American market, posing
a serious threat to the CARICOM countries being "marginalized at the policy making
level" in Canada.136
Another challenge for CARICOM has been the decrease in official capital flows
to the region. Since the early 1990s, according to a 1994 World Bank report, the sources
of external finance available to the Caribbean region have changed tremendously. Net
capital flows from bilateral and multilateral sources have decreased, from an annual
average of $70 per capita during 1980 - 1982, to an average of $31 per capita for 1990 -
1992.137 Net lending from multilateral sources decreased from $546 million in 1982 to
only $72 million in 1992, while net bilateral lending showed a negative balance in 1992
of negative $32 million compared with $603 million in 1982.138
Another source of funding to the region that showed a decrease was in USAID
funds. Total U.S. assistance were reduced from $217 million in 1992 to around $180
million in 1993 for the region as a whole. For Jamaica, total U.S. assistance was $133
million in 1992, but only about $68 million in 1993; for St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St.
135 GSR Associates, Report on the North American, 61.
136 Ibid.
137 "Caribbean Region: Coping With Changes in the External Environment, Sector Report 12821,




Vincent, the amount in 1989 was $1 million, but fell to zero in 1993.139 The World
Bank estimates that this downward trend is likely to continue since the donor
communities perceive the region as a whole as one that has attained a level of
development in which the needs are less urgent than those of Africa, and Eastern and
Central Europe.140
All these developments have presented a situation for CARICOM that can be
viewed as either a challenge or an opportunity to confront the changing global
environment. The situation is one which requires the region to become more
competitive, and to reach out beyond its traditional boundaries to form new relationships
with a wider group of trading partners. The CARICOM leadership has already taken the
initiative and was instrumental in the formation of the Association of Caribbean States
(ACS) in 1994 and the signing of several bilateral trade agreements with countries such
as Venezuela and Colombia. These arrangements offer CARICOM the opportunity to
become used to engaging in trade in an environment that differs substantially from the
one in which their economies are founded, that of non-reciprocity.
By establishing the ACS, it was hoped that the organization would provide a
framework for widening trade relations and other forms of economic and functional
cooperation among Caribbean states, widely utilizing the principle of reciprocity. The
ACS was perceived as one under which bilateral negotiations within the hemisphere and
139 Suarez, "The Caribbean in Economic Transition," 131.
140 Ibid., 130.
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multilateral between the region and extra-regional states would be conducted.141 With
37 states, a cumulative population of 202 million, combined GDP of around US $508
billion, the ACS has the potential of being a significant trading partner to the U.S., and
can function as a conduit that allows the CARICOM countries to overcome the size
disadvantage which most small economies have.142 The ACS, though, has yet to fulfill
its promise.
In the case of the Venezuela/CARICOM agreement, the provision was made for
duty free access for a limited number of CARICOM products into the Venezuelan market
for a period of 5 years after which the Agreement will convert to one of a reciprocal
nature. The case is similar for the Colombia/CARICOM Agreement.143
The signing of the NAFTA Agreement between the U.S., Canada and Mexico
adds another more challenging level of complexity and uncertainty to what the Uruguay
Round and the other developments already outlined, have presented for the Caribbean
economies.
The Problem That NAFTA Poses For CARICOM
NAFTA is viewed as a manifestation of the recent trend towards trade
liberalization and reduction in protectionism. This on-going process is seen as one that
will force the Caribbean states to adopt and implement revised strategies which will
141 GSR Associates, Report on the North American Free Trade Agreement, 4.
142 Bryan, "Coping With the New Dynamics," 243.
143
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allow them to compete more effectively as the preferences they at present receive under
the programs such as the CBI are dismantled.144
CARICOM sympathizers have identified a number of areas which they believe
will experience negative effects as a result of the implementation of NAFTA. However,
the ones that seem to elicit much concern are Trade Investment Diversion and Export
Displacement. A study by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) concluded that NAFTA is "likely to cause diversion of trade
and investment into Mexico away from the rest of the Latin American and Caribbean
countries."145 Some Caribbean politicians and officials have echoed similar sentiments
suggesting that investors who are thinking about establishing factories in the region
would be more likely to choose Mexico instead of CARICOM because of the superior
market accessibility their products will enjoy under NAFTA.146 Richard Bernal, the
Jamaican Ambassador to the U.S., has stated that the elimination of quotas and the
phasing out of tariffs on Mexican products under the Agreement, could erode the
advantage enjoyed by the CBI exports to the U.S., resulting in a diversion of the U.S.
demand for suppliers in the Caribbean to firms in Mexico.147
144 Fauriol, U.S-Caribbean Relations Into the 21" Century, iv.
145 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, "Open
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Production Patterns with Social Equity " (Santiago, Chile: UNECLAC, 1994). 1
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Seymour Mullings, Jamaica's Minister of Foreign Affairs, reaffirms this
position when he suggested that "the stark reality is that Mexico can now export its
products to the United States free of duty, which makes it more profitable for producers
to operate from here."148 As a result of Mexico":, larger domestic market and lower real
costs of production, it is projected that new investments will also be attracted to Mexico
rather than to the Caribbean, whose economies will need to greatly increase their
productivity levels in the affected industries in order to become ''effective competitors for
international investment" in this new evolving global process.14
In addition to investment diversion, one preliminary study predicted that the
likelihood of investment displacement occurring as Mexico becomes a more attractive
location will increase and subsequently be a catalyst for uprooting already existing
investments in CARICOM states their transplanting them to that country.150 The same
study showed that the trade losses to CARICOM due to displacement of CARICOM
exports by Mexico should be less than 2% and that the major products which will be
affected are clothing, clothing accessories, and to a lesser extent, footwear.151 These
products along with leather and leather related products, petroleum and petroleum
products are the region's major non-traditional export, accounting for 30% of total U.S.
imports from the region.152
148 Larry Rohter, "Impact ofNafta," New York Times, January 30, 1997.
149 G.S.R. Associates, Report on the North American Free Trade Agreement, xii.
150 Ibid., 50.
151Ibid.
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As early as 1995, U.S. industry officials claimed that NAFTA has led to a
"measurable diversion of apparel trade and investment from CBERA countries to
Mexico."153 Bennett Marsh, trade policy and legislative director of the Caribbean and
Latin American Action (CLAA), a Washington D.C. based group that advocates closer
relationship between the U.S. and CBI countries, worried about the impact NAFTA will
have on the Caribbean countries vis-a-vis Mexico:
NAFTA eliminates all duties on Mexican products, but only about 5% of total
Caribbean exports to the U.S. receive duty free benefits via the CBI... The
discrepancy, coupled with easier overland transportation and an ability to secure
far cheaper labor than is available in CBI countries, gives Mexico a real
advantage.. ,154
The threat that NAFTA poses to CARICOM als arises in respect to the nature of the
NAFTA and the CBI agreements. Although most non-sensitive products from both
Mexico and the CBI countries now enter the U.S. duty free under the provisions of the
GSP, NAFTA gives Mexico the advantage that its duty free access is now permanent.
On the other hand, the CBI, because it is a unilateral, non-reciprocal U.S. policy, can be
altered at any time by the Congress.155 The implication of this is that NAFTA gives
more security and permanency to Mexico's duty free access than the CBI affords the
Caribbean. Some believe that investors are more likely to prefer a "binding treaty to the
granting of a privilege" as a basis of making an investment decision.156 Products such as
153 Report from the USTR, "Second Report to Congress on the Operation of the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act" (Washington, D.C: USTR, 1996).
154 Julie Ritzer Ross, "Shippers Question CBI," Global Trade 112 (October 1992): 14-15.
155 David E. Lewis, "The North American Free Trade Agreement," Caribbean Affairs 4, no. 4
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98
apparel, footwear, and leather goods which are dutiable under CBI, are expected to be
granted gradually phased-in duty reductions under NAFTA.157
At an International Trade Commission hearing, Michael Rothbaum, the CEO of
The Harwood Companies which before NAFTA took steps to open a second apparel
manufacturing facility in Honduras, testified that the project will be abandoned unless
CBI nations were granted the same treatment as Canada and Mexico under NAFTA.
The executive noted that:
an analysis of labor costs and duties shows us that ifNAFTA is enacted with no
corresponding benefit to Honduras, then Mexico should be the location for our
new plant... I am convinced that NAFTA agreement with Mexico, without the
same trading advantages to the CBI countries, will bring about substantial
disinvestment in apparel production in the Caribbean Basin in no more than 5
to 7 years.159
Another executive in the manufacturing industry, Tom Korbas, Senior Vice President of
operations of American Tourister, hinted that his company was seriously considering
1 fi/Ci
closing its Dominican Republic plant and moving to Mexico in order to save costs.
Some companies had already begun relocating to Mexico in anticipation of NAFTA. A
spokesman for an unidentified medium sized company said that his company began
curtailing materials sourcing in the Dominican Republic and was negotiating a shift to
Mexico. He explained that "what we need will very likely be brought onto Mexican soil
156 UNECLAC, "The Caribbean and the North American Free Trade Agreement," 14* Session of
CDCC (n.p., December 1992): 8.
157 Ibid.




from the Far East and made available to us duty-free. Transacting business under CBI
is not an advantage anymore."
Steve Lande, a Washington consultant who heads the Manchester Group,
suggested that business people were withholding new orders from the Caribbean, were
limiting investment, and that the growth rate in the Caribbean could not continue given
the situation with NAFTA.162 These concerns are shared throughout the Caribbean and
particularly in the textile/apparel industry. Peter King, Chairman of the Caribbean
Textile Apparel Institute, observed that:
some of Mexico's growth has been the result of the diversion of investment
from the Caribbean Basin ... we are not unduly worried just about Mexico's
growth, but concerned Caribbean Basin producers could go under because of
it.163
However, not all the sentiment about NAFTA's impact on CARICOM are bleak
and pessimistic. American Airlines Vice President of Cargo Sales, Steve Leonard,
suggested that any advantages pertaining to Mexico will draw more business from Asia,
rather than taking it away from the islands. He noted that "NAFTA is a lure for greater
hemispheric business, not a loss for the Caribbean."164 Others feel that the Caribbean
should not worry about the trade and diversionary impact of NAFTA on the Caribbean
because there are several existing or proposed programs that will reduce NAFTA's
161
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negative impact on the area and offer business some great opportunities. One such
program that was administered by Puerto Rico, Section 936, offered below market rate
financing for investment in CBI countries that had signed Tax Information and
Exchange Agreements.165 The program which has been discontinued for fiscal reasons
in the U.S., however, was not highly utilized by the CARICOM countries.
In addition, it is felt in many circles that if NAFTA is able to increase the wealth
of Mexico, Canada and the U.S. as it is intended to do, then CBI countries can benefit
from their own trade relations with the larger, richer market.166 Rodney Schonland,
Manager of Trade and Relations for Polaroid Corporation, noted that the impact will not
be great for the Caribbean since "manufacturing in Mexico is no more convenient than
doing so within the Basin, except the maquiladoras along Mexico's border."167 There are
even those who suggest that NAFTA should be seen as an opportunity and not as a
threat, as a catalyst that may help to rally domestic support for reform.168
Caribbean leaders too, have recognized the necessity for change and had taken the
initiative in implementing economic reform programs including trade liberalization even
prior to both the enactment ofNAFTA and the end of the Uruguay Round. Steps that the
governments in the region had taken included making progress in the creation of a single
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market and economy, the lowering of the Common External Tariff, and the separate
agreements with Venezuela and Colombia, which as indicated earlier, would eventually
lead to reciprocal arrangements. Some leaders within the CARJCOM are also urging
that the governments take steps to intensify the diversification of their economies, and
begin to take a more proactive approach to dealing with the global changes sweeping the
international system.
One earlier strategy designed to lessen the negative impact of NAFTA that was
supported by CARICOM leaders was a NAFTA-parity proposal. HR 1403, the Gibbons
Bill, named after Representative Sam Gibbons of Florida, attempted to give parity to
CARICOM countries in regards to access to U.S. markets as is given to Mexico under
NAFTA. The legislation which failed to pass when it was first introduced, was
designed as a "transitional arrangement" to enable the Caribbean economies to prepare
for fully reciprocal trade with the U.S.169
HR 553, another bill introduced by Philip Crane in the House of Representatives,
and S-529 introduced by Bob Graham in the Senate, calling for NAFTA-like treatment
for apparel and other exempted manufactured goods, languished in Congress after failing
to be passed in the 103rd Congress.170 However, in November 1999, after much
wrangling in Congress, H.R. Bill 434, which lowers or eliminates tariffs and quotas on
products from the region (as well as from sub-Saharan Africa) was passed in the Senate.
This was superceded by the eventual passing of the Caribbean Basin Partnership Trade
169 Julius Gittens, "NAFTA:CARICOM's Prospects, Fears and Concerns," Canabusiness 5, no. 4
(December 1993): 21.
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Act (CBTPA) which was signed into law in May 2000, and which was the culmination
of a major effort mounted by CBI governments to alleviate the perceived negative impact
ofNAFTA on the region. This ACT will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter.
CHAPTER 4
CARICOM'S PREFERENTIAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS:
For more than twenty five years, CARICOM economies have built their trading
relationships with the industrialized countries around preferential and non-reciprocal
arrangements. Despite the nature of these arrangements, three of them, the CBI, Lome
and its successor agreement, and CARIBCAN are of greater importance to the countries'
economies than are others, particularly in the level of dependence that these economies
have developed on the arrangements. This chapter will deal with the main preferential
trade agreement, the CBI, that the Caribbean nations share with the U.S. However, it
will first briefly discuss the other arrangements that were important elements of their
overall participation in international trade.
The GSP
Tariff preferences for developing countries had been explicitly permitted in
Article XV of the International Trade Organization's Charter, but were not included in the
GATT. However, the GSP was introduced in 1971 as a GATT waiver permitting a
preference scheme for developing countries. The introduction of this system legalized a
trend at that time that departed from the non-discrimination principle which permeated
world trade.1 Individual GSP schemes were designed by the developed countries (the




donors), and included many exclusions some of which included agricultural products
and labor intensive manufactured items, and commodities in which developing countries
had a comparative advantage.2
In order to receive any duty free treatment under the GSP program, eligible items
from beneficiary countries must meet certain rules or origin, which stipulate that 35% of
the product must be added by a single beneficiary/country3. Eligible items from
beneficiary countries must pass a competitive need test that consist of a dollar value limit
set each year, and a 50% limit for each tariff line item.4 The U.S. GSP schemes included
ceilings or volume limits beyond which Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs would apply.
With this arrangement, "automatic triggers" were applied for the removal of GSP benefits
when GSP imports of a product, or the share of a single developing country in total GSP
covered imports of a product, reached specified levels.5
The GSP program therefore allows a country/product to graduate from the system
if these stipulations no longer hold in regards to the country or product. This feature
together with rules of origin stipulation therefore serve to substantially reduce the
coverage ofGSP for developing countries, including the CARICOM economies.
2 Ibid., 106.
3 Joseph Pelzman and Gregory K. Schoepfle, "The Impact ofthe Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act on Caribbean Nations' Exports and Development," Economic Development and Cultural
Change 36 (July 1988): 753-796.
4 Ibid., 755.
5 Pomfret, The Economics ofRegional Trading Arrangements, 106.
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For the Caribbean countries, after the introduction of the CBI, the GSP
declined even more in importance as a conduit to duty free access to the more developed
countries' markets. The share of U.S. imports from the Caribbean Basin, including
CARICOM, entering under the GSP has been declining over the years because products
which are eligible for duty-free entry under either GSP or CBI increasingly have entered
under the CBI.6 Also, the total absence of the GSP program, when it was not resumed
for the first three quarters of 1996, further depressed the share of entries under GSP
during that year. The GSP was reinstated in October 1996, but lapsed again in May
1997.7
From its inception, the GSP program excluded textile and apparel articles subject
to international textile agreements. With the renewal and amendments to the GSP
program in 1984, the list of products that was designated as not eligible articles under the
program was expanded to include footwear, handbags, luggage, leather flat goods, and
leather wearing apparel.8 This served to further weaken the importance of the program to
CARICOM countries. In 1997, 1.4% of imports from Caribbean Basin economies
entered under the GSP, compared with 6.8% in 1984.9
As the participation of developing countries in the GATT and WTO increases, the
basic foundation of the preferential system is weakened. Some developing countries
6 "Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 12* Report, 1996: Investigation No. 332-227: Impact
on the U.S. USITC Publication 3058" (Washington, D.C.: USITC, September 1997): 14.
7 Ibid.
8 Pelzmanand Schoepfle, "Special U.S.-Caribbean Economic Relations," 178.
9 "Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 13* Report, 1997: USITC Publication 3132"
(Washington, D.C.: USITC, 1998): 22.
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have already been graduated from the GSP, diminishing the numbers of countries still
clinging to the system.10 Nevertheless, the GSP was one of the most important features
of trade relations between the U.S. and the Caribbean prior to the establishment of the
CBI.
CARIBCAN
Canada's economic, political and cultural relations with the English speaking
Caribbean were developed as early as the beginning of the 18th century when Atlantic
Canada traded fish and timber for West Indian rum, sugar and molasses.11 Since then,
trade relations between the countries have remained particularly strong. The
Canada/West India Agreement which came into effect in 1926 provided access to
Canadian markets for traditional commodities and also made provisions for development
assistance.12 The main areas in which Canada and CARICOM have established
economic, political and cultural links are through imports, selected exports to Canada,
migration to Canada and the remittances of the migrants, foreign direct investment
(banking, insurance, tourism and public utilities) and official development finance
particularly in the funding of infrastructure projects.13
10 Anthony P. Gonzales, "Europe and the Caribbean: Toward a Post-Lome Strategy," in The
Caribbean: New Dynamics in Trade and Political Economy (Miami: University ofMiami North-South
Center, 1995): 60.
11 Catherine Hyett, "Caribcan: Canada's Response to the Caribbean Basin Initiative," Imperial
Power and Regional Trade: The Caribbean Basin Initiative (Ontario: Wildrid Laurier University Press,
1993), 59.
12 DeLisle Worrell, "Caricom and the North American Free Trade Area," Paper Prepared for the
Overseas Development Council (n.p., February 1992) : 5.
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In June 1986, the Canadian government passed into law CARIBCAN, a
program aimed at encouraging trade, investment and industrial cooperation with the
Commonwealth Caribbean region.14 Canadian and Caribbean leaders, in signing the
Agreement, sought to foster expanded trade with Canada through preferential
commercial arrangements for non-traditional exports, particularly garments, cigars, and
footwear.15
This preferential commercial feature that offers duty-free access to the Canadian
market to most Commonwealth Caribbean exports, is the backbone of the arrangement.
Before CARIBCAN was implemented, 93% of the Caribbean countries' exports entered
Canada duty free. With CARIBCAN, it is estimated that less than 1% of product
categories are excluded from the tariff-free treatment.16 Products which are excluded
under this act include textiles and clothing, footwear, luggage and handbags, leather
garments, lubricating oils, and methanol.17 These manufactured items, however, have
been identified by Caribbean leaders as the ones offering the best opportunities for rapid
economic diversification and export development for the region.
In order to qualify for duty free access under CARIBCAN, at least 60% of ex-
factory value of eligible products must originate in the Commonwealth Caribbean or
14 "Impact of Canada-United States Free Trade on Caribcan Countries: A Report Prepared for the






Canada. These restrictions, including the exclusions criteria for rules of origin and
other safeguard provisions, have not been well received by Jamaican and other
Commonwealth Caribbean officials.
Also included in CARIBCAN are programs to strengthen the exporting
capabilities of the countries involved, as well as seminars for diplomats and business
people from the region on strategies for developing markets for Caribbean products in
Canada. The program affords access to the regional offices of Canada's Department of
Regional Industrial Expansion to assist Caribbean trade officials in promoting bilateral
trade.19
Imports from CARIBCAN countries account for only .23% of Canadian imports
with the most important being bauxite from Jamaica. Food and beverage items, crude
and refined petroleum, and other manufactured goods make up the rest of the imports.
Telecommunications and related equipment exports from Barbados have been on the
increase since 1984.20
Canada's direct investment in CARICOM's manufacturing sector is relatively
small, particularly when compared to the U.S. investment. For this and other reasons,
such as the volume of trade between Canada and CARJCOM, not much attention has
been paid to the US/Canada trade in NAFTA as they relate to any diversionary effects of
18 Gregory K. Schoepfle, "U.S. Caribbean Trade Relations Over the Last Decade: From CBI to
ACS, " The Repositioning ofUS-Caribbean Relations in the New World Order, ed. Ransford Palmer
(Westport, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1997): 9.
"Hyett, "Caribcan," 64; "Impact of Canada-United States Free Trade," 3.
20 "Impact of Canada-United States Free Trade," 4.
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trade and investment from the Caribbean. On the contrary, one study forecast that
NAFTA is more likely to have a positive outcome for the CARICOM states. As
corporate profits in Canada increase as a result of NAFTA, it is predicted that there will
be a greater import demand in Canada which will subsequently import more from the
CARICOM countries.21
The Lome Convention
The Lome Convention signed in 1975 between the European Community and the
ACP group of countries was seen as a new form of North-South cooperation at the time it
came into being , and had since been regarded as one of the most generous of the
European Union's hierarchy of preferences for developing countries. Its stated purpose
was to promote "trade between the ACP states and the Community, taking account of
their respective levels of development, and also between the ACP states themselves."22
The Agreement was designed to act as a catalyst for promoting the economic,
cultural and social development of the ACP states by granting duty free access to the
European Community's market.23 The first Lome Convention agreement covered the
period 1976 to 1980, and was followed by three successive agreements, the last of which
expired in 2000. Other principal features of the Lome Conventions included areas of
cooperation, programmed aid and commodity export earnings stabilization.24
21 Ibid., 8.
22 OAS Trade Unit, "Special and Differential Treatment in International Trade," submitted to the
FTAA Working Group on Small Economies (Washington, D.C.: November 17, 1995).
23 Pomfret, The Economics ofRegional, 95.
24 Wendell A. Samuel. "The OECS-EC Trade Under the Lome Convention: The Promise and
Disappointment" (Barbados: University of the West Indies, 1989): 1.
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Trade
Trade, the main component of the program, provided for non-reciprocity
involving one-way duty free access for a substantial percentage of ACP products. ACP
agricultural and processed agricultural products were exempt from customs duties and
preference was given to ACP products over those from non-member countries.25 Such
access was unlimited for industrial products and surpassed the provisions of the GSP
which established competitive need ceilings on some of these products. Also, the tariffs
under Lome on agricultural goods were lower for a wider range of commodities
compared to the levels under the GSP.26 Since the first Lome, trade provisions were
broadened to improve access for some additional ACP products such as rice, strawberries
tomatoes, tropical fruit and vegetables.27
There were a limited number of agricultural products, for example, bananas,
sugar, and rum, which came under specific arrangements on protocols in the agreement.
These commodity arrangements were established to ensure stable and remunerative
prices for the major export staples to the European Community's market. Under the Rum
Protocol, the ACP nations were able to export annually, a specific, fixed quantity of rum
free of customs duties. Some ACP countries, including the Caribbean nations of
Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana, had benefited a great deal from
25 Ransford Palmer, Caribbean Dependence on the United States Economy (N Y • Praeger
Publishers, 1979), 25.
26Gonzales, "Europe and the Caribbean," 55.
27 Ibid., 56.
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this protocol.28 The Sugar Protocol enabled the ACP states to export guaranteed
amounts of sugar cane at the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) prices, which were
about two to three times higher than the world market price.
The Banana Protocol was the one arrangement in the Agreement that caused
much controversy both within the EU and outside Europe in recent years. Bananas from
the ACP countries enjoyed special privileges that gave them an advantage over fruit from
non-ACP member countries. However, with the establishment of the Single European
Market (SEM), a New Banana Regime (NBR) was implemented which was designed to
satisfy several considerations, including protecting the preferential arrangement with the
ACP countries until the conclusion of the Lome IV in 2000. The NBR in effect sought
to maintain guaranteed access to ACP bananas particularly for those member countries
whose economy was heavily dependent on banana exports. It tried to guarantee the
incomes of European producers, and support the European companies involved in the
industry in anticipation of the rising competition expected form the American
transnational corporations.29
Before 1992, there were three distinct banana regimes in the European market,
where consumers in some countries paid more for their bananas (as in Britain and France)
than those in others (as in Germany):
28 "The Lome Convention: A Unique Model for Development Cooperation," Stabroek News
(Georgetown, Guyana) May 9, 1997, iv.
29 Clive Bishop, "The Impacts of Integration on the Caribbean Banana Market" (n.p., Windward
Islands' Farmers Association, n.d.): 17.
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- A preferential market for France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece for
producers from either the EU and/or ACP countries;
- A duty free market in Germany; and
- A market that was subject to 20% tariff in Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg.30
While the ACP producers, overwhelmingly from the Caribbean, supplied the vast
majority (88%) of the market in the U.K., and 35% of the French market (mainly from
African producers), the dollar producers of Latin America supplied close to 100% of the
bananas to the Belgian, Danish, and German markets; 90% in the Irish and Dutch markets;
85% in the Italian market and 12% in the U.K. market.31 The dollar producers of Latin
and Central America are mainly controlled by three U.S. multinationals - The United
Brands (Chiquita) with 35% of the world market; Standard Fruit (Dole Foods) with 20%;
and Del Monte with 15%. Together, they control about 66% of the EU market.32 With
the establishment of the Single European Market (SEM), these different regimes were
replaced by a single one that would be universally applicable. It is therefore not
surprising that the NBR (1993) was opposed by interests both within and outside the EU.
In the case of the former, Germany was forced to buy greater quantities of more expensive
30 Paul Sutton, "The Banana Regime of the European Union, the Caribbean and Latin America,
Journal ofInteramerican Studies and World Affairs 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997).
31
Ibid.
32 Anthony Bryan, "Trading Places: The Caribbean Faces Europe and the Americas in the
Twenty-First Century, " The North-South Agenda Papers, no. 27 (Miami: University of Miami, North-
South Center, June 1997). 1
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Caribbean fruit, over the less costly competing fruit from the Latin and Central
American banana exporting countries.
This change in policy led to a landmark case and ruling, and the ongoing dispute
within the WTO, as the Latin and Central American producers along with the U.S.
companies with interests in the banana industry in those countries challenged the EU and
its NBR in the WTO. It is widely believed among most developing countries, that the
ones with the most to lose in this case are the ACP countries, particular the small banana
producing and exporting islands of CARICOM, whose economies are substantially
dependent on bananas.
CARICOM leaders believe that this case represents a harbinger of what the future
holds for them in this era of globalization and trade liberalization, and with the thrust by
some industrialized countries and the WTO to dismantle the preferential trade
arrangements that have been in existence for more than two decades. CARICOM
sympathisers feel that the ruling in favor of the dollar producing countries of Central and
Latin America and the U.S. companies by the WTO, spells disaster for their economies.
CARICOM governments strongly believed that they need the preferential access
previously afforded by Lome to be rolled over into the new Partnership Agreement, to
enable them to compete with other larger exporting economies.
Aid Under Lome
The aid component of Lome was generally awarded based on a country's per
capita income, thus favoring some beneficiary countries more than others. Aid was
categorized into two areas, Programmed and Non-Programmed. Programmed aid is set
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up to assist the ACP states to more predictably plan their investments program.33 Non-
Programmed aid, on the other hand, was the basis of the commodity export earnings
stabilization programs, the System of Stabilization of Export Earnings, (STABEX) and
the Special Financing for Safeguarding Mining Production (SYSMIN). The STABEX
was used mainly to cover shortfalls in earnings resulting from fluctuations in prices or
output of agricultural exports to the European Community. SYSMIN provided assistance
to countries that depended heavily on mining.34
In the area of cooperation, the Center for the Development of Industry (CDI) was
established to assist in industrial promotion, and to provide information to small and
medium sized industries of the ACP states in identifying and acquiring technology,
markets and financing among other things.35 The European Investment Bank was also
assigned a key role in the area of financing industrial development in the ACP.36
The Lome trade provisions were considered to be a lifeline for many ACP
countries which would find it extremely difficult to compete under conditions of
unrestricted world trade. This was in spite of the fact that the EU had over the years built
up a favorable trade balance with the ACP even with the non-reciprocity provision.37 In
the last two decades, the export performance of ACP countries in the European market
"Samuel, "The OECS-EC Trade," 5.
34 Ibid.
35 Gonzales, "Europe and the Caribbean," 56.
56 Ibid.
37 Gonzales, "Europe and the Caribbean," 58.
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has deteriorated.38 The ACP countries' share of the EU market declined from 6.7% in
1976 to 3% in 1988. 39 The ACP economies have failed to achieve a high level of
diversification into nontraditional areas as primary products still dominate their exports,
with ten products accounting for 80% of these exports.40 This is as a result of some ACP
countries' trade and fiscal policies which act as a hindrance to the expansion of exports.
Some ACP countries also suffer from shortages of financial and physical infrastructure
and skilled labor which act as a brake to the development of trade.41
The EU's restrictive rules of origin also served to limit the expansion of ACP
trade with the former.42 These rules stipulated a local content requirement in Lome IV
of 45% of the finished product in order for it to be eligible for ACP preferential
treatment. For many ACP countries, particularly the smaller economies, this requirement
was somewhat unattainable and unrealistic because of the lack of resources. The rules of
origin also created additional burdens for many ACP countries because of their
complexity and the human resources required to keep track of all the rules, regulations,
provisions and complicated procedures.
38 Bryan, "Trading Places : The Caribbean Faces Europe and the Americas in the Twenty- First
Century," The North-South Agenda Papers 27 (Miami: The North-South Center, The University of
Miami, June 1997): 3.
39 EU Commission website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/development.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 4.
42 Gonzales, "Reciprocity in Future ACP/EU Trade Relations with Particular Reference to the
Caribbean" (Trinidad and Tobago: Institute of International Relations, UWI, 1996): 10.
43 Bryan, "Trading Places," 4.
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In addition, the preferential benefit that the ACP enjoys with the EU has gradually
been eroded as a result of various agreements and concessions made by the EU to other
developing countries and through the GSP.44 The southern group of European countries,
for example, where agricultural production and agro-processing industries directly
compete with ACP products, are in a more favorable situation to deal with international
trade liberalization, and have benefited more from new trade arrangements granted by the
EU over the years.45
CARICOM/Lome Trade
Many analysts feel that Lome had not benefited the CARICOM region in the area
of export expansion as was hoped. In fact, some CARICOM states experienced a
widening trade deficit with Europe between 1985 and 1995.46 As is the overall trend with
the ACP/EU trade, Caribbean exports to the EU grew very slowly with their share of the
EU market declining in recent years. In 1982, the Caribbean (including the Dominican
Republic and Haiti) experienced a small trade surplus with the EU amounting to $400
million. However, by 1990, the situation had changed as the EU accounted for 17.3% of
CARICOM trade, and CARICOM showing a net trade deficit of $350 million.47 Even in
the case of Britain which has been the main EU trading partner for most of the





Gayle, "The Evolving Caribbean Business Environment," 137.
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export, there was a decline with the Caribbean as a wb le from 0.9% to 0.4% of total
British exports, and from 0.7% to 0.5% of total British imports, between 1983 and the
third quarter of 1988.48 The following table shows EU trade with CARICOM countries
in the 1980s and 1990s:
TABLE 4.1
EU Trade with CARICOM Countries ($US Millions)
Country Exports Imports
Years Years

























































































































Source: IMF, Direction of Trade StatisticsYearbooks 1989, 1996
48 Colin Leys, "Britain, the Caribbean Basin, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, " Donner
Canadian Foundation Project on Sovereignty and Security (Kingston, Ontario: Queens University, May
1989): 5.
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Yet, the trade component of Lome is important to CARICOM. In the negotiations
of the first Lome, Caribbean governments sought protection for traditional exports such
as rum, sugar and bananas. These trade provisions greatly outweighed aid considerations
because the Caribbean generally had a higher per capita income than the other ACP
members, and thus less importance was given to the aid factor. Duty free access to the
EU's market is critical for CARICOM's sugar, banana and rum industry. Overall these
exports gained the desired access and stable remunerative prices. In addition, the sugar
and banana protocols stabilized and at times increased export earnings. Due in part to the
STABEX , both the sugar and banana revenues were much larger than what could have
been obtained at world prices, 49 and these revenues were particularly important to the
economies of the Windward Islands, Jamaica and Belize, the main exporters of those
products.
Traditional agricultural and mineral exports continue to dominate CARICOM-EU
trade. Until quite recently, bananas were the main foreign exchange earner for the
Windward Islands and accounted for around 78% of agricultural exports. In terms of the
share of total export earnings from the EU in 1992, it represented approximately 90% in
St. Lucia and Dominica, 60% in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and 20% in Grenada.50
In Dominica and St. Lucia, the banana industry employs almost 50% of the workforce.51
Non-traditional exports including manufacturing are relatively insignificant primarily due
49
Gonzales, "Europe and the Caribbean: Toward a Post Lome Strategy," 60.




to the high EU tariff barriers which discourage non-traditional imports from the
Caribbean via the EU's rules of origin.52 Most of the Caribbean exports to the EU are
still limited to a narrow range of commodities. For Jamaica, four products - bananas,
sugar, rum, and bauxite/alumina - account for 90% of exports to the EU.3
Manufactured exports from CARICOM to the EU did not thrive under Lome, as
they have done in the U.S. market under the CBI, and even in this latter case, it is mainly
Jamaica and the Dominican Republic that have mostly benefited from this expansion.
The rise in manufactured exports to the U.S. from CARICOM is one of the reasons why
the U.S. has outpaced the EU as a destination for exports from and as a trading partner of
CARICOM.
TABLE 4.2
CARICOM Exports bv Destination. 1992
(US $3.6 Billion)
USA 40.6% Latin America 4.4%
EU 17.2% Japan 1.1%
CARICOM 12.3% Others 24.4%
Nevertheless, some CARICOM countries, for example the small banana exporting states,
have depended to such a great extent on EU commodity protection that they are
becoming increasingly concerned and can barely envision their survival in a world in
which globalization and liberalization rule. The EU has advocated a more diversified
52Gayle, "The Evolving Caribbean Business Environment," 137.
53 Ibid.
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economic base for these countries with tourism and more local non-traditional agriculture
playing a pivotal role, as an alternative to the banana industry.54
In February 2000, the EU and ACP leaders met to finalize an agreement to
replace Lome IV. The ministers agreed to a new Partnership Agreement, a 20 year
convention under which the terms of Lome IV will be extended through 2002. After
2002, there will be a preparatory period for the ACP countries extending to 2008 that
would be used to strengthen regional integration processes and build their capacities to
conduct trade negotiations and to engage in freer trade. From 2008 through 2020, the
EU and ACP will begin a two way free trade arrangement that conforms to WTO rules.55
One of the objectives that was outlined in the negotiations was "to promote
smooth and gradual integration of ACP economies into the world economy" and the
WTO system,56 and for a replacement of the preferential market access arrangement with
a series of regional trade agreements by the year 2008. The new accord also emphasizes a
joint approach to combating poverty and promoting sustainable development.57
The CBI
The most important of the preferential arrangements to the Caribbean countries is
the CBI. The CBI was officially announced by President Ronald Reagan at the
54 Gonzales, Reciprocity in Future ACP/EU Trade Relations with Particular Reference to the
Caribbean, 17.
55 nr
"EU, ACP Agree to New Trade and Aid Accord," available from http://www.ictsd.org,;
Internet; accessed February 8, 2000.
56 "The New Trade Framework," available from http://euro.eu.int/comm/development; Internet-
accessed February 8,2000.
57 "ACP-EU Waiver Request Receives Lukewarm Reception, " Bridges Weekly Trade News
Digest 4, no. 14 (Geneva, Switzerland: ICTSD, April 11, 2000) .
121
Organization of the American States (OAS) meeting in February 1982. However, the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) which passed into law the CBI
program, did not come into effect until January 1, 1984. The initial idea for the
establishment of what was hoped to be a "Marshall Plan" for the Caribbean had
originated with the CARICOM leaders and in particular Prime Minister Edward Seaga of
Jamaica.58 It is believed that the U.S. embraced the proposal for the CBI as a response to
an economic crisis that was perceived to be threatening the political and social stability
throughout the Caribbean region. The escalating costs of oil, declining world prices for
the region's primary exports which included sugar, coffee, bauxite, the increasing debt
burden, and the perceived threat to democracy in the region from the political leadership
in Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua contributed to the situation which was viewed as a crisis
for the region.59 The Reagan Administration saw the national security interests of the
U.S., of which the economic interests were an important component, as being threatened
by the situation in the Caribbean. The administration therefore regarded the CBI as a
program that would help in alleviating the impending social and political instability in the
area.
Objectives of the CBI
The CBI was presented as an economic package but was really designed to
address political and security concerns which the U.S. felt could no longer be ignored.
58 Lloyd Searwar, "The Dilemmas of Being Small: Some Thoughts on the CARICOM Approach
to the North American Free Trade Area and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative" (Georgetown,
Guyana: n.p., May 16,1991): 16.
59 Schoepfle, "U.S. Caribbean Trade Relations Over the Last Decade: From CBI to ACS," 9.
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One of the primary objectives of the program that was outlined in the Act was to help
beneficiary Caribbean Basin countries "earn their own way towards self sustaining
growth"60 by providing aid to encourage the private sector activity, unilateral and
nonreciprocal duty-free treatment for a wide range of U.S. imports from the region, and
by stimulating both national and foreign private investment.61
Although several tax and trade related incentives were included in the program,
the centerpiece of the CBI was the provision of the unilateral and nonreciprocal duty-free
treatment for a wide range of U.S. imports from the region.62 This program of aid, trade
and investment, it was hoped, would serve to stabilize the region by revitalizing the
economies. The CBI was also seen as an attempt to redirect Caribbean trade and
economic links away from regional multilateral relations such as those with the UK and
Canada, towards bilateral ties to the U.S.63 This package, presented as an economic,
trade oriented and private sector-based initiative, appeared to emphasize multilateralism
rather than bilateralism. It was therefore packaged to respond to the interests of the U.S.
even as it served the Caribbean Basin.64 The Administration sought to clarify the point
that the CBI was comprehensive in nature, in that it integrated trade concessions with
60 Winston H. Griffith, "Caricom Countries and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, " Latin American
Perspectives 17, Issue 64, no.l (Winter 1990): 33.
61 Ibid.
62 Joseph Pelzman and Gregory K. Schoepfle, "The Impact of the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act on Caribbean Nations' Exports and Development," Economic Development and Cultural
Change 36 (July 1988): 733.
63 Bakan et al., Imperial Power and Regional Trade, 5.
64 Ramnarine, "The Political Logic of the CBI," 20.
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investment incentives and financial assistance, 65 and that this represented a departure
from traditional U.S. programs that emphasized financial assistance.
In addition to trade, the other important component in the CBI package was
foreign investments. The program sought to ensure that specific sectors in the Caribbean
Basin would be made safe for foreign investment from the U.S. in particular, with the aim
of maintaining control over the region.66
Sociopolitical Aim
The Reagan Administration successfully sold the program as a multilateral
economic strategy that could address instabilities in the region at their socioeconomic
source while promoting U.S. interests there.67 To the Administration, the strategy
represented a cost effective alternative to political violence, economic decline and human
suffering, and mass migration to the U.S. from the Caribbean Basin.68 The view was that
economic development in the region would promote stability which was vital to U.S.
interests including the safeguarding of export markets and investments from communist
inspired regimes.69
The Reagan Administration used the CBI to fashion Jamaica, under its
conservative pro-US government, into a model of development as an alternative to the
"ibid., 21.
66 Clinton G. Hewan, Jamaica and the United States Caribbean Basin Initiative: Showpiece or
Failure (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1994) , 10.




Cuban system.70 Implemented in the wake of the Nicaraguan and Grenadian revolutions,
and the increasing rejection of U.S. hegemony throughout the region, the CBI was
therefore used as an instrument to reward or to punish declared socialist regimes in the
region.71 This policy was observed by the initial exclusion of Nicaragua , Grenada,
Guyana and Suriname, which had socialist or military governments, as designated
countries.
The underlying philosophy of the CBI was that broad based economic growth
could lead to political stability, and that this growth should be export-led and depend to a
large extent on both local and foreign private sector initiatives. The signing of CBERA
marked the first time that the U.S. engaged in a unilateral, nonreciprocal trade preference
program specifically directed toward a particular geographic region."
Although the program was promoted as one that would be of mutual benefit to the
Caribbean region and to the U.S., there were critics within congress who did not support
the CBERA legislation. Objections were raised that the CBI would be detrimental to
U.S. domestic industries and subsequently lead to the unemployment of U.S. workers as
industries were lured to the region. Critics also suggested that foreign, non Caribbean
Basin competitors would use the region as a duty-free conduit to the U.S. market.
Proponents however, countered with the argument that the Caribbean economies would
70
Ibid., 12.
71 Don D. Marshall, "From Triangular Trade to (N)AFTA: A NeoStructuralist Insight Into Missed
Caribbean Opportunities," Third World Quarterly 17, no. 3 (1996): 445.
72 Schoepfle, "U.S. Caribbean Trade Relations Over the last Decade: From CBI to ACS," 1.
73 Ramnarine, "The Philosophy and Developmental Prospects of the CBI," 110.
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become lucrative markets for the U.S. goods and attractive venues for investment in
manufacturing industries that would raise the global competitiveness of U.S. industries.74
It was suggested that the cheaper unskilled labor of the Caribbean Basin workers would
supplement the skilled labor of U.S. workers to produce goods that would be more
competitive, without incurring the loss of jobs. Also, as the CBI strengthened the
economies of the region, it was projected that the already high demand for U.S. goods
would also increase.75 An important argument that was presented by proponents of the
agreement was that by promoting economic development in the Caribbean, this was one
way to slow the migratory flow from the region to the U.S.76
Features of the CBI
Initially, the CBERA specified that the program would last for a period of 12
years until 1995. However in 1990, the program was replaced with CBI II which
covered an indefinite period of time and expanded the benefits in a number of areas.
Congress also urged that special efforts be undertaken to improve CBI utilization in the
very small island states ofthe Eastern Caribbean, and Belize.77
The three basic components of the CBI are concessionary trade arrangements,
considered the most important aspect of the program; the allotment of tax incentives for
74 Ibid.
75Ibid., 111.
76 Ransford Palmer, "Caribbean Relations With the U.S. in the Twenty-First Century," Caribbean
Forum 1, no. 1, Issue 11 (Winter 1994): 5.
77 Lloyd Searwar, "The Dilemmas of Being Small: Some Thoughts on Caricom Approach to the
North American Free Trade Area and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative" (Georgetown, Guyana:
n.p., May 16, 1991): 20.
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specific U.S. business activities in the Caribbean; and one-off financial assistance for
balance of payment support.
Concessionary Trade Arrangements
The CBI affords preferential rates of duty below the MFN rates to most products
from the Caribbean Basin countries by reducing the tariff rates on a number of products
entering the U.S. market from the region. However there were some products that were
excluded - textile, apparel, petroleum and petroleum products, canned tuna, footwear,
luggage, handbags, leather, rubber, plastic gloves, and watches and watch parts
containing material made in a communist country. Sugar was also granted duty-free
status, but remained subject to non-tariff barriers such as import fees and unilaterally
imposed quotas. In order to be eligible for duty free treatment under
CBERA, articles grown, produced or manufactured in a beneficiary country must meet
the rules of origin criteria which specify that at least 35% value added must be from one
or more CBI beneficiary country. Also, the program specifies that up to 15% of the value
added requirement can be accounted for by the value of U.S. made components, with the
remaining 20% being CBERA-beneficiary nations' value added portion.78
Many beneficiary countries, including some of the CARICOM states criticized the
arrangement in that it originally excluded products in which the countries had a
comparative advantage in production. One such export was textile/apparel. As a result
of the criticism concerning the exclusion of textiles and garments, the Caribbean Basin
Special Access Program for Apparel was introduced in February 1986 under the CBI
78 Pelzman and Schoepfle, "The Impact of the Caribbean," 754.
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framework.79 This special program "the Super 807 Program", provided for a more
favorable treatment for Caribbean Basin apparel and textile under 3 types of agreements:
1) Specific Limits (SLs) which are absolute quotas either negotiated or unilaterally
imposed and which increase by a certain percentage annually;
2) Guaranteed Access Levels (GALs) which are reserved for garments assembled in
beneficiary countries from materials manufactured and cut in the U.S.;
3) Designated Consultation Levels (DCLs) which allows negotiated levels of apparel
articles to enter the U.S.
Imports under the GALS are now charged duty only on value added outside the U.S. These
special provisions give CBI beneficiaries what amounts to an unlimited access to the U.S.
market for qualifying textile/apparel products.
With these provisions, the U.S. sought to integrate CBI economies into its textile
and apparel industry. In order to be cost effective in production, the U.S. industry
required a higher incidence of offshore production which meant low wages and cheaper
factors of production being utilized.81 The Special Access Program also gave liberal
import quota treatment to U.S. companies that used U.S. fabric, (knitted or woven and cut
82
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Domestic and Foreign Private Investment
The provisions in CBI were specifically framed to provide a clear path through
which the private sector could develop. Foreign investment was emphasized since it was
considered to be preferable to other sources of capital inflow such as official aid and
private loans. It serves to transfer new technology and management skills in order to
increase exports and reduce the burden on the existing export sector in achieving the dual
goal of renewed domestic growth and servicing the national debt."83 The CBI thus
provides tax incentives to promote foreign investment in the CBI countries.
Another element of the CBI was the promotion of domestic private investment as
a complement to foreign investment. However, incentives had to be made available to
dissuade capital exports and retain investments in the region. It was hoped that the state
would limit economic intervention and public sector spending in order to make more
capital available for investment.
Beneficiaries of the CBI - The Textile/Apparel Industry
The most visible gains as far as the CARICOM countries are concerned with
regard to the CBI provisions have been in textiles and apparel, a sector which was
excluded under the initial CBI benefits, but later included under the Special Provisions of
the 807 code, which has been renamed HTS 9802.84 Over 80% of the apparel imports
83 Ramnarine, "The Philosophy and Developmental Prospects of the CBI," 85.
44 Item 807.00 of the Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (TSUS) had been in effect since 1963. In 1989,
the U S replaced the TSUS with the Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) as the basis for classifying imported
goods for duty and other customs purposes. HTS 9802.00.80 is the successor provisions to item 807.00 of
the former TSUS. HTS 9802.00.80 provides a duty exemption for U.S. components that are returned to the
U.S. as parts of goods assembled abroad.
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from CBERA countries in 1996 entered under the HTS 9802 tariff provision.85 Textile
and apparel have registered the most gain of all other manufacturing exports.86 By the
late 1980s, this product became the major CBERA country export to the U.S., surpassing
those of crude and refined petroleum products.87 Between 1983 and 1986 apparel exports
increased by 107% followed by textiles with an 81% increase.
According to the USITC, the products which have attracted the most investment
in the 1980s were apparel manufacturing, ethanol, agriculture, fish processing and
aquaculture. In the insular Caribbean, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic have
received the largest appropriations. By the end of the decade, the apparel industry was
the largest recipient of foreign investment and the fastest growing industry in the region.
Garment exports from Caribbean Basin countries grew 80% between 1985 and 1987,
increasing their share of total U.S. apparel imports from 5% to 9%.89 Between 1984 and
1996, apparel imports grew form 5.5% of overall U.S. imports to 41%, with a value
reaching $6 billion.90 During 1987 to 1996, apparel shipments from CBERA countries
more than quadrupled, increasing at an average rate of 21% per year.91 U.S. apparel
85 "Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 12th Report 1996, Investigation No. 332-227,
USITC Publication 3058 (Washington,. D.C.: USITC, September 1997).
86 Hewan, Jamaica and the United States Caribbean Basin Initiative, 124.
87 Schoepfle, "U.S. Caribbean Trade Relations Over the Last Decade: From CBI to ACS," 25.
88 Ramnarine, "The Philosophy and Developmental Prospects of the CBI," 92.
89 George P. Montalvan, "Promoting Investment and Exports in the Caribbean Basin: Papers and
Proceedings (Washington: OAS, General Secretariat, 1989): 62.
90 "Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 12th Report," xiii.
91 Ibid.
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firms shipped garment parts valued at $5.3 billion to the CBERA countries for sewing
in 1996, nearly double the amount in 1993 and $810 million more than in the previous
year.92 The rise in apparel imports from CBERA countries reflected increased U.S.
Caribbean production sharing.
The Caribbean region is the second leading source after Mexico of U.S.
production-sharing imports.93 Almost all U.S. apparel exports to CBERA beneficiaries
consist of garment parts, which are reimported as assembled garments.94 In CBERA
apparel production sharing, U.S. firms ship garment parts to the region for sewing, and
re-import the assembled garments paying duty only on the value added offshore.
In order to increase the export production in CBERA countries and expand the
use of U.S. fabrics, the U.S. government in 1986 introduced a "Special Access Program"
for CBERA goods within the framework of the former "807" provision. Commonly
known as "807A", the program provided in addition to the reduced duties, guaranteed
access to the U.S. market for apparel assembled in participating CBERA countries from
fabric made and cut in the U.S. Apparel under these provisions enter under virtually
unlimited quotas known as "guaranteed access levels" (GALS). The U.S. components
can be made of either U.S. or foreign fabric as long as the fabric is cut to shape in the
U.S. and exported ready for assembly. By 1998, the U.S. had agreements providing
92 ibid.




for GALS and regular quotas with six CBERA beneficiaries - Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Jamaica.96
The rapid growth of Caribbean apparel shipments to the U.S. followed the
implementation of the Special Access Program for CBERA countries in 1986. Since
1983, two way trade between the U.S. and CBERA countries in the textile/apparel sector
has grown by an annual average of 20% to $12 billion in 1997 far exceeding the 6%
annual gain in overall U.S.-CBERA trade.97 Levis Strauss' Director of Government
Affairs, David Weiskopf, stated that the "CBERA has been a catalyst for significant
changes in our global sourcing strategies".98 The company has shifted much of its
offshore production from Asia to the CBI region, where U.S. made fabric and
components are used in greater amounts than in Asia. Weiskopf suggested that:
the expansion of apparel assembly operations in the CBI countries has brought
benefits to all concerned - U.S. textile producers who manufacture fabric used in
the region's apparel operations; U.S. apparel manufacturers who benefit from
lower cost assembly operations and lower transportation costs due to the region's
proximity to the U.S.; America's workers in high value jobs related to the pre and
post assembly stages of apparel manufacturing; and thousands of workers and
families in the Caribbean Basin countries.99
Performance/Results of the CBI
More than a decade and a half after the implementation of the CBI, the






general agreement as to some of the observed results in specific sectors and in individual
countries.
The CBI has been credited with shifting the export orientation and commodity
structure away from traditional agricultural products towards non-traditional fruits and
vegetables, industrial processing, and assembly operations in the region. At the same
time, it has "perpetuated and reinforced" dependence on the U.S. economy by integrating
Caribbean countries more closely into the international production structure of
manufacturers in the U.S.100 It has "provided the impetus to the development of trade
and investment" between the U.S. and the Caribbean Basin resulting in an increased flow
of trade and investment between the two areas.101 It is believed that the CBI has been a
good strategy for building trade linkages opposed to creating a dependence on aid, and is
therefore seen as a stimulus for economic development in the region.
The U.S. was the single largest destination for exports from the CBERA
beneficiaries combined during the period 1980 - 1996. Before the CBI, Caribbean Basin
countries' exports to the U.S. market were predominantly high value petroleum products.
However, between 1983 and 1989, non-traditional CBI-eligible exports from the
beneficiary countries to the U.S., principally textiles and apparels registered improved
100 Hyett, "Caribcan:Canada's Response," 76.
101 Elena M. Suarez, "The Caribbean in Economic Transition, " Choices and Change: Reflections
on the Caribbean, ed. Winston C. Dookeran (Washington, D.C.: Interamerican Development Bank, 1996):
125.
102 Richard Bemal, "Changing Trade Trends Confronting the Caribbean," CAIC Magazine 1.1
(4* Quarter, 1996): 16.
133
performance showing a 90.8 percent increase in that time period.103 Textile and apparel,
which by 1989 had become the major item imported from the region, accounting for 25%
of all U.S. imports from the region, is now the largest source of U.S. trade with the
region. In 1997 it accounted for 35% of the total trade, up form 6% in 1983.104
The results of a survey published by the Department of Commerce indicated that
285 new export oriented investments in CBI countries, valued at $208 million and
creating approximately 25,891 jobs, could "be reasonably tied" to the CBI from the
period of its inception to the Spring of 1985. Of these, 75 new investments were reported
to have been made in Jamaica, making it appear to be a preferred location.105 The
majority of these new investments, however, were in the export-oriented assembly
operations.
In another survey of CBI investment projects conducted by the U.S. Department
of Commerce in 1988, it was revealed that the fastest growing category of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in manufacturing was export oriented assembly operations, and that the
textile/apparel industry was the largest FDI recipient and fastest growing in the region. It
was also established that the benefits of the CBI related foreign investment and related
promotion efforts were concentrated in just three countries, the Dominican Republic,
Jamaica and Costa Rica.
103 Bakan et al, Imperial Power, 8.
104 "Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 13* Report," 13.
105 Ramnarine, "The Philosophy and Developmental Prospects of the CBI," 92 - 93.
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Another important finding was that while some countries have undoubtedly
benefited from the CBI program as far as expansion of exports and attracting foreign
investment, others have not fared as well. One subgroup that has not shown any
significant increase in trade under the CBI is the smaller CARICOM nations.106 This
pattern has been reflected in exports to the U.S. from the CBERA region which showed
that in 1992, the Central
American countries accounted for 42.3% of U.S. imports, followed by the Central
Caribbean countries of the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Haiti accounting for
32.5%, and the oil producing countries with 23.1% . The Eastern Caribbean countries
accounted for only 2.1% of total U.S. imports from the Caribbean Basin in that year.107
Between 1983 and 1986, CBERA eligible exports from the Eastern Caribbean
(most of which are CARICOM countries) fell from $215.7 million to $89.4 million, and
then to $77.1 million form 1986 to 1989. l08 The Eastern Caribbean is the only subgroup
where U.S. trade has declined since the inception of the CBI program, and most of these
countries have not had much success in attracting a high level of foreign investment.
The majority of CBI investments in CARICOM has been in the textile/apparel
industry, where forward and backward linkages are minimal. It has been suggested that
the reason why CBI has had a limited impact on CARICOM countries as a whole is due
to the "non-dynamic manufacturing entrepreneurial class, the relative unattractiveness of
106 "Survey ofCBI Investment Projects " (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce,
July 1988).
107 Suarez, "The Caribbean in Economic Tansition, " 126.
108 Pelzmanand Schoepfle, "The Impact of the Caribbean," 194.
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CARICOM countries as global platforms, the new technological revolution, and the
adoption of economic policies which harm national industry".109 These observations
confirm the finding that not all the countries in the region have benefited to any great
extent from the CBI.
On the other hand, there are some countries such as the Dominican Republic and
Honduras that have successfully promoted and attracted a large amount of new private
investment, much of it foreign direct investment from the U.S. Between 1984 and 1990,
almost $2 billion in new investments went to some Caribbean countries as a result of
CBI.110 Many of these countries have significantly increased their manufactured
exports of nontraditional products, while thousands of new jobs have been generated in
others as a result of the program.
Despite these varying results or because of them, the U.S. seems to have emerged
as one of the prime winners or beneficiaries of the CBI. The U.S. has maintained a
consistent trade surplus with the region since 1986. From 1983 to 1990, U.S. imports
from the Caribbean declined by 15.6%, and U.S. exports to the region surged by 64%
from $5.7 to $9.7 billion.112 In 1992, the U.S. trade surplus with the region amounted to
109 Winston H. Griffith, "Caricom Countries and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, " Latin American
Perspectives 17, Issue 64, no.l (Winter 1990): 35.
110 Sarath Rajapatirana, "The East Asia Experience ad Its Relevance to the Caribbean Within the
NAFTA Environment," in Choiches and Change: Reflections on the Caribbean.
111 "Survey of CBI Investment Projects" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, July
1988).
112 Dalley, "A Post-Nafta U.S. Trade Policy, " 171.
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$1.8 billion."3 Total value of U.S. imports from CBERA countries amounted to 1.9%
of total U.S. imports in 1997, while the value of U.S. exports to CBERA countries was
2.8%.'14
U.S. exports to CBERA countries have more than tripled growing from $5.9
billion in 1980 prior to the implementation of CBERA, to $17.8 billion in 1997.115 The
increased use of free trade zones as well as CBERA and production sharing provisions
(PSP) have generated a growing demand for U.S. made parts, accessories, machinery and
equipment required to assemble these products in the Caribbean. This production
structure which has boosted U.S. exports to these countries, is one of the main reasons
why the Caribbean region has become the second leading source after Mexico of U.S.
production-sharing imports, and the leading source of U.S. imports of apparel.116
Production sharing with CBERA countries involves primarily semi-finished
products, cut apparel pieces exported from the U.S. to low-labor -cost CBERA countries
where they are assembled and returned to the U.S. for further processing, packaging and
distribution.117 As a result of the increase in investment in this sector, U.S. exports to
CBERA beneficiaries of cut fabric used in the assembly of apparel products increased in
importance between 1990 and 1997. It is estimated that each $1 billion of exports to the
region generated 20,000 new direct jobs in the U.S. The increase in CBI purchases of
113 Suarez, "The Caribbean in Economic Transition," 126.





U.S. goods and services from 1983 to 1990 helped to create around 80,000 new direct
jobs in the U.S.118
The U.S. also enjoys a strong advantage with the program in that CBI industries
in the region have a strong propensity to purchase raw materials, machinery and
equipment from the U.S. Consequently, around 45% of the CBI imports come from the
U.S.119 These figures which are based on trade reports, suggest that the U.S. has gained
more than the CBI countries from the trade arrangement.120
Up until the mid 1990s, there was a widespread sentiment in the Caribbean that
the CBI was a disappointment particularly for the smaller CARICOM nations as a whole
in the area of trade and increased exports. However, supporters of the agreement feel that
the CBI may have benefited the region in other ways.121 Many Caribbean Basin
countries have strengthened their infrastructure to improve investment possibilities by
developing industrial parks and free trade zones. The countries have also reinforced their
administrative institutions to promote exports and investments, and as a result, increased
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The CBI has also been credited with functioning as a first and vital step in the
expansion of trade and U.S. investment in the region, and trade between the region and
the U.S. It has also stimulated growth by encouraging economic reform and
liberalization of economic policies in the region.123 The program is believed to have
acted as a catalyst to encouraging the countries in the Caribbean to embrace privatization
and deregulation that promote "export driven, private-sector led" growth and
development.124 The CBI is also regarded as having supported economic reform which
resulted in "genuine" market economies that laid the foundation for mutual prosperity,
growth and stronger trade links.125 These benefits seem to support the claims of
proponents of preferential arrangements:
underlying the adoption of preferential treatment in regional economic
integration has been the notion that the benefits which relatively less developed
countries might derive from access to expanded markets in the context of regional
trade liberalization arrangements will not accrue merely as a result of trade
liberalization measures, but also as a consequence of the implementation of
mechanisms that might counteract structural deficiencies of various kinds which
prevent these countries from experiencing the full benefits of economic
integration.126
There are however, critics of the CBI who feel that the program's drawbacks and
disadvantages outweigh any benefits that have been cited by its proponents, and that the
arrangement has not lived up to its expectations nor met its objectives.
123 Dalley, "A Post-Nafta U.S. Trade Policy," 171.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 "Small and Relatively Less Developed Economies and Western Hemisphere Integration, " 26.
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Critics of the CBI
The CBI was implemented as part the U.S. policy to revisit its relations with the
Caribbean Basin in the wake of deteriorating economic and political conditions that were
considered as having the potential to threaten the economic and security interests in the
region. As a result, some critics of the program feel that the arrangement was not
designed to primarily assist the economies of the region but to fulfill two primary
purposes vital to the national interests of the U.S.:
... to assist private enterprise, particularly the U.S. businesses by ensuring that the
Caribbean region remain open to and safe for internal as well as external investments
... and to guarantee the economic and military security interests of the U.S. by
ensuring its continued dominance of the Western Hemisphere.127
Critics argued that the program reflected the U.S. Administration's interest in "military
security, political loyalty, and advantages for U.S. firms, rather than U.S. concern for the
region's long term development".128 Some suggest that the fundamental flaw with the
program stems from the fact that it was designed to satisfy the needs and interests of the
U.S. more than those of the Caribbean region. Various sectors of the Caribbean society
including union, non-governmental developmental agencies, and Caribbean "grassroots"
organizations have criticized the CBI strategy that involves private sector led, export
oriented development. The argument they offer is that this strategy instead of building on
the productive strength of the region, only served as a stimulus to offshore production for
127 Hewan, Jamaica and the United States, 115.
128 Ibid., 114.
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the re-export assembly type industries which create limited stable employment
opportunities with few forward and backward linkages to the local economies.129
The program was also criticized in that it involved bilateral investment treaties
which ignored regional concerns. In the case of CARICOM, the arrangement ignored the
subregion's unified approach to attracting foreign investment which involved a plan to
lessen competition between the small states. The program also did not support regional
production schemes and paid little attention to cooperation in the agro-industry. With a
bilateral negotiating strategy, the CARICOM nations were placed at a disadvantage in the
negotiations. The governments were forced to participate in the negotiations without the
type of technical advice and regional resources that would have been available had they
been required to negotiate as a group.130 With their outdated technologies, inadequate
management systems, and inadequate training and assistance,131 CARICOM countries
also lacked the entrepreneurial and financial resources to capitalize on the different
provisions of CBI.
Results indicate that the CBI, although it attempted to stimulate exports from the
Caribbean Basin countries, also encouraged greater imports from the U.S. contributing to
the consistent balance of payment deficit that the subregion has experienced in the last
two decades with the U.S. The program has been criticized as one that has overlooked
129
Ibid., 126.
130 Catherine Hyett, "The Impact ofthe CBI on Barbados, Jamaica, and Grenada: An Assessment"
in Imperial Power, 211.
131 Griffith, "Caricom Countries and the CBI," 38.
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social development and its ramifications in favor of providing incentives to the private
sector to increase exports.
Conclusion
Edward Seaga, one of the original architects of the idea for a program to assist the
economies in the region, had embraced the CBI as a vehicle that would push the region's
economy to a higher level of development. Although it is debatable whether this has
occurred, there are several countries that have benefited to some extent from the program,
while there are others where the results have not been as expected.
Overall, the CBI may have provided the countries in the region, particularly the
smaller economies which may not have benefited a great deal from the trade, aid and
investment package, with the experience and exposure to deal with the U.S. on important
trade issues. The level of expertise gained could be an important asset and work to their
benefit in the current negotiations underway involving the Free Trade Area of the
Americas arrangement.
More importantly for the region, the arrangement seems to have served more than
merely as a trade arrangement with preferential treatment that is supposed to aid small
countries in developing their economies. This is evident in the fact that even the small
economies which have not capitalized on the arrangement as some of the larger countries,
have been the most proactive and vocal in their desire to ensure that the program
continues and that it is strengthened so that other regional trade arrangements such as
NAFTA, would not detract from it and erode any benefits afforded to the CBERA
beneficiaries.
CHAPTER 5
NAFTA AS A CATALYST FOR INCREASED TRADE RELATIONS : IS IT A
PROTECTIONIST OR A FREE TRADE PROMOTING AGREEMENT?
Background
In January 1994, the governments of the U.S., Canada and Mexico implemented
the NAFTA, considered to be the first reciprocal free trade pact between a developing
country and industrial countries. The Agreement brought together a market of around
357 million people with a gross national product of about $5,932 billion.1 The impetus
behind the establishment of NAFTA can be viewed in terms of the individual goals and
agendas of the three member states which included a combination of economic, social
and political issues. "Economic integration is often motivated less by economic interests
than by social and political movements and pressures"2 seems quite appropriate in the
case of NAFTA, although it would appear at first glance to be exclusively about trading
relationships, in some respects free, and in other areas, more restricted.3
The idea for NAFTA was the first step towards President Bush's Enterprise for
the Americas (EAI), a proposal for an entity that would link all the countries in the
1 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA: An Assessment (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics, October 1993), I.
2 Michael Wallace Gordon, "Economic Integration in North America - An Agreement of Limited
Dimensions by Unlimited Expectations," The Modern Law Review Limited 2. no. 26 (March 1, 1993):
157.
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hemisphere, except Cuba, in an economic trade bloc. The EAI, when completed,
would have rivaled the then evolving European Union at that time with a market of
around 358 million people and gross national product of approximately $5,784 billion.4
For the U.S., there were several reasons why NAFTA was warranted, although it
was more Mexico than the U.S. which was aggressive and proactive in pushing for the
negotiations for a free trade agreement. Jean Pasquero suggested that the U.S., by
promoting NAFTA, (and also more recently, the Free Trade Area of the Americas -
FTAA) is pursuing four individual goals: 1) it is reinforcing its position as a world power
in the Post Cost War Era; 2) it is promoting its own form of free market ideology; 3) it is
advancing democracy through trade and 4) it is securing access for U.S. products and
services to world markets.5 President Bush considered an agreement with Mexico as a
part of a broader trade strategy that would promote free trade throughout the Western
Hemisphere, while acting as a stimulus for multilateral trade negotiations.6
The U.S. administration also intended that NAFTA would assist economic
development in Mexico, and give support to the economic reforms of President Salinas
Administration, which the U.S. considered sincere in its efforts to promote economic
growth and greater cooperation between the two governments, particularly on matters of
mutual interest, such as drugs and immigration.7 Although the Agreement consisted of
4 Hufbauer and Schott, NAFTA: An Assessment, 1.
5 Jean Pasquero, "Regional Market Integration in North America and Corporate Social
Management," Business and Society 39, no. 1 (March 2000).
6 Sidney Weintraub, NAFTA at Three: A Progress Report (Washington, D.C.: The Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 1997) : vii.
7 Ibid.
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language dealing primarily with areas such as capital movements, transportation,
competition policy and dispute resolutions, there were "unwritten agendas" that alluded
to the governance of immigration, the uncontrolled movement of millions of mostly
unskilled, illegal Mexican immigrants crossing the border into the U.S., and the latter's
interests in the Mexican energy reserves.8
The Agreement contains no provisions in regards to the immigration of workers,
in accordance with U.S. wishes. However, part of the motivation and rationale is that
NAFTA, by increasing domestic employment opportunities, will provide the means to
keep Mexicans at home. Another motivation that drove U.S. support for NAFTA was the
growth and competition from Mexico-based Japanese firms, involved in "screwdriver"
1 operations. These firms were increasing their competitiveness vis-a-vis American
companies by utilizing the low labor costs in Mexico to increase their market shares in
the U.S.9 The Administration also hoped that NAFTA would help to draw U.S. owned
but Asian based facilities producing for the U.S. market, to Mexico. Thus, in the U.S.,
NAFTA was promoted as an arrangement that will increase U.S. exports and as a way to
make the country "safe" for U.S. investment - that Mexican governments' history of
nationalizing foreign assets would be curbed.10
The Mexican government, on the other hand, saw NAFTA as a way to obtain
assurance of an open U.S. market which had become an important element of its new
8 Gordon, "Economic Integration, " 157.
'Ibid., 158.
10 John R. MacArthur, The Selling of 'Free Trade: NAFTA, Washington, and the Subversion of
American Democracy (New York: The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc.), 10.
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development policy. Particularly attractive were the opportunities for job creating
investment possibilities that seemed promising under the free trade agreement.11 The
Canadian government, on the other hand, hoped to preserve the benefits of the
Canada/US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) that was signed with the U.S. in 1989, and
thus did not hesitate to be included in the NAFTA agreement.12
The NAFTA Agreement
Although not considered a real free trade deal in some circles,13 NAFTA
constitutes a comprehensive agreement that is designed to promote an environment that
encourages "fair" competition while increasing investment opportunities within each
country. It provides for the progressive elimination of all barriers to trade over a 10 year
period for the U.S. and Canada, and 15 years for Mexico. Members agree to give
preferential treatment to those inside the bloc, by eliminating tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade in goods; improving access for services trade; strengthening protection of
intellectual property rights and creating an effective dispute settlement mechanism.14
NAFTA also establishes a framework in which further regional, trilateral and multilateral
cooperation can be expanded and be enhanced.
In addition to the main agreement, there are five supplemental agreements
included in NAFTA which address, among other things, cooperation on the environment,
11 Weintraub, NAFTA at Three, 32.
12 As mentioned earlier, Canada will not be focused on in this study as will be the U.S. and
Mexico.
13 MacArthur, The Selling ofFree Trade', 10.
14 Paul Dacher, "The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): A Status Report, "
Business America (August 1996): 1
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investment, labor, and intellectual property rights. The Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT) stipulates that the rights and privileges given to a national investor can be extended
to a foreign investor. The BIT along with the Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
(EPRA) and other strict criteria, render eligibility for membership in NAFTA a very
selected process and difficult to achieve for less developed nations in the hemisphere,
should they consider membership. Countries must demonstrate that they are open to
undergoing a sufficient level of economic reform and are pursuing economic strategies
based on market driven principles.15 Potential members must show a commitment to the
multilateral trading system, and progress in achieving open trade regimes, including the
process of privatizing industries, opening up the economy to foreign investors, and
instituting exchange and interest rates determined by the market.16
Another important issue regarding the membership in NAFTA is that the
Agreement is based on reciprocity. As the least developed member of the group, Mexico
was obligated to provide reciprocal guarantee that its market also would remain open to
its NAFTA partners. However, some provisions such as the gradual approach to removal
of tariffs in different sectors, were made to compensate for Mexico's lower level of
development in the Agreement.17 A comparison of various indicators in the years prior to
15 Henry S. Gill, "NAFTA: Challenges for the Caribbean Community" in The Caribbean: New
Dynamics in Trade and Political Economy, ed. Anthony T Bryan (Miami: University of Miami North-
South Center, 1995): 30.
16
Ibid.
17 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Nikki Craske, and Monica Serrano, eds. Mexico and the North


























the signing of NAFTA gives an insight into the disparate levels of development that
were brought together under the umbrella of a single economic integration bloc:
TABLE 5.1
Economic Characteristics: U.S.. Canada and Mexico
U.S. Canada Mexico
GDP per capita (1988) $US
Population (mid 1988) millions
Population Growth Rate, 1982 1988 (%)
Population below 15 years old, 1987 (%)
Employment:
# of employees in workforce, 1988 (millions)
Employees in services sector (%)
Employees in Agriculture (%)
Employees in Industry (%)
Labor Compensation per industrial sector
Employee, (1988 wages plus fringes) 13.92 13.58 1.57
Capital Goods as a % of Industrial Production
(1987) 35.0 25.0 14.0
Productivity, GDP/employee (1988) 42,161.0 39,733.0 7,935.0
Per capita public expenditure on education 1,126.0 1,171.0 59.0
% of 20 - 24 year olds enrolled in higher
education (1986) 59.0 55.0 16.0
Source: IMD International, The World Competitiveness Report (Lausanne, Switzerland: 1990).
At the time of the Agreement, Mexico was barely able to meet those eligibility
requirements for membership. However, the country had, beginning in the 1980s,
embarked on a policy of economic liberalization, moving towards a relatively open
market. The government undertook a number of radical, internal and external economic
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reforms relying to a greater degree on market forces in allocating resources in a more
efficient manner.18
Mexico's Attempts at Economic Reform and Trade Liberalization
Under Presidents de la Madrid (1982 - 1988) and Carlos Salinas de Gotari (1988 -
1995), austerity measures were implemented which were reinforced by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to counteract balance-of-payments crises.19
Both administrations pushed outward looking economic programs and backed away from
the import substitution approach to industrialization that had been pursued years earlier.
The country joined the ranks of GATT members in 1986 to reinforce its interest in a free
trade agreement with the U.S. It also pursued diversification and promotion of its exports
to improve competitiveness.20
By the late 1980s, the Mexican government had implemented strict fiscal policies
over the country's monetary and spending regimes, devalued the currency, and imposed
wage controls. Import tariffs were reduced to an average of 13% for goods entering
Mexico, in contrast to about 5% for goods entering the U.S.21 Strategic industries such
as banks, trucking, airlines and parts of PEMEX, the state-run oil company, were
privatized and deregulated, introducing a certain amount of competition into the
18 Gladstone A. Hutchinson and Ute Schumacher, "NAFTA's Threat to Central American and
Caribbean Basin Exports: A Revealed Comparative Advantage approach, " Journal oflnteramerican
Studies and World Affairs (Spring 1994).
19 Don Marshall, "NAFTA/FTAA and the New Articulations in the Americas: Seizing Structural
Opportunities," Third World Quarterly 19, no. 4 (1998): 690.
20 Hutchinson and Schumacher, "NAFTA's Threat."
21 Gordon, "Economic Integration in North America," 116.
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economy. The government also tried to lure capital to Mexico by reducing the
numerous barriers to foreign investments. It also played an important role in stimulating
exports by offering programs such as the Pitex Program (Temporary Import Program),
the Maquilarora and the Drawback Program, all designed to grant benefits to import and
export companies.22
By the early 1990s, the closed Mexican economy of the early 1980s was
transformed into a relatively open one. Inflation, which had reached an annual rate of
159% in 1987, was reduced significantly to levels around 10%. The financial deficit
which registered over 15% of GDP in 1982 and 1986, was continuously reduced to reach
a surplus by 1992. Interest rates in the domestic financial markets also declined in both
real and nominal terms from the 1980s.23 Mexico entered into a series of bilateral
agreements with the U.S in the 1980s which further opened up trade between the two
countries, and which gave Mexico a special status with the U.S. upon which the
development ofNAFTA was facilitated.24
Under President Salinas' administration, Mexico was very aggressive and
proactive in pursuing NAFTA negotiations. Subsequent administrations continued the
country's focus on trade liberalization and the signing of NAFTA which undoubtedly
served as a demonstration of the country's commitment towards that policy. This
attitude was reflected in Mexico's Commerce Minister's comments in 1996 that, "...we
22 Mercedes Cortazar, "Mexico's Export Competitiveness," Apparel Industry International
(September/October, 1998): 1.
23 Bulmer-Thomas et al, Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 39.
24 Gordon, "Economic Integration in North America," 167.
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are looking for free trade anywhere we can find it because we believe that is the way
to promote our exports, and in that fashion, promote employment in Mexico."25
Mexico also sought to develop other trade arrangements with hemispheric
nations, pursuing bilateral trade liberalization agreements with the Central American
countries, signing a 1992 unilateral framework agreement with Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Similar agreements were also signed with
Columbia, Chile, Venezuela, and Bolivia.26
U.S./Mexico Trade: Before and After NAFTA
Trade between Mexico and the U.S. started to increase before the implementation
of NAFTA as a result of: 1) Mexico's economic recovery during the late 1980s; 2)
Mexico's reduction of import duties which began around 1983 and accelerated after
Mexico's membership in GATT, and 3) the 'anticipation effect' of the impending
NAFTA.27 Trade between the two countries increased quite consistently after Mexico
emerged from its economic crisis of the 1980s, and particularly after the country
unilaterally opened its market to imports and focused on export oriented development.
There are some indications that NAFTA has also contributed to the growth in
U.S./ Mexico trade at a very significant level, and to an increase in foreign direct
investment (FDI) to Mexico. Although trade had increased consistently over the last two
decades, while in 1980 two-way trade was merely $28 billion, in 1995 it had grown to
25 "In Praise ofNAFTA", El Financiero Weekly International, 1996.
26 Marshall, "NAFTA/FTAA," 693.
27 Weintraub, NAFTA at Three, viii.
28 151
$107 billion. U.S. exports to Mexico and Mexican exports to the U.S. each rose by
more than 20% in the first nine months of 1994, contributing to Mexico becoming the
second largest consumer of U.S. products, surpassing Japan.29
Between 1990 to 1997, Mexican exports to the U.S. rose from 78.8% of total
exports to 85.4%.30 Between 1994 and 1998, figures show an even greater increase
registering a 113% growth from $81.5 billion to $174.4 billion, exceeding the rate of
growth among all of America's top ten trading partners including Canada, which trade








































Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, compiled from the official statistics of the U.S. Dept. ofCommerce
28 Ibid., 31
29 Brigitte Levy, "Globalization and Regionalism: Main Issues in International Trade Pattern,"
International Trade in the Twenty First Century, ed. Khosrow Fatemi (New York: Elsevier Science Inc.,
1997), 69.
30 Anne O. Krueger, "Are Preferential Trade Arrangements Trade Liberalizing or Protectionist?"
Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 13, no.4 (Fall 1999) : 110.
31 John S. McCIenahen, "NAFTA Works, " Industry Week 249, no.l (January 2000): 1
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Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, compiled from the official statistics ofthe U.S. Dept. ofCommerce
Of the $230.6 billion worth of merchandise which the U.S. exported to its NAFTA
partners from January to November 1998, $78.1 billion went to Mexico.32
Foreign investment into Mexico also began to rise in anticipation of NAFTA and
showed a marked increase once NAFTA came into effect. Between 1989 and 1994, FDI
averaged about $4.5 billion a year. For the first seven months in 1994, FDI to Mexico
rose by 32% over the same period in 1993, with about 62% of the share coming from the
U.S.33 From January 1994 through April 1996, FDI totaled $16.5 billion.34
This consistent growth in US/Mexico trade and investment has made Mexico the
second largest trading partner of the U.S., accounting for over 70% of Mexican exports
32 U.S. News Wire, "Details ofthe Trade and Developoment Act of 2000" (Washington, D.C.:
White House Fact Sheet, 2000).
33 Levy, "Globalization and Regionalism," 69.
34 Weintraub, NAFTA at Three, 32.
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and imports; and made the U.S. Mexico's most important trading partner.35 When the
Mexican economy grew in 1994, U.S. exports increased, and when it experienced a
slowdown in 1995, U.S. exports fell. U.S. exports also moved in sympathy with the
economic downturn in 1995 in Mexico, and with its recovery the following year.36
NAFTA appears to be responsible for a boom in the manufacturing sector that is
restructuring economies on both sides of the border, particularly in the northern part of
Mexico.37 The growth is occurring as a result of companies relocating their operations to
the Mexican states, and also as a result of Asian producers using Mexico as a gateway to
North America for high end production.38 Many Asian companies, including Sony,
Matsushita, and Sanyo, are looking at areas such as Baja California, the Mexican state
situated on the southern border of San Diego, as prime locations for setting up business.
Samsung, a Korean company, expanded its plant workforce in the industrial park near
Tijuana in 1998. Companies from Japan, Taiwan and South Korea which manufacture
component parts, are considering establishing operations in Baja California to take
advantage of the benefits the maquiladora sectors provide under NAFTA. It is reported
that two of every three television sets bought in North America are manufactured in this
region.39
35 Tom Stundza, "Trade Approaches $ 600 Billion, " Purchasing 128, no. 3 (March 9,2000).
36 Weintraub, NAFTA at Three, 51.





On the U.S. side of the border, the San Diego area has positioned itself to take
advantage of NAFTA by setting itself up as a supplier of high-end services, as a site for
research and development centers, and as a residential community for corporate
headquarters and personnel, where managers and technical workers commute across the
border to Baja each day. The local government has even built specially constructed
commuter lanes to accommodate this growth for trips that can take a couple of minutes.40
San Diego is becoming known as an "emerging giant of the Pacific economy bringing
together the manufacturing prowess of Asia, a pool of cheap Mexican labor" and the
area's own high tech enterprises.
U.S./Mexico Trade:TextiIe and Apparel
One of the most important sectors in Mexico that has shown to have gained
tremendous benefits from NAFTA has been that of the textile/apparel industry. Prior to
the implementation of NAFTA, apparel exported from Mexico to the U.S., which is the
former's primary foreign market, was subject to relatively high import duties and indirect
costs such as quotas that limited the amounts that Mexico could export to the U.S.42
Over 90% of U.S. apparel imports from Mexico before NAFTA were "re-imports" -
garments assembled from pre-cut pieces that had been shipped to Mexico by U.S. firms
under 807 regulation. U.S. garment firms often backed out of Mexican sourcing
40 ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Elena M. Suarez, "The Caribbean in Economic Transition," Choices and Change: Reflections
on the Caribbean, ed. Winston C. Dookeran (Washington, D.C.: Interamerican Development Bank, 1996):
129.
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arrangements, citing a number of complaints ranging from poor quality, inconsistency,
long lags in turnaround, communication problems, and bureaucratic red tape.43
Under NAFTA, import duties were immediately eliminated from about 80% of
Mexico's apparel trade with the U.S. The remaining apparel that did not gain duty free
status when the Agreement came into effect will benefit from an accelerated
implementation of free trade, with annual reductions in duty and liberalization of quota
that began in 1994 and will continue until 2001.44 In addition, administrative
requirements including documentation and other enforcement measures were simplified
or eliminated.45
While NAFTA represents the first attempt by the U.S. to subject or open its
heavily protected textile and apparel sector to significant trade liberalization with a
developing country, 46 it establishes strict rules of origin for textiles and apparel. In
order to qualify for preferential treatment, textile and apparel goods must normally pass a
"triple transformation test" which essentially requires that finished products be cut and
sewn from fabric spun from North American fibers in order to qualify for NAFTA
preferences.47




46 Hufbauer and Schott, NAFTA.An Assessment, 45.
47 Ibid.
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NAFTA also provides a reduced rate and generous quota for Mexican apparel
made from Asian fabric, a benefit which is not provided to other exporters such as the
Caribbean countries. Mexico is not required to pay duty on value added portion of the
807A exports, as Caribbean countries are required to do.48 Apparel assembled in Mexico
from "fabric wholly formed and cut in the U.S." enters free of duty and quota under
NAFTA (subject to the "fabric forward" rule of origin). In 1996, yarn forward
represented 88% of the total value of U.S. imports of apparel from Mexico.
Before the Agreement was signed, Mexican textile/apparel exports to the U.S.
market were only 3.5% of total U.S. imports. However, by 1997, these exports
constituted more than 9% of the U.S. total textile and apparel goods imported from
Mexico.49 The majority of the former are blue denims, non-woven fabrics, woven
cottons, and cut corduroy; while cotton pants, cotton t-shirts, synthetic fiber pants,
brassiers and cotton shirts and sweaters, constitute apparel's major exports.50
From 1994 to 1997, Mexico increased its share in the U.S. market in denim,
cotton, and synthetic pants, cotton t-shirts and cotton and synthetic sweaters. Mexico
supplies the U.S. market with approximately half of its total denim imports.51 Between
1995 and 1998, Mexican apparel exports to the U.S. increased 119%, surpassing those of
48
Ibid.





Hong Kong, China, South Korea, and the ASEAN states.'2 In the first six months of
1995, Mexico experienced a rise in exports to the U.S. by 69% to $1.3 billion.53 hi 1997,
exports rose to $7,875 billion, or 41% more than what was registered in 1996, rendering
the sector one of the most important and dynamic ones and accounting for 62.6% of total
exports.54
In the first quarter of 1998, Mexican textile and apparel exports to the U.S.
showed an 18.4% increase compared to the same period in 1997, to reach a total of
$1,947 billion;55 and for the year 1998, exports to the U.S. alone exceeded $6 billion,
three and a half times greater than Mexico's 1980 maquila output of all manufactured
goods. No other country among the top ten exporters to the U.S. boosted its exports to
such an extent. Mexico's exports to the U.S. have risen at a significant rate of 44% a year
since NAFTA was implemented.56
The nucleus of Mexico's sewn products exports, the maquiladora system, grew
from about 100 registered plants in 1980 to about 2000 in 1994 across all industries.
That number increased to 3000 by 1999, with about one third of the total being apparel
factories.57 Some companies that are adding to this growth include Borden Apparel
52 Kessler, "New NAFTA Alliances," 1.
53 Larry Luxner, "CBI Grows, but Mexico Dominates," Bobbin Magazine (November 1995): 73
54 Cortazar, "Mexico's Export Competitiveness," 1.
55 Ibid.
56 "US Bill Could Return Lost Jobs: A Proposed Trade Law Could Help Caribbean and Central
American Countries Bring Back Jobs to NAFTA," Greensboro News and Record via ProQuest (November
18, 1999).
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Inc., which invested $3.5 billion to build an apparel factory in Mexico, one that would
generate 1500 direct jobs and 8,000 indirect jobs; and Industries Borj; which invested
$1 million in a textile plant along the Mexico-Texas border, that would offer significant
employment opportunities. Sigma Industrial Corporation also recently constructed a
$140 million textile factory in Mexico.58
Textile and apparel production appears to be concentrated and accounting for
significant growth in some areas of Mexico more than in others. The manufacturers of
LaLaguna lead the nation in the production of denim. In the states of Coahuila and
Durango two years ago, there were over 300 factories and it was estimated that over
40,000 direct jobs were generated with an average production of three million garments
manufactured per week.59
NAFTA therefore appears to have been instrumental in promoting textile/apparel
exports to the U.S. Other factors that may have played a supporting role, however,
include the proximity to the U.S. market, the 2000 miles of shared border, low production
costs and the country's extensive experience in the sector.60 Added to these
complementary factors is the existence of Mexico's modern infrastructure, including
airports, sea ports, railways, highways, industrial parks and communications, which are
all necessary to keep abreast of the constant and rapid changes in the industry, that result
38
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(March/April 1998): 1.
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from consumer tastes. However, since these conditions existed prior to NAFTA,
most changes that occurred after 1994 may not be attributable to the Agreement.
In addition, Mexico's ability to intensively utilize its workforce gives the country
a competitive advantage as it relates to lower wages and higher productivity.62 This
situation has affected the U.S. textile/apparel industry which in 1999 contributed to the
U.S. trade deficit with Mexico.63 In 1995, U.S. exports of apparel to Mexico, which
included cut pieces to be assembled into apparel were up 21.2% over 1994 to $1.3
billion.64 However, imports from Mexico were $3 billion in 1995, an increase of 60%
over 1994 and 38% more than in 1993.65 Meanwhile, employment in the U.S.
textile/apparel sector which totaled 1,484,000 in 1995,66 has for the past couple of years
consistently declined. This drop in employment and also in output and income has been
as a result of a number of recent developments including growth in Mexican textiles
spurred by NAFTA and the devaluation of the peso, a worldwide overcapacity in textiles,
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Mexican apparel and textile firms are becoming increasingly more important
in the U.S. network of transnational enterprises, particularly as U.S. textile firms,
manufacturing and retailing, pursue the opportunities made available through NAFTA
to capture and exert control over segments of the industry. More Mexican companies are
improving their facilities and upgrading their operations as they become incorporated into
the production pipelines of major U.S. firms.
Benefits of NAFTA to Mexico
NAFTA has fostered new types of relationships between U.S. and Mexican firms,
and encouraged more long-term commitments on both sides of the border. Production
sharing agreements and mutual production alliances have given rise to new sourcing
centers in certain areas of the U.S., such as in the Southeastern region, and Southern
California. In Southern California, for example, the number of apparel manufacturers
sourcing in Mexico increased four fold between 1992 and 1998.69
The new type of alliances that have developed in the post NAFTA period differs a
great deal from the pre-NAFTA production sharing relationships. The former
encompasses corporate/legal and financial ties between the U.S. companies and their
Mexican affiliates - shared ownership of production facilities, wholly owned subsidiaries
in Mexico, and capital investment in maquiladoras. They represent a higher level of
transnational integration, with larger investments of time, money, personnel and closer
68 Kessler, "New NAFTA Alliances Reshape," 1.
69 Ibid.
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monitoring by U.S. lead firms.70 These types of emerging relations between the U.S.
and Mexico have prompted observations that regional trade arrangements such as
NAFTA play a more significant role in business decisions and sourcing patterns than
multilateral trade agreements, such as the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement.71
NAFTA seems to have had the greatest impact on Mexico, more than on any
other of the members in the group. It has been advanced that NAFTA has helped to
institutionalize the domestic reforms that Mexico began adopting in the 1980s, by locking
in the reforms in such as way that it would be difficult for them to be reversed.72
Whereas it took more than five years for Mexico to shake off the recession which began
in the early 1980s, it took only about two years after the 1995 economic slowdown for
Mexico to begin the recovery process. Of course, it can be argued that the reason for the
shorter economic contraction was because the U.S. took a more active role in ensuring
the quick recovery of the Mexican economy in the 1990s because of the binding ties that
NAFTA created for the U.S. An extension of this argument is that had it not been for
NAFTA, the U.S. would not have felt obliged to step in and assist with the recovery,
including the resolution of the pesos crisis in 1994.. Whatever the reason given, it is
clear that NAFTA played an instrumental role in the U.S. assistance. NAFTA helped
Mexico adhere to the macroeconomic policy measures to deal with the problems. The
70 Ibid.
71 Brenda Jacobs, "Have CBI Nations Found a Full Package Opportunity?" Bobbin (July 1998):
70-71.
72 Jeffrey A. Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System (Washington,
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country was constrained in raising tariffs and erecting other import barriers against
U.S. goods (as it had done previously during the 1982 recession) since that would have
been in violation of the Agreement.73
There are also predictions that NAFTA will provide the environment in which
more rapid structural domestic reforms can take place - that it will encourage a larger
capital inflow into Mexico which would increase its capital base and "enhance its long
run growth potential".74 It has been suggested that by strengthening Mexico's investment
climate through improvement in financial markets and improved dispute settlement
mechanisms, more investment from non-NAFTA sources will be attracted to the country,
as can already be identified by the relocation of some firms, particularly in the garment
industry, to Mexico.75
It is felt that although some segments of the economy, for example, farm workers,
may lose their jobs because of NAFTA, the net loss of agricultural income will be offset
by the gains in industry and services, resulting in an overall gain.76 The U.S. Department
of Labor reported that 112,000 U.S. jobs have been lost as a result of trade with Mexico
and the closing of plants in the U.S. However, a recent University of California study
cited that approximately 200,000 jobs "directly related to trade with Mexico" have been
73 Weintraub, NAFTA at Three, 27, 30.
74 Lawrence R. Klein and Dominick Salvatore, "Welfare Effects of the North American Free Trade
Agreement," International Trade in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Khosrow Fatemi (New York: Elsevier
Science Inc., 1997), 152.
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created in the U.S. since NAFTA's implementation.77 Also, that the manufacturing
sector in Mexico will become more competitive as discriminatory government
regulations are removed and as improvements in the border infrastructure facilitate a
more efficient, faster, and cheaper movement of goods.
Benefits of NAFTA to the U.S.
Although Mexico is expected to be the greatest beneficiary of the Agreement,
there are indications that some important benefits will also accrue to the U.S. It is hoped
that NAFTA would improve the U.S. export performance and increase exports to Mexico
in a more dynamic manner, thus creating higher levels of employment domestically. The
Agreement provides U.S. firms with the capability of combining skilled and semiskilled
workers and cheap labor to create a type of production sharing scheme that will benefit
U.S. firms.79 U.S. companies will be able to import labor-intensive components from
Mexico which will allow them to keep other operations at home. The low paying jobs
that are expected to be lost to Mexico, would most likely have been lost anyway because
of the "rapid structural changes and globalization taking place in the world economy."
In terms of investments, NAFTA helps to reduce the risks that U.S. and other
foreign investors face as they invest in Mexico. It provides somewhat of a stable
environment that will encourage the return of capital that left Mexico in the pre-NAFTA
77 SusanS. Black, "Life After NAFTA," Bobbin (May 1999).
78 Suarez, "The Caribbean in Economic Transition," 129.
79 Bulmer-Thomas et al, "Mexico and the North American," 7.
80 Klein and Salvatore, "Welfare Effects," 155.
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period. Most important to the U.S., NAFTA provides the means to ensure that the
preferences derived from the Agreement are kept among the partners and do not leak to
non-members, making Mexico a "backdoor" to the U.S. market particularly for the Asian
companies. This is in contrast to the opinions of the U.S. critics of NAFTA such as
organized labor, who suggest that NAFTA would open new backdoors to the U.S.
Proponents however, argue that "rather than opening new backdoors, NAFTA seeks to
close them."82
Critics of NAFTA
Despite these benefits to both Mexico and the U.S., NAFTA has had its
detractors. Opponents ofNAFTA in the U.S. are primarily concerned about the jobs that
would be "sucked out" from the U.S. and the impact of increased industrial activity in
Mexico on the environment. At the same time, non NAFTA members from the region
complain about the potential negative impact the Agreement can have on other countries
in the hemisphere.
From the time NAFTA was proposed, opposition to the Agreement was strongest
among labor organizations such as the AFL-CIO, non-exporting U.S. firms, and
environmental groups who felt there would be increased pollution along the
U.S./Mexican border. The former predicted that NAFTA would cost the U.S. jobs and
hold down wages in both the U.S. and Mexico. They cited figures which suggest that in
some regions and industries within the U.S., NAFTA has directly contributed to
81 Ibid.
82 Bulmer-Thomas et al, "Mexico and the North American," 31.
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unemployment. In the textile and apparel industry, some estimates place the job loss
as high as 400,000 since 1993, and in South Carolina alone, the sector's workforce
dropped from 29,000 to less than 14,000.M
However, according to Gary L Shoesmith, a professor at Wake Forest University,
NAFTA should not be blamed for these results. He defended the Agreement by showing
that an increase in 11.5% or $11 billion worth in textile shipments means that "increased
automation and productivity, not trade" are responsible for the loss of jobs. He further
contended that "NAFTA has resulted in lower prices for U.S. consumers and created
many export opportunities for U.S. companies, all the while being mistakenly blamed for
hundreds of thousands of American job losses."85
Critics of NAFTA have also used the U.S. merchandise balance-of-payment
position with Mexico to bolster their case against the Agreement. The U.S. enjoyed a
merchandise trade surplus with pre-NAFTA Mexico of about $1.3 billion; however, after
the Agreement, this had turned into a deficit of $22 billion by 1999.86 The correlation
that is made between NAFTA, ;ob losses, and increased imports is however weakened
by the observation made by Weintraub. He asserted that exports do not automatically
83 McClenahen, "NAFTA Works," 1.
84 Jules Abend, "US Contractors Diversity," Bobbin 41, no. 4 (December 1999): 1
85 McClenahen, "NAFTA Works," 1.
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equate with job growth and imports with job losses.87 as is the case where imports of
components may be associated with exports of finished goods.
Those voicing opposition to the Agreement warned that whereas the U.S. and
Canada may be committed to preventing nonmember countries from "invading" their
markets, Mexico may be willing or even eager to encourage such action. It is felt that
foreign companies, particularly from Japan and the Asian newly industrializing countries,
will be able to utilize Mexico as an assembly site or distribution center from which their
products could be "sneaked" into the U.S. market.89 This situation, usually referred to as
the "Trojan Horse" issue, deals with the possibility where nonmember countries will take
advantage of a preferential trade arrangement in order to circumvent import barriers and
gain easier access to the market of one or more member countries. Critics warn that
Mexico will accommodate such a situation by becoming a huge "export platform" or
entrepot, via which products from other countries will be brought into the U.S. on an
unrestricted duty-free basis, as a result of their companies setting up "screwdriver-type"
assembly plants or distribution centers in Mexico.
Mexico is seen as vulnerable to this type of activity for a number of reasons.
One is the abundance of low cost labor and high unemployment rates which make the
country an attractive site for the establishment of labor intensive manufacturing or
87 Weintraub, NAFTA at Three, vii.
M Ibid.
89 James Weekly, "The Trojan Horse Issue in a North American Free Trade Area," Multinational
Business Review 1, no.2 (Fall 1993): 19- 25.
90 Ibid., 19-25.
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distribution operations, as well as an eager recipient of such activities. Another is the
country's extensive involvement in the maquiladora phenomenon, which has created both
a base of experience and a physical and legal infrastructure that would support an
expanded entrepot/export platform role. A third issue is the new openness to imports and
foreign direct investment which the Mexican government initiated and has promoted
since the mid 1980s. Yet another reason for the country's vulnerability is the recent
buildup of direct investment in Mexico by Japanese and other Asian companies, which
some view as a positioning strategy targeted toward the U.S. market.91 As was
mentioned previously, this last issue was one of the main concerns for many in the U.S.
during the debates about a NAFTA between the U.S. and Mexico; and it played a major
influence in the stringent rules NAFTA employs to keep nonmembers from benefiting
and from exploiting the trade pact.
Caribbean Concerns About NAFTA
In the years since CUSFTA was negotiated, leaders from the Caribbean nations
expressed real concerns about losing preferential market access, concessions and other
advantages first to a North American bloc and then to Mexico when NAFTA was signed
in 1993. The opinion that permeated some Caribbean official policy-making circles was
that CUSFTA was an attempt to construct a North America fortress similar to the Single
European Market (SEM) of 1992. It was viewed as another example of the erosion of
historical commitments by the industrial nations to the Caribbean region, which was
suffering from neglect, and was being prepared for an existence without market
Ibid.
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preferences or foreign aid of previous levels.92 As a result, Caribbean governments
embarked on a strategy to protect their interests which they perceived as being in danger.
These governments undertook two main series of actions. They resolved to sign
framework agreements with the U.S. in July 1991, soon after the latter declared an
interest in forming a western hemisphere free trade area. They also sought to negotiate
NAFTA parity for the Caribbean nations which were signatories to the CBI.
There is a school of thought that has a somewhat optimistic view of the
integration process. This neoliberal perspective, shared by Caribbean powerholders who
envision an unfolding environment permeated with increased foreign investment, sees the
new restructuring and realignments of countries, economic sectors and businesses as a
win-win scenario for the region.93 A broader cross section of the anglo-Caribbean
community, however, shares a different perspective. It views NAFTA as holding
disastrous consequences for Caribbean economies - as another internationally binding
mechanism that will further exploit the region as the U.S. reaps its benefits.94 The small
economies in the subregion were concerned that NAFTA will neutralize the trade
preferences they receive under CBI through a number of ways:
1) Trade Diversion: Reduced U.S. demand for supplies from CBI countries as a result of
the increased demand that would be diverted to Mexico in response to the elimination
of quotas and phasing out of tariffs on Mexican products.




2) Investment Diversion: The USITC in 1992 concluded that "NAFTA will introduce
incentives that will tend to favor apparel investment shifts away from CBERA
countries to Mexico."95 The belief is that NAFTA could negatively impact U.S.
investments in the Caribbean countries since such capital would be inclined to move
to Mexico.
3) Relocation of Production Capacity: That existing production facilities or capacity in
CBI countries will be closed or transferred, particularly in industries such as assembly
operations like apparel, which can easily be relocated.
4) Contraction of Economic Activity: That the loss of trade and investment opportunities
would precipitate a decline in business confidence and economic activity,
undermining development prospects throughout the region.
The Caribbean countries believed that by seeking NAFTA parity, these potential
effects on their economies would be greatly diminished. Spearheaded by the
government of Jamaica, whose prime minister was responsible for external negotiations
for CARICOM. efforts were made to encourage the U.S. to implement certain provisions
that would give the Caribbean exports similar treatment in the U.S. market as was
afforded Mexico.
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University of Miami North-South Center, 1995): 220.
170
However, the Caribbean governments have been criticized in some circles for
the manner in which they relentlessly pursued the issue of NAFTA parity instead of
focusing their energies on other strategies such as increasing the competitiveness of
Caribbean exports that would enable them to survive in this increasingly liberalized and
globalized world economy. As Don Marshall has pointed out, ". . . the Caribbean
countries expended political energies in the pursuit of CBI parity and spent less effort
putting in place a regional strategy and approach to NAFTA".97 By focusing only on
NAFTA, the Caribbean is overlooking an important issue relating to the new demands of
global competition. Marshall argued that the Caribbean leaders' concern about
Mexico's competitive edge was misplaced for a number of reasons:
rewarding piecemeal concessions in conformity with neoliberal while ignoring
the need to improve the knowledge-infrastructure of industries and services, will
not result in increased foreign direct investment inflows to the region nor create a
viable competitive economic platform.
CARICOM's strategy of pursuing NAFTA parity is further criticized in that
Mexico's competitiveness and inflow of investment into the country did not begin with
NAFTA, but were rather a continuation of a trend that began in the mid 1980s. Also,
investment diversion vis-a-vis Mexico should take into consideration the importance and
result of Mexico's "domestic reforms, its retooling efforts, its proactive response to
hemispheric free trade designs, the supportive role of the U.S., and the "band wagon"
97 Don Marshall, "NAFTA/FTAA," 680.
98 Ibid., 681.
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effect stimulated by Mexico's enhanced profile during and since the NAFTA talks."
Marshall thinks that investments were drawn to Mexico beginning in the pre NAFTA
period of the mid 1980s in large part due to its reforms and restructuring programs, and
that NAFTA simply reinforced that trend.100
Despite these observations, some reports suggest that NAFTA has affected the
competition between Caribbean countries and Mexico.101 An ITC examination of U.S.
imports since NAFTA showed an increase in Mexico's import share, but a relatively
stagnant share for the Caribbean region. When the analysis is focused solely on trade
directly related to NAFTA and CBERA, the effects are more pronounced showing that
shares for the Caribbean region declined while Mexico's shares increased significantly.1
The ITC looked at the apparel sector and found that Mexican imports were growing
three to six times as fast as imports from CBERA partners.103
The issue of trade diversion from the Caribbean to Mexico is mostly addressed in
the textile/apparel sector. In the three years 1991 to 1993 prior to the implementation of
NAFTA, U.S. apparel imports from CBERA countries and Mexico rose at similar rates
of around 26% per year. However, during the three year period after NAFTA went into
99 Ibid., 682.
100 Ibid.
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Publication 3058" (Washington, D.C.: USITC, September 1992): 11.
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effect (1994 - 1996) apparel imports from the region grew by only 15% per year,
while imports from Mexico increased by 44% per year.104 In 1996, U.S. apparel imports
from CBERA countries rose by 11%. representing the smallest increase since 1990.105
The U.S. Department of Commerce in 1996 suggested that NAFTA trade also
seems to be displacing textile and apparel imports from the Far East. In 1995, the
department figures reveal that while U.S. exports of apparel to Mexico, which included
cut pieces to be assembled into apparel for reshipment back to the U.S., were up 21.2%
over 1994 to $1.3 billion, imports from China fell 13%, from Korea 7%, from Taiwan
5%, and from Hong Kong 4% from 1994 figures.106 These Asian countries, it should be
remembered, had established apparel facilities in the Caribbean countries from which
they exported to the U.S. market. These figures and reports had provided additional
stimulus to the Caribbean governments to intensify their efforts to gain NAFTA parity.
Making The Case for NAFTA Parity
Proponents of the NAFTA parity or CBI Enhancement legislation in both the U.S.
and the Caribbean, cited a number of reasons involving humanitarian, good trade,
domestic and foreign policy, for their strong support and lobbying efforts in Congress.
Some members of Congress who supported the passage of the CBI parity Bill,
considered it as a way to aid the four Caribbean Basin nations whose economies were
devastated by Hurricanes Mitch and Georges in 1998. However, the broadest support
104 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 12* Report.
105 Ibid.
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came from those members who offered domestic, economic and security-interest
reasons as their rationale for backing the legislation.
Parity Makes Good Sense for the U.S.
U.S. proponents of NAFTA parity, including the export component of producer
associations of the textile/apparel industry, joined forces with Caribbean governments in
lobbying for passage of the Bill. They frequently cited the benefits that would accrue to
the U.S. as well as to the countries in the Caribbean as a result of the U.S. granting parity
to the economies of the CBI region. These proponents saw NAFTA parity as a way to
boost sourcing options and competitiveness, particularly in certain industries, the most
prominent being the textile /apparel industry. They predicted that the U.S. could increase
textile shipments by $8.8 billion and increase related employment by 120,000 jobs by
2004.107 Supporters ofNAFTA parity also hoped that it would allow the U.S. textile and
apparel industry to become more competitive internationally by building on the existing,
production relationship between the U.S. and Caribbean firms and workers; and
strengthen an already established system put in place by governments in the Caribbean
region that discourages illegal textile transshipment from the East and South Asian
countries of illegal and low cost imports.
Proponents argued that the main gain from NAFTA parity would include the
expansion of U.S. trade which moved from $1.6 billion in 1984 to $4 billion in 1999. At
the same time, exports from the Caribbean to the U.S. increased much slower from $1.8
107 Burt Wilkinson, "Much Hope Hangs on Trade Bill," Interpress Service (November 8, 1999).
108 Richard Bemal, "Changing Trade Trends Confronting the Caribbean," CA1C Magazine 1, no.
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billion in 1984 to about $2.1 billion in 1997.109 This issue is significant in that prior
to the enactment of the CBI, as mentioned earlier, the U.S. suffered large trade deficits
with the region. However, the turnaround in trade has resulted in the surplus increasing
from $0.3 billion in 1986 to $2.4 billion by 1997."° In a position paper prepared for
leaders in the region arguing their case earlier in 1999, it was stated that "this favorable
trade performance for the U.S. demonstrates that the CBI has been very beneficial to the
U.S. industry and labor".111 The implication is that legislation to further enhance the
CBI, will benefit the U.S. further.
Senator William Roth, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, offered that
CBI parity would "encourage new economic opportunities and a path toward both
political and economic renewal for the countries involved, and will promote opportunity
and economic growth here at home."112 Joining him in congressional support was
Senator Bob Graham of Florida, who in his testimony before the sub-committee on Trade
of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, reiterated that
passing the legislation for parity would be in the U.S. own best interest, in that it would
help reduce the flow of illegal drugs and illegal immigrants to the U.S.
113
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Another influential supporter of parity, Erik Autor, the Vice President and
International Trade Counsel of the National Retail Federation, observed that the passage
of the legislation would provide the U.S. with the opportunity to set the standards for
trade liberalization for the rest of the world to follow, while promoting export growth for
the U.S. machinery and equipment manufacturers."4
Other proponents suggested that parity would allow U.S. companies to form
strategic partnerships with companies in the region. These partnerships would be able to
provide tariff and quota relief to help keep U.S. apparel manufacturing costs down, and
protect and keep U.S. textile and manufacturing jobs at home.115 With these trade
partnerships in the CBI countries, U.S. companies would be able to lower the average
production costs of apparel exports and in so doing help make the U.S. apparel industry
more competitive vis-a-vis the Asian countries.116
The call for "trade, not aid" has often been heralded by government leaders
throughout the region in the debate surrounding NAFTA parity. Parity is thus presented
as a strategy to encourage private sector initiative and lessen the dependence on
government subsidies. It would allow U.S. and Caribbean apparel companies to work
together to harness their strengths into a competitive advantage.117 It was suggested that
the Bill would help the economies in the region develop, giving them the potential to buy
114 Ibid.
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more American goods and subsequently helping to preserve the U.S. trade surplus
with the region, while supporting more American jobs domestically.118
Supporters feel that the partnerships developed through such an arrangement
could be utilized as an effective foreign policy tool between the U.S. and the CBI
countries since they would lead to continued improvements in labor practice,
environmental standards, and greater political and economic freedom in the region.119
Benefits of NAFTA Parity to the Caribbean; The U.S. Perspective
NAFTA parity was presented as a way to build on the established US/CBI
framework as increased trade gives rise to higher levels of job growth both in the U.S.
and in the Caribbean.120 Advocates of parity insisted that it was necessary because in its
absence there would result stagnant or declining investments in the CBI region from the
U.S., which would subsequently lead to possible economic and political instability as
living standards are diminished. Such a situation would warrant increased aid flows from
the U.S. to the region which would eventually cost the U.S. more, than if it had taken
steps to assist the countries through parity, in boosting economic development and
encouraging the influx of foreign investment.121
Parity was thus regarded as a cost-effective, economic foreign policy tool that
would promote regional development, and enable countries to become less dependent on
118 Ibid,
'"ibid.
120 Richard Bemal. "Changing Trade Trends Confronting the Caribbean," CAIC Magazine 1.1
(4* quarter, 1996): 1- 23. Dr. Bemal is Jamaica's ambassador to the U.S. and has been instrumental in
leading the fight for CBI parity.
121 Manuel Gaetan. "Is There Logic in CBI Parity?" Bobbin (July 1996): 1.
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foreign aid, particularly at a time when these funds from industrialized countries are
being sharply cut back - "parity represents a tangible extension to the "trade not aid"
approach."122 Parity for the Caribbean, it was argued, would strengthen the trade links
between the U.S. and the subregion leading to greater cooperation in other areas such as
narcotic interdiction, anti-corruption activities, and the struggle against terrorism and
international crime.123
Opponents of the CBI Parity
Although the legislation for parity received support from various segments within
the U.S., there were some opponents to the Bill even among the textile/apparel industry
such as knitwear, who argued that it would contribute to ongoing import-related declines
in production and employment.124 Those opposed to parity cited a number of factors as
to why it would not have been in the best interests of the industry in the U.S.
Congressional representatives from U.S. garment producing states who voted consistently
against the Bill, expressed concerns that exports from countries with cheap labor like
those in Latin America and the Caribbean could undermine the market in the U.S.
The American Apparel Alliance, a consortium of apparel manufacturers and
contractors in the U.S., took the view that the trade bill was "decidedly one-sided" with
a totally anti-U.S. apparel production character.125 They suggested that American jobs
122Bemal, "Changing Trade Trends," 1-23.
123 Ibid.
124 "Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 12* Report," 26.
125 "American Apparel Alliance Responds to Statements Made Concerning Pending Trade
Legislation," available from http://www.Onlinetextilenews.com; Internet (November 1,1999).
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would be lost and transferred overseas as opposed to jobs being created as proponents
had espoused.126 In October 1996, U.S. apparel factories employed 849,000 workers
nationwide. However, by October 1997, there were 802,000 workers or 47,000 fewer
jobs.127 Critics of the Bill attributed many of these losses to trade policies which have
made manufacturing more attractive in other countries with a large supply of cheap
labor.128 Even more industry job loss have been tied to the passage of NAFTA with an
estimated 400,000 industry workers losing their jobs since the implementation of the
Agreement.
Critics also argued that the legislation would lead to reduced earnings for
Americans as the shift from manufacturing to the service sector comes about because of
the effects of such bills. They contended that this will be the case since most American
jobs are in the service sector which has historically paid less than the manufacturing
sector.130 Organized labor believed the legislation would accelerate the migration of
U.S. apparel jobs to other markets. It is estimated that because of the legislation,
approximately $1 billion will be "taken out" of the Federal Treasury (as a result of tariff
revenues foregone) over the next 5 years, and that most of the money will go to enhance
126 Ibid.
127 ..CTPA. A Good Deal for America," 1.
128 Ibid.
129 "Garment Workers, Apparel Companies Unite to Blast Caribbean Free Trade Bill"; available
from http://wwwOnlinetextilenews.com; accessed September 10, 1999.
130 »CTpA. A Good Deai for America," 1.
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the profits of offshore apparel companies and American retailers instead of workers or
governments in the Caribbean.131
A spokesman for a coalition of small and mid-sized apparel companies and
garment workers that includes The National Knitwear and Sportswear Association, Union
of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees and Apparel Contractors Alliance
argued that:
A trade bill sponsored with the stated intent of spurring economic growth in the
Caribbean and Central America is instead likely to funnel hundreds of millions of
dollars into the pockets of large apparel corporations such as Cayman Island-based
Fruit of the Loom, Inc. and Chicago-based Sara Lee Corp.132
This sentiment was shared by another critic of the Bill, Joseph Rodriguez,
Executive Director of the Los Angeles-based Apparel Contractors Alliance of California
who warned that it was highly unlikely that "a single cent" of the estimated $1 billion will
reach the Central American and Caribbean populations for which it is iniended ..."the
vast majority of this huge sum will go directly into the pockets of a handful of huge
American corporations..."133 Companies such as Fruit of the Loom, which critics charge
recently incorporated itself in the Cayman Islands in order to avoid paying U.S. taxes,
could benefit from the legislation more than U.S. based companies. The company which
was once a large employer in the U.S., is now the single largest employer in Honduras
and El Salvador, with over 20,000 workers in those two countries. With such capacity, it




could gain as much as $200 million over the next 5 years.134 The company is
reported to have saved approximately $150 million already by taking advantage of the
cheap labor supply in those countries.
Opponents of the Bill also charged that if the goal of the policy is to create a
prosperous middle class in these countries who can buy more American goods, then it
appeared as though just the contrary was occurring. They cited statistics which showed
that as trade with the Caribbean Basin has increased, wages paid to workers there have
fallen significantly. One report showed that since 1989, trade with Honduras and El
Salvador had increased by over 250%, while wages in those countries had dropped by
57% and 29% respectively.135
The President of the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees
(UNITE) criticized the Bill in that it regarded textile jobs, which are usually low-tech and
held by low income workers in America's small towns and inner cities, as disposable.136
Opponents also consider the issue of transshipment as a potential problem. They believe
that customs will not be able to guarantee enforcement of yarn and fabric origin
requirement for the number of countries involved in the trade agreement, and that the
requirements for the use of U.S. fabric and yarn will multiply the "enforcement burden
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The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) in May 2000, will
remain in effect until the FTAA is established which is expected to be in 2005, or until a
similar arrangement is introduced, whichever occurs earlier. The issue now becomes
one of how effectively will the beneficiary Caribbean countries be able to capitalize on
this opportunity and increase their competitiveness in this protected market. How
quickly and effectively they utilize the opportunities afforded in the CBTPA to build
competitive textile/apparel industries that can hold their own in a trade environment
based on reciprocal relationships, will determine whether the preferential legislation has
been of any benefit to the economies involved.
The CBTPA
After years of aggressive lobbying by the Caribbean governments, in particular
by the Jamaican government which is also responsible for the region's external economic
negotiations, for a NAFTA parity-like agreement for the CBI beneficiary economies, the
Clinton Administration, as indicated earlier, finally signed into law the U.S.-Caribbean
Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), as part of the African Growth and Opportunity
Act (AGOA) in May 2000. It is the first major trade bill to be passed in the U.S.
Congress since 1995, and is considered by various members in the Administration to be
a "reflection of America's historic leadership role in international trade."
138 "Africa - CBI Trade Bill Passes Senate: Carousel Provisions Ignite EU-US Tensions" Bridges
Weekly Trade News Digest 4, no. 19 (May 16*, 2000): 1 .
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Caribbean leaders are of the impression that the new legislation would open and
expand regional markets to the U.S investors and exporters while U.S. supporters view it
in terms of it being vital to U.S. competitiveness.
To those supporters in the U.S. Administration, the legislation is good trade and
foreign policy. The AGOA and the CBTPA serve to advance U.S. economic and security
interests by strengthening relations between the U.S. and the two regions, expanding
two-way trade, and creating incentives for both regions to continue reforming their
economies while increasing their participation in the global economy. It is also believed
that the Bill will contribute to improved economic performance in the U.S., by
encouraging the opening of markets and the reduction of poverty in the targeted countries
where there is a potential market of hundreds of millions consumers of American
exports.139
As Robert Scott insists, "NAFTA parity is all about the apparel market".l40 The
Bill enhances the provisions of the CBI to provide for a specified transition period,
similar preferential tariff and quota treatment as given that of textiles and articles
imported from NAFTA countries to the same type of articles from CBI beneficiary
countries. It also provides NAFTA parity for some products which were excluded in the
original CBI legislation.
139 "Details of the Trade and Development Act of 2000," U.S. Newsnire (Washington, D.C.:
White House Fact Sheet, May 18, 2000). 1.
140 Robert E. Scott, "Rebuilding the Caribbean: A Better Foundation for Sustainable Growth,"
Briefing Paper (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, March 1999): 1.
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One of the main driving forces behind the passage of the Bill was the strong
advocacy stance taken by the governments of the Caribbean in support of their textile and
apparel interests in the region. More importantly, the forceful lobbying efforts by the
U.S. supporters of the legislation, mainly the apparel manufacturers and their industry
groups, certainly added weight to the push for the passage of the Bill. In the
intervening years between NAFTA and CBTPA, and especially those under review
(1994 - 1999), apparel imports from Mexico have increased 611%, while imports from
CBI have increased about one third that rate. In 1998, the CBI region accounted for less
than 23.8% of the U.S. garment imports. This represents a decline of 1.4% point from
the 25.1% market share in 1997.141 Those advocates of the CBI Enhancement Bill who
viewed the CBI market as an important one for the U.S., also believed that the Bill in
particular would benefit American workers, consumers and businesses as much as it
would the economies of the Caribbean Basin.
The CBTPA offers temporary trade benefits to CBI countries and will "place
them on a more equal competitive basis with Mexico in the U.S. market, and reinforce
the region's trend toward more openness in the conduct of economic policy."142 For the
Caribbean, the CBTPA will extend preferential tariff treatment to certain textiles and
apparel products assembled from U.S. fabric, and to textile handicrafts and all non-textile
products currently excluded from such treatment under the existing CBI, for example
141 General Counsel for Jockey International, Testimony submitted to Subcommittee on Western




canned tuna and certain leather footwear.14;> The Agreement will also reduce duty
rates for covered textiles by up to 100%. and such products will be free from quantitative
restrictions. For other products, the tariff rate would be reduced up to 100% of the
difference between the current rate and the rate applicable to Mexican goods under
NAFTA. Safeguards provisions on covered textile products will be afforded, and tariff
benefits could be modified under the same conditions as in the NAFTA in the event of
144
disruptive import surges.
Regarding non-U.S., non-regional fabric, textile and apparel products imported
into the U.S., they would be subject to tariff preferences levels (TPLs), 95% of which
will be allocated to the seven biggest shippers in the CBI - the Dominican Republic,
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Haiti.145 Among the other
important provisions included in the legislation are:
- preferential tariff and quota treatment would be accorded to those products made
from fabrics produced in the CBI, that are knit-to-shape, and/or made from fabric knit
in the region of U.S. yarn.146
- 5 years duty free and quota free treatment to textile and apparel items imported into
the U.S. from CBI beneficiary countries that are: a) assembled in a CBI beneficiary
country from fabrics wholly formed and cut in the U.S. from yarns formed in the
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 International Trade Administration, Otexa, Textile and Apparel Legislation (Washington,




U.S.; b) cut in a beneficiary country from fabrics wholly formed in the U.S., from
yarns wholly formed in the U.S., and assembled in a CBI beneficiary country; c)
identified as hand loomed, handmade or folklore articles.147
As a safeguard against transshipment, the law provides that the President can deny an
exporter benefits under the Bill for 2 years if there is evidence that an exporter has
knowingly engaged in textile/apparel transshipments.148
Supporters of the Bill hope that it encourages the development of trade and
investment policies in the region that will help the beneficiary countries make the
transition to and facilitate their subsequent participation in the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). They would like to see the benefits derived from the new legislation
be a springboard for the countries to further open their markets to U.S. products , services
and investment. They also want the Bill to act as a catalyst for the increase and
acceleration of economic reform, and stimulate new value added industries in the region
and increase Caribbean competitiveness as the FTAA approaches.149 Supporters suggest
that it will also encourage additional U.S. exports of cotton and yarn and strengthen the
international competitive position of the U.S. textile industry.150 The CBTPA, which
extends similar preferential market access enjoyed by Mexico under NAFTA to
Caribbean Basin countries, is envisioned to have important economic and social benefits
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 The United States Trade Representative (Washington, D.C.: USTR, September 1999).
150 "Details of the Trade and Development Act of 2000," U.S. Newswire (Washington, D.C.:
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to the beneficiary countries who are able to capitalize on the provisions afforded in the
legislation.
Reaction to the CBTPA
Three of the most prominent industry groups in the U.S., who have been at the
forefront in supporting the Bill are the American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI),
the National Cotton Council (NCC), and the American Apparel Manufacturers
Association (AAMA).
The ATMI: Roger W. Chastain, President of the ATMI, fully supports the Bill. He
speculated that there should be a significant increase in the export of U.S. fabric and yarn
as a result of the Bill. He contends that the trade bill, by giving duty-free, quota-free
benefits to apparel from the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa made from U.S. yarn and
fabric, will also help the U.S. industry:
We currently export $480 million worth of fabric and $109 million worth of yarn
to the Caribbean ... in addition, we export cut pieces of fabric amounting to $3.6
billion, the majority of which is U.S. fabric. If Caribbean trade develops at even half
the growth of our exports to Mexico under the NAFTA, we will see major increases
in our fabric and yarn shipment to the Caribbean...
The ATMI official cited studies which estimate the gains, as a result of the new
law, to be valued at around US$ 8 billion in added sales for U.S. textile mills,152 with
textile exports to the Caribbean increasing by $11.0 billion over 5 years while other U.S.
textile shipments to U.S. apparel manufacturers and other export markets declining by
151 "ATMI President Addresses Southern Textile Association," available from http://www




$2.2 million.153 In the study conducted by Nathan Associates, an Arlington Virginia
based economic and management consulting firm, results showed that the Bill would also
increase U.S. textile and textile related employment by 121,000 by the end of 5 years154 -
direct U.S. textile industry employment contributing 63,100 jobs while textile related
employment in areas such as cotton, wool, man-made fiber production, chemicals, energy
and transportation adding 58,3OO.155
The ATMI president, using the results of the study, declared that the legislation
would boost U.S. textile shipments by 11%.156 Because the CBI countries are the U.S.
biggest export customers for yarn and fabric including cut pieces of apparel that are sewn
in the Caribbean, the organization thinks that the Bill will present many U.S. textile
companies with significant new export advantages and opportunities which the U.S.
industry "has been seeking for years".157 The organization's position is that they are in
support of the legislation because it helps the U.S. continue its trend of displacing apparel
imports from the Far East and bringing apparel production back to the Western
Hemisphere.158
The NCC: Several officials of the NCC have come out with strong support for the
153 "Study Shows 'Yarn-Forward' Caribbean Basin Initiative Trade Legislation Would Benefit








CBPTA, suggesting that it should strengthen the U.S. cotton industry. Robert
McLendon, NCC President, thinks that the Bill will be advantageous to the U.S. textile
industry.
this should result in a highly competitive apparel product. These trading
arrangements also have the potential to enhance cotton producers' income while
improving U.S. cotton and textile competitiveness against increasing imports from
Asia. Cotton apparel imports from Caribbean countries are about 3 times more
likely to be composed of U.S. cotton than apparel imported from other sources...'
McLendon speculated that the Bill encourages U.S. firms to combine U.S. cotton and or
fabric with further processing in the Caribbean which most likely will result in a highly
competitive apparel product. Another NCC official, Vice President W. Duke Kimbrell,
who is also Chairman and CEO of Parkdale Mills, a U.S. garment company, reiterated
that:
... the regional fabric provisions of U.S./Caribbean trade will be especially meaningful
to U.S. yarn manufacturers. Our industry has been under severe economic pressure,
and the trading partnerships these provisions will facilitate are expected to boost
demand for U.S. made yarn very significantly over the next several years...'
The AAMA: The AAMA is the national trade association representing roughly 250
U.S. companies that produce more than 85% of the clothing sold at wholesale outlets in
the U.S.161 Jack Morgan, Director of Communications for AAMA, suggested that,
delaying the implementation of parity will have done nothing to stem domestic job losses
159
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among U.S. apparel manufacturers. On the contrary, it would have increased the
advantage of U.S. overseas competitors who already manufacture half the clothing
purchased by U.S. consumers. He warned that that share could have increased if the Bill
was not passed.162
Jim Jacobson, chairman of the AAMA, opined that "the legislation will spur
economic growth and reinforce democratization efforts" in many of the countries
targeted.163 He suggested that the Bill and its resulting effects would move the Caribbean
and Central American countries closer to trade parity with Mexico, and "enhance the
competitiveness of apparel producers throughout the Western Hemisphere".164
CBI beneficiaries were involved in drawing up proposals on how the benefits of
the Bill should be equitably distributed among the countries. It is interesting to note that
the countries that were most vocal and aggressive in pursuing parity are the ones who
will benefit least from the quota levels granted. The English speaking CBI countries,
except for Jamaica, are relatively small textile/apparel producers when compared with
their Central American counterparts, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, who appear
to be the greatest beneficiaries of the legislation.
Does NAFTA Promote Free Trade or Is It Merely Protectionist?
NAFTA can be described as a combination of protectionist and free trade policies,
as an agreement that, while it does not totally liberalize trade at the present time, will do
162
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from non-NAFTA nations. The Agreement has opened up trade in agriculture.
energy, textiles and automotive parts and equipment, and in such services as finance,
transportation, and telecommunications. It has set rules for government procurement
between the three members and for intellectual property rights. The pact has outlined
specific methods to deal with subsidies, dumping, investment disputes and unfair
practices through its dispute resolution methods.170 In addition, NAFTA boosted trade
within the three nations by almost 90% over 6 years to an estimated $553 billion in 1999,
accelerated cross-national investment, and expanded trilateral trade in automotive
products, machinery and equipment, industrial goods, forestry products, food and
agriculture, energy products and many consumer goods.171 The following shows the
extent ofNAFTA trade:

















































Source: Bureau of Census
For all but fourteen categories of goods, NAFTA establishes tariff rate quotas for those
products that do not meet the strict NAFTA rules of origin, with imports up to the quota
level being subject to NAFTA's preferential duty. Over-quota shipments are subject to
the MFN rate.172
Despite its trade liberalizing effects, NAFTA is also considered to be highly
protectionist because of the rules it imposes on both members and nonmenbers. Its rules
of origin requires 50% inputs in gross output to qualify for tariff-free treatment and in
certain sectors, the rate is much higher. It protects sensitive sectors - agriculture,
minerals, banking and textiles and apparel, by imposing stringent North American
172 Jeffrey J. Schott, Free Trade Area and U.S. Trade Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1989): 45.
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content and origin requirements. In order for autos, for example, to receive NAFTA
benefits, the North American content rule is as high as 62.5%.m
The origin requirement pertaining to clothing and textiles are even more
discriminatory against non-members by requiring that clothing must be sewn in North
America from fabric made within the bloc and that yarn from which the fabric is made
must also originate in member states. With the passage of the CBTPA and the AGOA,
this requirement was relaxed for CBI and African signatories of the Bills. This triple
origin requirement however, will necessitate that Mexican and Canadian clothing
manufacturers wishing to export to the U.S., buy yarn and fabric from U.S. or CBI
beneficiary countries' mills unless they can gain exemption from the "yarn forward" rule
by proving that the materials they need are not available from these sources.174
These rules of origin that the NAFTA employs are the principal tools that limit
the privileges of preferential trade schemes to eligible partners. They are a set of fairly
detailed rules and are designed in such a way as to preclude the circumvention of U.S.
Tariff barriers by bringing in products through Mexico175 - the Trojan Horse Effect. The
U.S. has used the "value added" requirement for clarifying and tightening rules of origin
requirements. The latter specify a minimum contribution of the final value of a product
that must take place within a beneficiary country before the product qualifies for
173 Ibid.
174 Weekly, "The Trojan Horse Issue," 19-25.
175 Bulmer-Thomas et al., "Mexico and the North, American Free Trade Agreement," 33.
194
importation into the U.S. on preferential terms. On most products, it has been set at
35% of the value of a product being exported to the U.S.176
In order to make goods coming from Mexico eligible for reduced or zero tariff
treatment in the U.S. under NAFTA, a substantial amount of processing in Mexico is
required. Whenever foreign investors establish subsidiaries in Mexico and perform
substantial transformations which confer origin, their products will be allowed to enter
the member states under the NAFTA preferential arrangement.177 The "substantial
transformation" test or the change of tariff classification rule is utilized to decide whether
a product can be identified as having been originated in the beneficiary country. The
"test" involves deciding whether imported materials or components are regarded as
having been substantially transformed if they emerge from a processing stage with a
name, character or use which differs from that which they possessed before processing.
Establishing rules of origin has become quite complicated in recent years as a
result of the proliferation of products traded internationally and the expansion of
worldwide sourcing of materials and components by globally integrated enterprises.
However, the U.S., by using this procedure, has shown its resolve to ensure that third
countries will not use NAFTA as a "passkey" to its markets.
Important issues that must be addressed concerning diversion are whether the
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low cost-producing nonmembers. Other issues to be considered in terms of the
effects of NAFTA are whether imports and exports of all members are increasing, and
whether total trade is increasing.179 The Agreement seems to offer only minimal
opportunities for trade diversion from other countries in the hemisphere since Mexico,
because of its location, abundance of cheap labor, and economies of scale, already is
positioned as a cost competitive producer. The scope for trade diversion is also limited
due to the relatively unhindered access that Mexico enjoyed to the U.S. market prior to
NAFTA. As far as the increase in trade goes, as was shown earlier, the increase in trade
among the members in the post NAFTA period was markedly greater than in the pre
NAFTA era. This does not mean, however that NAFTA was totally responsible for the
results, but it can safely be claimed that NAFTA did play a role, particularly with the
removal of the tariffs and other barriers.
It can be surmised that NAFTA has been both protectionist in some respects, and
open in others. While the Agreement has made it more difficult for foreign firms to
compete in the North American market, both because of the higher barriers erected
against non members, and also due to the increased competitiveness of the North
American companies, it has spearheaded economic regionalism in the hemisphere,
which is regarded as one route to promoting free trade.
NAFTA has also contributed to trade liberalization by nudging the Caribbean
governments to countenance more reciprocal trading relationships both with hemispheric
179 Weintraub, NAFTA at Three, viii.
180 Kessler, "New NAFTA Alliances," 1.
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and extraregional partners. The Agreement has been credited with encouraging the
Caribbean countries to be more amenable to new trade arrangements with Europe that
would be reciprocal. It has also encouraged these countries to seek equally new
arrangements with nations in the Pacific Rim, in order to compensate for the perceived
or potential loss of CBI advantages to Mexico. In this respect, has acted as a catalyst for
some Caribbean and Latin American states to move towards deepening and widening
hemispheric cooperation, as is evidenced in the plethora of bilateral and multilateral
trade pacts that have been developed.
NAFTA may well have been the stimulus that was needed within the subregion to
force the governments into devising new economic strategies and establishing new forms
of cooperation to achieve development with the private sector playing an integral role.
However, it is left to be seen whether or not this progress by Caribbean governments will
be short circuited by the granting of CBI parity that went into effect in October, 2000.
These governments may once again become somewhat complacent and secure in being
granted these benefits. They may not consider the need to continue aggressively seeking
reciprocal arrangements as one that is as urgent as before the CBTPA was granted. This
type of complacency could set the stage for future problems when the FTAA comes into
effect, as it is slated in 2005.
Caribbean governments, despite the benefits they perceive as having gained from
CBI parity, must continue their efforts to make their industries more competitive in order
to survive in the increasingly liberalized trading environment. One of the region's
industries that would be facing such a challenge particularly in the context of CBI parity
and the implementation of the FTAA, is the textile/apparel industry.
CHAPTER 6
JAMAICA fS ECONOMY AND ITS TEXTILE/APPAREL INDUSTRY:
Background
As one of the largest and most populous of the English speaking Caribbean
nations, Jamaica was well positioned economically to embrace the CBI program and
the export oriented strategy that it entailed. Beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
successive Jamaican governments introduced various pieces of legislation such as the
Industrial Incentives Act (IIA), the Export Industry Encouragement Act (EIEA), and the
Factory Construction Act (FCA) as part of an overall plan to restructure the economy.
One of the key objectives of the plan and its corresponding programs of tax incentives
and fiscal concessions to approved investors, was to promote economic diversification
through the development of manufacturing industries geared towards supplying the
domestic market.1 This strategy emerged as a blend of an export-led development
approach and the fundamentals of an Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model.2
The various pieces of legislation offered liberal fiscal incentives granting tax
relief to certain enterprises3. There were a number of benefits that were available under
1 Catherine Hyett, "The Impact of the CBI on Barbados, Jamaica, and Grenada: An Assessment"
Imperial Power and Regional Trade, eds. Abigail B. Bakan, David Cox, and Colin Leys (Ontario: Wilfird
Laurier University Press, 1993), 131.
2 Ibid.




these Acts. Companies were eligible for a full exemption from certain liabilities,
including tax, customs and consumption duty on imported equipment and machinery, and
customs duty on raw materials. These exemptions were available for varying periods
depending on the level of the local value added. The legislation also made exemptions
for the carry forward of losses incurred during the tax holiday for a period of six years
after the expiration of the holiday. Companies were also eligible for partial relief from
tax on profits related to export performances by industries not approved for benefits
previously mentioned, or whose period of enjoyment of these benefits had expired. A
special export incentive scheme under which profits derived from exports outside of the
Caribbean Common Market are eligible for perpetual income tax relief of levels ranging
from 25% to 50% of chargeable tax, depending upon the ratio between profits derived
from such exports and total profits, were also covered by these bills. Another benefit
provided for the availability and use of factory space at economic rates of rental, under
the Factory Building Program.4
Several other programs were also instituted by the government in its strategy to
move the country beyond its traditional role as a supplier of primary commodities and to
stimulate activity in new areas of the manufacturing sector. One of the most important
programs under this plan was the formation of the Jamaica Industrial Development
Corporation (JIDC) in 1952, which evolved into what is now known as JAMPRO, to
market and promote the country's industries abroad. Thus by the 1980s, the country
possessed a relatively developed industrial infrastructural system.
4 Ibid.
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Included in the overall plan for economic growth was the goal to attract
foreign investment by encouraging foreign firms to form joint ventures with local
enterprises, and to become involved in export-oriented industries.5 Thus from the mid
1960s onwards, the manufacturing sector had emerged as the most important single
sector in the Jamaican economy, replacing agriculture. The agricultural sector in
Jamaica has been traditionally divided into two subsectors: 1) crops produced primarily
for export and 2) a large subsector for domestic agriculture. Traditional agricultural
exports include sugar, bananas, coffee, pimento, citrus and cocoa, while fruits such as
papayas, and root crops such as yams and potatoes, make up the nontraditional
agricultural export market. However, while the share of agriculture to GDP between
1950 to the 1980s declined from 30% to around 8%, the contribution of manufacturing
to GDP grew from about 11% to around 15% in that same period. 6 The main areas
which had attracted foreign private capital in the post war period were the bauxite-
alumina industry, tourism and the manufacturing sector. However, the majority of
capital inflows into Jamaica went into the bauxite-alumina sector.7 The following tables
show the contribution of various sectors to the Jamaican economy:
5 Ibid.
6 Ramesh Ramsaran, U.S. Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends and Issues
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Source: The Institute for Social and Economic Research, UWI, Mona, Jamaica.
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Source: PIOJ, Social and Economic Survey, various issues
Prior to the 1960s, the manufacturing sector was comprised mainly of activities
in the processing of local agricultural products, and the production of a limited range of












































cigars, beverages, and food products. As the sector expanded, it began to include a
range of assembly-type industries producing mainly for the local and CARICOM
markets.8 By the 1980s, manufactured exports particularly to North America rose rapidly
in both volume and value, accounting for 32% of total Jamaican merchandise exports in
1995. Much of this increase was a result of the restructuring of the country's apparel
industry.9
The government's strategy to attract foreign investment particularly for the
assembly-type industries included the establishment of special commercial locations
known as Free Trade Zones (FTZs), also called Export Processing Zones (EPZs). FTZs
offered manufacturers whose products were geared towards the export market, a wide
array of publicly subsidized services, and allowed them to operate a manufacturing plant,
assembly or packaging facility and redistribution center with fewer import and exchange
control restrictions than businesses whose production was aimed towards the domestic
consumption.
Jamaica FTZs
The FTZs have played an important role in the expansion of labor-intensive , light
assembly exports from Jamaica particularly in the area of textile/apparel where close to
90% of the zones' employees produce garments. These establishments were set up in
close proximity to the international airports (mainly Kingston and Montego Bay areas)
8 Ramsaran, US Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends and Issues, 153.
9 Gordon V. Shirley, "Jamaica and Free Trade in the Western Hemisphere: A competitive Analysis
of Selected Manufacturing and Service Industries," in Jamaica After Nafta: Trade Options and Sectoral
Strategies, eds. Ann Weston and Ushan Viswanathan (Ottawa, Canada: The North-South Institute, 1998):
99.
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and adjacent to deep water port facilities. The incentives offered to potential investors
include exemption from payment of corporate tax and customs duty on raw materials,
machinery and equipment; no restrictions on repatriation of profits; exemption from
import licensing and quantitative restrictions; exemption for foreign based companies
from exchange controls and exemption from work permit fees for foreign personnel;
lower than market price rental fee for factory space; 100% tax holiday on profits in
perpetuity for industrial activities; and total exemption from income tax on sales for
commercial enterprise.10 Under the provisions of the Jamaica Export Free Zone Act,
products from the free zones must be exported. Also, FTZ exports to CARICOM
members are subject to the policy of the importing country, that is, liability for the
payment of the import duty and subject to quantitative restrictions.11
In addition to the FTZ program, the EIEA allowed manufacturers producing
exclusively for export outside of the CARICOM to apply for concessions that would
exempt them from the payment of income tax on profits for varying periods, up to 10
years depending on the level of local value added and foreign exchange earning potential
of the project. The income tax exemption also applies to dividends distributed to
residents as well as non-residents who are not subject to income tax on such dividends in
their country of residence.12 In addition, imports of capital goods and raw materials
10 Jamaica National Investment Promotion Ltd., Jamaica: Establishing An Off-shore Apparel
Operation in Jamaica (Kingston , Jamaica: 1992).
" Jampro, From 807 to High Fashion...Jamaica on Show. Jamaica: the Premier Locationfor
Apparel (Kingston, Jamaica, n.d.): 19.
12 Ibid.
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under this program are not charged either customs duty or General Consumption Tax
(GCT) which are generally applicable to similar imports by other manufacturers.13
As a result of these programs of generous tax incentives, Jamaica was able to
offer advantages as an export production site, and gained a comparative advantage in
export activities over many of its strongest competitors in the region. The country also
had several advantages which made it attractive as an investment site for labor intensive
production operations. It possessed an educated, English speaking , inexpensive labor
force, and its geographic location placed it in close proximity to the North American
market. The country, in addition, has relatively developed financial systems and an
effective air and sea freight communication and transportation systems. Jamaica also
shared with the other English speaking Caribbean nations certain attributes that
reinforced its competitiveness. These advantages included relatively low cost of
production, political and social stability, a cooperative workforce, preferential access to
markets other than the U.S., notably the European Union, and the widespread use of the
English language.14
By the early 1970s, however, many of Jamaica's advantages were beginning to be
eroded by economic and sociopolitical developments. The oil crisis and a decrease in
private investment were partly to blame for the downturn in economic activity. The
country's export earnings fell sharply as a result of a drop in demand for aluminaftauxite
Ibid.
14 Peter Steele, "The Caribbean Clothing Industry: The U.S. and the Far East Connections,"
Special Report, No. 1147 (Kingston, Jamaica: The Economist Intelligence Unit, October 1988): 134.
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and lower prices for agricultural products, particularly sugar.15 Currency
overvaluation and a spate of industrial unrest and social tensions prompted some foreign
companies to relocate from the island to more stable low wage countries. These
problems also stimulated capital flight. Added to this, publicity about what was
occurring on the island negatively impacted tourism earnings. The Jamaican economy
went from a year of strong growth in 1981 to a period of stagnation between 1982 and















Source: Organization of American States, Statistical Bulletin ofthe OAS
In the late 1980s as this trend persisted, and as the downturn in the economy continued,
pressure from the international financial institutions on the government to restructure the
economy began to increase. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) strongly suggested
exchange rate adjustments through currency devaluations. The economic and social
situation was largely responsible for the electoral defeat of the People's National Party
(PNP) social democratic government under Michael Manley, and the replacement with
15 Kempe Ronald Hope, Economic Development in the Caribbean (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1986) : 33.
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the Edward Seaga's Jamaica Labor Party in 1980, whose administration was a
conservative one and enjoyed support from the Reagan Administration.
U.S. foreign assistance to the island which amounted to merely $56 million in the
final three years of the PNP government, rose to $500 million for the first three years of
the Seaga's reign.16 It is estimated that during the seven years of the Seaga's
administration, Jamaica averaged among the top twenty recipients of U.S. aid.17 It
appeared that the close relationship shared by Prime Minister Seaga and President
Reagan facilitated the implementation of the CBI in the mid 1980s.
Nevertheless, the situation worsened. In the 1980s, the Seaga government
introduced a program of budget cutbacks, government layoffs, tax increases, currency
devaluation, and the elimination of price supports on food and fuel. The government also
implemented a program of reform that was centered around industrial manufacturing. As
a result of the cutbacks, corresponding educational, health, and other social programs
which were the hallmark of the Manley Administration, were severely affected, causing
the costs ofbasic goods and services to spiral out of control.18
Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister welcomed the CBI in 1984 as a
program that would lead Jamaica's and the region's economy towards a more prosperous
future. He saw it as an opportunity to influence trade and aid patterns in the region,
moving away from a trend where dependence on foreign aid in the form of grants and
16 Hyett, "The Impact of the CBI," 134.
17 Clinton G. Hewan, Jamaica and the United States Caribbean Basin Initiative: Showpiece or
Failure (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1994), 128.
18 Ibid., 151.
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loans had developed, to one of self reliance based on joint development projects.19
During the first year of operation of the CBI, net foreign private investment rose by
$12.2 million, signaling a possible return of investor confidence in the economy.20
Although the CBI offered preferential treatment on a wide range of products to
the beneficiary countries, one of the main criticisms of the program when it was first
instituted was that the most successful and promising export from the region, apparel, did
not benefit from the trade provisions. However, after much negotiation and lobbying on
the part of the Caribbean governments, in particular Jamaica, the U.S. administration
formulated the CBI Textile Program in 1986 to provide a framework under which textiles
and apparel from the CBI beneficiary countries could enter the U.S.
International Trade in Textiles and Apparel: The MFA and ATC
Prior to 1986, U.S. apparel imports from the Caribbean region were treated in the
same manner as other similar imports from other parts of the world, governed by the
Multifibre Agreement (MFA). Beginning in 1974 through 1994, the period when the
MFA was in operation, exports of textiles and clothing from developing to industrialized
countries were subject to the bilaterally agreed or unilaterally imposed quotas and
quantitative restrictions by the developed countries under a special regime outside of
normal GATT rules.21 The MFA permitted the use of quotas without compensation,
contrary to the general prohibition against their use under the GATT. Under this
19 ibid., 2.
20 Hyett, "The Impact of the CBI," 139.
21 Antero Hyvarinen, "The Changing Pattern of International Trade in Textile and Clothing '
(New York: International Trade Centre, UNCTAD/GATT, June 24*, 1996): 1.
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Agreement, the importing country could apply selective quantitative restrictions when
surges in imports caused or threatened market disruption or serious damage to the
industry of the importing country.22 The MFA was thus a substantial departure from the
basic GATT rules and particularly from the principle of non-discrimination.
In 1994, at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the MFA was
replaced by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). The ATC will serve as a
preparatory period during which time developing countries can prepare themselves for
the global liberalization in international trade in textiles and apparel beginning in 2005.
The main purpose of the ATC is to place international trade in textiles and clothing
within the basic principles of non-discrimination of the GATT discipline. The ATC
obligates WTO members to integrate textiles and clothing into normal trade regime by
outlining a three-stage transitional process for the progressive reduction of quotas and
the ultimate removal of all restrictions by 2005. The quotas due to be eliminated
continue to apply to most textile and apparel trade and to hold back significant expansion
of trade in the products.23 The Agreement also included minimal concessions for
lowering apparel and textile duty rates. The duty reductions included in the Agreement
will only lower most U.S. textile and apparel duty rates by 6% to 11 %. For example, the
duty rate on a pair of cotton woven trousers will be 16.6% by 2004, compared with
22
Ibid.
23 Brenda Jacobs, "Regional Pacts Produce New Trade Patterns," Bobbin 41, no. 3 (November
1999): 70-71.
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17.7% in 1994, while the duty on a wool pullover will be set at 16% in 2004,
compared with 17% in 1994.24
One of the implications of this agreement that seeks to remove all quantitative
restraints of trade in textile and apparel, is that market access on a worldwide basis will
be progressively improved, while contributing to lessening the negative effects of the
many trade distortions in both the developed and developing countries. However, in
the first five years of its implementation, the ATC has yielded disappointing results for
developing countries. In July 2000, at a meeting of The International Textile and
Clothing Bureau (ITCB), a consortium of twenty four developing countries, members
accused industrialized countries of failing to grant meaningful access concessions under
the ATC by withholding the most significant market access concessions until the last
possible moments.25 The duty rates for textiles and apparel in the developed countries
remain about three times the levels of those on other products.26 This prompted the group
to unveil a proposal demanding that the developed countries liberalize 50% of all
restrictions to trade in textiles and clothing by 2002. They proclaim that they would
remain reluctant to engage in further trade liberalization until concerns over textiles are
resolved.27 The ITCB accusations highlight the growing tensions between developed
and developing countries over the distribution of benefits from trade liberalization.
24
Ibid.
25 "Africa-CBI Trade Bill Passes Senate," Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest 4, no. 19 (May
2000): 1.
26 Jacobs, "Regional Pacts Product New Trade Patterns," 70 - 71.
27 Ibid.
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The CBI Textile Program
The textile and apparel industry which requires large numbers of relatively low
skilled labor and utilizes high levels of labor intensive technologies, is seen as a viable
sector to be developed by countries seeking to base their modernization on the export
oriented model. The potential linkages that exist with an entrenched apparel industry are
many. The industry brings into industrial employment persons who might otherwise not
have an opportunity to be thus employed. It expands the base of such employment and
has the potential to generate higher levels of skills that can be transferred to a broader
sewn products sector, including the assembly of leather products or footwear, as well as
to the assembly of electronic components.
Another benefit of developing this industry is the potential for the offshoot growth
of a service sector relating to repair and maintenance of machinery. This service can be
extended to form the base of a machine-tool operation, especially if the garment industry
were to become vertically integrated in the manufacture of textile.29 Due to these
potential benefits , many countries in the Caribbean region pursued the development of
this sector beginning in the early 1980s, as part of their Structural Adjustment Program.
The U.S. fully supported this strategy of export led growth, and through the CBI,
sought to encourage manufacturing activity in the region by opening its domestic market
to imports from the region. This was done through the dismantling of most tariff barriers
except for a few commodities where the U.S. domestic industry was considered to need
28 The Jamaican Government, "National Industrial Policy: A Strategic Plan for Growth and




particular protection. The case of textile and apparel was the most significant
exclusion from the CBI program. Governments in the region considered the exclusion of
textiles/apparels from CBI benefits as a significant flaw that served to lessen the value of
the entire program to the region.30
The U.S. decision to make a special case for the region's exports of textile and
apparel in 1986 by the implementation of the CBI Textile Program was thought to be
influenced by a number of political and economic factors including the special
relationship with the Seaga government in Jamaica, and as a reward for the support that
most of the governments in the region gave to the U.S. invasion of Grenada a few years
earlier.31 In addition, exports of textile/apparel from the region to the U.S. showed a
rapid increase beginning in the early 1980s, and the situation was seen as posing a
potential political problem for the U.S.
The U.S. industry was becoming less competitive due to the high cost of
production domestically, particularly from the cost of labor and other environmental and
labor restrictions by which they are bound in the domestic market. Therefore, U.S.
apparel makers began showing increasing interests in setting up low cost assembly
operations in the region in an effort to improve their competitiveness against similar
imports from low cost producing countries.
The U.S. administration was also faced with the challenge of how to deal with the
problem of the increasing use of foreign fabrics by U.S. apparel makers, including those
30 Steele, "The Caribbean Clothing Industry," 54.
31 Ibid.
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who were partnering with Caribbean manufacturers under the 807 system.32 Another
issue that the Administration was faced with was how to contain the activities of the Far
Eastern textile companies operating in the Caribbean. These enterprises, like U.S.
companies, were becoming increasingly more interested in the region as an offshore
production location targeted at the U.S. market.
The CBI Textile Program therefore came about as a result of political and
economic need to protect U.S. interests, as much as (if not more than) the need to assist
the Caribbean region in their developing efforts. The Program as it was designed, sought
to sustain manufacturing activity in the U.S. It facilitated domestically those elements
of the manufacturing process in which the U.S. manufacturers could take advantage of
capital intensive technology. At the same time, it allowed for the transfer overseas
those elements of the process in which the U.S. companies are at a particular
disadvantage relative to their international competitors.34 It also relieved U.S.
manufacturers of duty payable on the value of the U.S. content of goods assembled
overseas from components manufactured in the U.S., when these products are reimported
into the U.S. as finished goods.
Overall, the program promoted the establishment of labor absorbing, export
oriented manufacturing activity in the region by pairing such businesses with technical,
managerial, and marketing skills from the U.S. In this way, it sought to address the
32 This has been dealt with fully in previous chapters.
33 Steele, "The Caribbean Clothing Industry," 55.
34 Ibid., 48.
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immediate need of providing employment in the manufacturing sector and
contributing to the process of industrial development. ""
The CBI Textile Program also represented a strategy to bring textile trade within
the realm of the CBI from which it was deliberately excluded. The objectives of the
Program included: 1) to expand the manufacture of apparel in the Caribbean by
providing guaranteed access to the U.S. market for such clothing when produced under
certain specific conditions; and 2) to aid the U.S. textile industry by ensuring that those
specific conditions provide for the highest possible U.S. inputs into the privileged
categories of imports.36
The Program operated by allowing the CBI beneficiary states to enter into special
bilateral trade agreements with the U.S. utilizing a new form of restrictive quota,
Guaranteed Access Levels (GALS), which would govern access to the U.S. market for
categories of textile products assembled in CBI territories from goods cut and made in the
U.S.37 The Program also contained another category, Specific Limits (SLs), for products
made from fabric cut but not formed in the U.S.
GALS were established based on the capacity of the Caribbean beneficiary
country to produce the category of specific products. However, the level could be
increased if requested by the government of the CBI country on the same basis. In
addition, when the goods are reimported into the U.S., they would be subjected to the
35
Ibid.





regular 807 duties on the value of the U.S. components with duty payable only on the
value added during assembly. This system. 807A or Super 807, differs from the regular
807 in that the former offers those additional exemptions from the quantitative
restrictions which the U.S. uses to control apparel imports.
In order to discourage manufacture of products other than the 807A goods that are
targeted at the U.S. market, and particularly to limit the growth of Far Eastern companies
gaining a foothold by using the Caribbean to secure further quota allocations, the CBI
Textile Program included certain safeguards. These were designed to limit the scope for
such activities by capping imports of all categories showing signs of strong growth. Such
products would be subject to restrictive action under the market disruption clause of the
MFA.
The Program benefited the CBI countries in a number of ways. The costs
involved in the setting up of a manufacturing plant were reduced since the U.S. contractor
usually supplied the components for assembly and equipment. This was particularly
important, since the cost of finance in the region is prohibitively high. The producers in
the region had a secure export market for their goods provided they adhered to the
delivery schedules and specifications. For the Caribbean workforce employed in the
industry, the Program offered the opportunity to be introduced to the practices and
processes of doing business with an industrialized country, as they were exposed to
working with exact specifications and schedules.
Although the managerial, technical and other high level positions were usually
held by foreigners, some of these advanced skills were able to trickle down to local
workers even though to relatively small numbers. There were instances where local
214
managers were trained in various aspects of management, exposing them to areas
such as contract negotiation. These benefits were gained without high foreign exchange
38
costs.
Although the countries vigorously sought and welcomed the CBI Textile
Program, there were criticisms levied against it, particularly the claim that the U.S.
administration made it impossible for the beneficiary countries to develop significant, self
sufficient apparel industries. Critics suggested that the Program was structured in such a
way that it discouraged those npes of enterprises, and instead served to retard the wider
economic benefits that could have been gained by the region.
It is also argued that 807 garment production in the Caribbean region is
concentrated in sewing, finishing, inspection and packaging. Higher level skills involved
in design, pattern making, layout, cutting and marketing are done exclusively by the U.S.
firms. Even in the case where processes are carried out locally, managerial control
remains in the domain of foreigners. As a result, the system tends to develop low skills
that can only be used in assembly and sewing , and does not tend to foster the
development of forward and backward linkages.40 The system is also "credited" with
forcing the Caribbean industry to specialize in product types and marketing methods that
are uncompetitive in other areas:
38 Steele, "The Caribbean Clothing Industry," 57.
39 Ibid.
40 Winston H. Griffith, "Caricom Countries and the Caribbean Basin Initiative," Latin American
Perspectives 17, issue 64, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 42.
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specialization on simply-styled garments with low design content, enhances
firms' vulnerability to competition in the home market, and there is no hope for
penetration in the export market... competition comes from fashion-oriented
manufacturers abroad and will worsen when tariff barriers fall. ..
Critics also assert that the profit margins on the local processes are relatively low
as local value added ranges between 10 and 20% of the total value of the product. As a
result, the foreign exchange earnings potential is limited making the accumulation of
capital for further investment difficult.42 Another problem with the industries is that
operations can cease to be viable for reasons that are outside the control of local partners
if the enterprises become unattractive to the U.S. contractor.43 One CBI country's
industry that is currently experiencing such events is Jamaica, which was the first
signatory to the CBI Textile Program.
Jamaica's Textile/Apparel Industry
Background
The apparel industry in Jamaica was one of seven manufacturing sub-sectors
targeted for development under the Structural Adjustment Program, when Prime Minister
Seaga embarked on a series of activities to reorient the economy towards export
manufacturing. The island's textile manufacturing industry began as an export sector in
the 1960s and 1970s. By the beginning of the 1980s, the sub-sector was comprised of
predominantly small, locally-owned businesses, producing primarily for the local and
41 Report prepared by Antonios Vouranis, "Productivity for the Apparel Sub-Sector in Jamaica," a
Project Coordinated by Jampro (Kingston, Jamaica: 1992): 1.
42 Steele, "The Caribbean Clothing Industry," 50.
43 Ibid.
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CARICOM markets, together with a small group of foreign-owned export oriented
producers, serving exclusively extra-regional markets including the U.S.
In the early 1980s, the regional garment industry declined along with the entire
CARICOM market. There was a significant reduction of factory operations, even some
closures throughout the region. The Jamaican garment industry was one of the most
adversely affected, resulting in massive closure of sewing facilities. However, the
Jamaican companies that survived the downturn developed alternative market sources
which led to the development of manufacturing arrangements with US 807 contractors,
who offered them an opportunity to continue operating at full capacity. The program
required a high level of production and plant efficiency in order for the plants to maintain
viability at the low profit margins that were characteristic of the program.44
The government from the beginning was committed to maintaining relatively
reasonable wages in the industry and provide training for the workers in the sector.
Included in its plan of action were a four to five year factory building and training
program; a 20-factory complex targeted towards the production of apparel and other sewn
products for the North American and European market, and constructed in the FTZ along
the ports of Kingston and Montego Bay; and a detailed road map for management,
supervisory and operator training in conjunction with plant start-up. The Jamaican
National Investment Program Agency (JNIP), the investment promotion agency,
44 The Commonwealth Secretariat, "Jamaica: Productivity Improvement and Upgrading of
Garment Factories" (London: January, 1986): 1.
45 Jampro, "A Special Report: Jamaica," reprinted from Corporate Location, Apparel (Kingston,
Jamaica: 1995).
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contracted with Kirk Salmon and Associates, an Atlanta based industrial consulting
firm, to spearhead the fully funded training program, along with the world renowned
Singer Company who provided the training for maintenance and mechanical personnel.
The government bore the costs associated with the training of
management/supervisory, technical and direct labor personnel, and also provided a cash
subsidy of $JA 10 per week to each apparel industry- company for each of its trainee
employed for a six month period.46 A campaign was also launched simultaneously to
attract North American, European, and Asian companies engaged in export processing
activities to the island As a result of these initiatives, apparel manufacturing was
transferred from local ownership dominance to foreign companies producing for overseas
markets, moreso as the additional factory space attracted foreign investment. An
increasing amount of total output consisted of apparel assembled from precut imported
fabric, with the majority of raw materials used imported from and re-exported to the U.S.
under the 807 program.47
By the mid 1980s, and particularly after the signing of the US/Jamaica Bilateral
Textile Agreement in August 1986, the sector was becoming one of the most dynamic in
the Jamaican economy, steadily increasing its contribution to foreign exchange earnings
and contributing to the country's emergence as one of the four largest Caribbean suppliers
of 807 products to the U.S.48
46 Jampro, "Jamaica: Establishing an Offshore Apparel Operation in Jamaica " (Kingston, Jamaica: n.d).




Jamaican Exports of Garments: 1982 -1987 ($US Millions)













































USA .6 2.5 10.6 21.4 40.2 77.1
Others - - - 1.0 2.1 3.4
Total .6 2.5 10.6 22.4 42.3 80.5
Source: Jampro
The apparel sector also became the single largest employer in the manufacturing sector
during this period.
While the companies producing for the export market particularly under the 807
system were expanding and being courted by the Jamaican government, the small locally
owned garment factories on the island that catered primarily to the domestic and
CARICOM markets were being pressured by, and excluded from government policies.
In 1982, there were only half of a dozen 807 enterprises operating on the island, but by
1986, the number had grown to sixty, and while over one hundred companies were
registered as clothing exporters in 1988, only eleven were reported as locally owned.49
49 Jampro, "Updated Report of the Sub-Committee on Adjustment" (Kingston, Jamaica: July, 18,
1990).
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It is estimated that many of the foreign companies that were not U.S. owned or
subsidiaries, were from the Far East mainly Hong Kong and South Korea, and were set
up after 1985. They were actively encouraged beginning in the early 1980s as part of the
government's strategy to develop the sector. These establishments involved high levels
of investment in Jamaica, not only in terms of plant and investment, but also in the
development of skilled staff.
Many of the small domestic companies that moved into the 807 trade did so as a
group working together, with one of them acting as the coordinator in order to secure
contracts which were too large for any one of them to undertake. They were also able to
make use of the subsidies provided by the government to help companies train their staff
for 807 exporting. Nevertheless, the small domestic producers faced a number of
difficulties in the industry. With interest rates at exorbitant levels, it became difficult for
them to borrow funds to finance their business. They were also saddled with huge debts
which compounded the problem of raising funds. In addition, they could not afford to
pay the high rates of duty on imported capital equipment, fittings and spare parts needed
for their factories. With inadequate management staff, the companies often faced delays
in meeting delivery schedules and failures to maintain specifications.
The domestic small companies gained few or no benefits from the government
subsidized infrastructure that was made available to the foreign garment manufacturers
that were establishing operations in the FTZs. The former were also excluded from the
majority of public and USAID funds given to companies in the 807 system. 50 USAID
50 Hyett, "The Impact of the CBI," 145.
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criteria for granting funds tended to discriminate both against local businesses and the
type of enterprises which formed the backbone of the country's apparel industry in
previous years, by categorizing enterprises in terms of size - employees and machines in
operation. Businesses employing less than sixty production workers did not gain as much
from fiscal and other incentives.51
While the 807 system which relied on imports of U.S.-made components,
accessories, and other inputs fueled the growth of the apparel sector, it dealt a severe
blow to local producers. The restructuring of the industry towards export orientation for
the U.S. market reduced outlets for Jamaican-made fabric, components and accessories,
making it extremely difficult for local manufacturers focusing on local and regional
demand.52 This process can thus be considered to have had the effect of reducing the
country's potential to be self reliant.
Growth in the Sector from the mid 1980s
The growth of the apparel industry in Jamaica contributed to the manufacturing
sector becoming the second in importance in terms of its contribution to employment and
exports by the mid 1990s. The sector employed 98,000 workers or about 11% of the
country's labor force.53 The significance of the sector's contribution to exports can be
gauged from the following tables:
51 Ibid.
52 Interview conducted with local Jamaican garment business owner by author (Kingston,
Jamaica: May 2000).
53 Gordon V. Shirley, "Jamaica and Free Trade in the Western Hemispheres: A Competitive
Analysis of Selected Manufacturing and Service Industries," in Jamaica After Nafta: 100.
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TABLE 6.5
% Contribution of Manufacturing Sector to GDP: 1986 to 1995
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
21.3 20.9 19.6 19.6 19.4 19.1 19.6 18.4 18.5 17.7
Source: PIOJ, Economic and Social Survey, several issues
TABLE 6.6
Contribution of Manufacturing to Jamaican Exports : 1991-1995
($US Millions)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
If"e 66.0 67.4 63.6 72.0 84,
NonTradiditonal
Agriculture 46.4 52.8 60.0 65.1 77.3
Manufactured goods 217.8 280.9 347.1 366.1 434.5
Source: PIOJ, Economic and Social Survey ofJamaica, several issues.
TABLE 6.7






































By 1995, the textile and apparel subsector was the largest export subsector in
manufacturing and the second largest in terms of sales revenue with its gross sales
increasing from $US 10 million in 1980 to $US 500million in 1995.54 The sector's share
of Jamaica's total exports to the U.S. grew from 41% in 1990 to 63% in 1995.55 The
industry contributed to sustaining other sectors such as ports, shipping, trucking, security,
bus transport, retail and vending,56 thus becoming the island's largest foreign exchange
earner from non-traditional exports and the single largest employer of labor in the
manufacturing sector. The number of Asian owned companies that assembled apparel in
Jamaica rose from eight in 1992 to twenty three in 1997. Many of these newcomers
relocated to the region to exploit unfilled U.S. apparel quotas."7
Structure of the Industry
Beginning in the 1980s, the structure of the industry began to evolve into three
distinct areas: 1) Item 9802, formerly the 807, in which apparel pieces cut in the U.S. are
assembled in Jamaica and returned to the U.S. where duty is paid only on value added; 2)
CMT arrangement, where fabric is imported into Jamaica and cut, made and trimmed on
the island; and 3) Full Package, where the garment is designed and fully made in
54 "The Jamaican Government National Industrial Policy: A Strategic Plan for Growth and
Development" (Kingston, Jamaica: April 25, 1996): 139.
55 Weston and Viswanathan, "Nafta and the Potential for Trade and Investment Diversion from
Jamaica," 38.
56 The Jamaican Garment Manufacturers Confederation, "The Jamaican Garment Industry"
(Kingston, Jamaica: September 1996).
57 Weston and Viswanathan, Jamaica After NAFTA, 38.
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Jamaica, and the Jamaican company is responsible for sourcing all material. Duty is
charged on the total value of the product when it is reimported into the U.S. Few exports
fall into this last category.58
Item 9802 (formerly known as 807a) Production 59
Companies involved in the 807a activities benefit from the liberal quotas under
the US/Jamaica Bilateral Textile Agreements. Approximately 50% of companies in this
group are offshore foreign direct investments from the U.S., 44% are Jamaica owned and
6% originate from the Far East.60 The companies usually operate under high intensity
production schedules employing largely unskilled and semi skilled workers. These
employees are usually not represented by labor unions, with employers frequently
discouraging unionization by workers in the FTZs where most of these companies are
located. Companies in this category are also usually described as "footloose" in
character, as a result of not having to shoulder the entire cost of setting up their factories
on the island, and are able to take their operations to whatever location that seems to offer
lower costs without a tremendous overhead loss.
This category of apparel exports are by far the largest contributor to foreign
exchange earnings and to employment. In 1992, forty seven companies were exporting
clothing under 807 provision, up from twenty one in 1987. By 1994, 807 production was
responsible for 71% of total exports amounting to $348.1 million, with roughly 63% of
58 Jampro, "From 807 to High Fashion...Jamaica On Show."
59 807 is the term that is still commonly used in the industry.
60 Jampro, Marketing Plan 1996 -1997 (Kingston, Jamaica: March 2000).
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Jamaican apparel exports to the U.S. coming under this category.61 Around 73% of
807 exports were produced in FTZs, while 27% were manufactured in the Customs
Territory in 1994. The following table shows the structure of apparel exports in the































The rapid growth in 807 was attributed to several factors including the unlimited access
to the U.S. market; the support from the U.S. industry and government for this category
of production which complements their fabric and cutting industry; the relatively low
initial capital investment required by Jamaican investors; the financing and marketing
activities that were undertaken by the U.S. partner; and the access provided to the latest
U.S. technology.62
CMT Production
CMT production differs from the 807 in that more value is added to the product
locally because the product is cut, assembled and finished locally. However, duty is paid
61 Weston and Visnanathan, Jamaica After Nafta: Trade Options and Sectoral Strategies: 40.
62 The Jamaican Garment Industry, a submission by the Jamaican Garment Manufacturing
Confederation (Kingston, Jamaica: Jampro, September, 1996).
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on the fabric and value added upon entering the U.S. This category of production is
dominated by the Far Eastern companies, which use fabric imported from Asia and which
produce mainly for the first country markets. In 1994, CMT production was responsible
for close to 28% of exports, amounting to around $US 107.7 million.63 In the same year,
around 82% of CMT exports were produced in the FTZs, while 18% were made in the
customs territory. In 1999, CMT production was responsible for 13% of apparel
exports.64
Full Package
The majority of the firms that produce this category of products are Jamaican
owned. They design apparel, cut patterns from fabric and assemble the final product,
exporting a large percentage of their product to the CARICOM market. These operations
add the most value to the product and require the manufacturer to source fabrics, provide
designs, do the cutting, assembling, and finishing of the product.
Under this system, when the U.S. firms place an order for items of apparel, the
Jamaican supplier finances the entire operation In addition to being responsible for
financing raw material, plant and equipment, full package companies also take care of
marketing the final product.
Importance of the U.S. Market to the Jamaican Industry and Economy
The U.S. is of great importance in sustaining the growth in production and exports
of labor intensive manufactured goods in CARICOM. It offers CARICOM a large
63 Jampro Marketing Plan, 1996 -1997 (Kingston, Jamaica: March 2000).
64 Jampro Marketing Plan, 2000 - 2001 (Kingston, Jamaica: March 2000).
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market for the products and services in which the Caribbean countries have or can
acquire a comparative advantage.65 Since the U.S. is no longer a significant exporter of
textiles and clothing, it has become the world's largest importer of garments - around
25% of the global imports.66
Among the countries with quotas for garment exports to the U.S., Jamaica was the
leading supplier of underwear, exporting 13.68 million dozen units in 1995, which was
worth roughly $79 million, and represented 44% of U.S. imports by volume.67 By the
mid 1990s, more than 90% of Jamaica's apparel production was exported to the U.S.
under the 807 program.
In 1995, about 93% of export sales were headed to the U.S68 Apparel exports in
that year exceeded 55% of total Jamaican exports to the U.S.69 In 1998, Jamaica was the
sixteenth largest supplier of garments to the U.S., and the seventh largest supplier of 807
products.70
In addition to the U.S., Jamaica exports apparel products to Europe - England,
Finland, France, Germany, Spain - Australia, Canada, CARICOM, Hong Kong, and
65 DeLisle Worrell, "Caricom and the North American Free Trade Area," Paper prepared for the
Overseas Development Council (n.p., February, 1992): 9.
66 Antero Hyvarinen, "The Changing Pattern of International Trade in Textiles and Clothing," 1.
67 Shirley, "Jamaica and Free Trade in the Western Hemisphere," 103.
68 Ibid.
69 "The Jamaican Garment Industry," 1.
70 Report by Kurt Salmon, "A Regional Comparative Analysis" (Kingston, Jamaica: Jampro
1998).
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Nigeria.71 However, duties on apparel exported to Canada which is excluded from
CARIBCAN, range from 18 - 25%.72 Exports to Canada also fell by 8% from US$4.8
million in 1993 to $US 4.4 million in 1994.73 In the same period, exports to Europe
decreased by 49.98% in 1994, from $US 51,950 million in 1993 to $US 25.99 million in
1994.74 Jamaica's attempts to increase exports to the European markets were
unsuccessful as that marketplace requires the manufacturer to be able to source all raw
materials.75 Trade with CARICOM however, increased from $US1.28 million in 1993 to
$2.25 million in 1994.
An important characteristic of the textile industry in Jamaica which has great
socioeconomic significance is the employment structure. The great majority of workers
employed in the industry are women. By 1995, 93% of workers in the apparel sector
were females between the ages of twenty and twenty- four years, who were usually the
sole breadwinner in their family. A 1988 survey of workers in the Kingston FTZ found
that 80% of the workers earned less than $US 15 a week. High unemployment drove
many women to seek jobs in the industry in the 1970s and 1980s despite the low wages
and poor physical conditions that were prevalent in the factories in the earlier period.
Since that time, the government has attempted to make significant changes in the
industry, as will be discussed later in this chapter.
71 Ibid.
72 Jampro, "From 807 to High Fashion...Jamaica on Show...
73 Jampro Marketing Plan 1996 -1997.
74 Ibid.
75 Jampro Marketing Plan 2000-2001 (March 2000).
228
Challenges to the Industry in the 1990s
The industry in Jamaica experienced significant growth after the implementation
of the CBI Textile Agreement and the signing of the US/Jamaica Bilateral Textile
Agreement. The annual growth rate of Jamaican apparel exports to the U.S., about 28%
over the period 1984 - 1995, was greater than any other in the manufacturing sector.
Income from apparel exports almost doubled from $26 million to $50 million between
1984 and 1985, while employment in the apparel factories of Kingston Export Free Zone
expanded from around 200 in 1981, to about 15,000 by late 1988.76 Factors contributing
to this growth included the competitive advantage enjoyed by the island in terms of
market access, proximity to major markets, the cost and quality of labor, and the
government incentives including prebuilt factory space and attractive tax holidays.77
"Quota hopping" by Asian firms looking to secure locations with unfulfilled quotas also
contributed to this growth.78 It is being suggested that this growth may have caused the
government to feel overly confident and comfortable enough to cut back most of its
marketing and investment promotion efforts in the late 1980s thereby partly turning itself
off as an option for new apparel investment.79
76 Hyett, "The Impact of the CBI," 144.
77 "The Jamaican Garment Industry," 1.
78 Shirley, "Jamaica and Free Trade in the Western Hemisphere," 102.
79 Kurt Salmon Associates, "Second Draft of a Regional Comparative Analysis and
Recommendations on Strategic Initiatives to Increase Apparel Sector Competitiveness and Market
Effectivenss for Jampro " (Kingston, Jamaica: Jampro, January 1997).
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Despite these impressive growth rates, the industry began to confront a
number of challenges both internal and external, which affected that growth both in
export earnings and employment by the mid 1990s. As early as 1988, in a letter from an
official with the Jamaican National Export Corporation to Coopers and Lybrand, a
consulting company working with the Jamaican government on the industry,
manufacturers expressed concern that the industry might be in jeopardy and needed
governmental assistance. The local, small 807 garment producers claimed that the major
problem they were facing were low profit margins exacerbated by under-capitalization,
exorbitant interest rates of between 27 to 30%, their inability to collect payment from
contracting parties, and the high rates of duty on capital goods. These small
manufacturers which numbered about sixty four, wanted the government to intervene
with local banks on their behalf concerning more favorable terms for financing. They
also wanted the government to set up a bank similar to the Agricultural Credit Bank to
deal exclusively with the garment industry. They complained that due to their
overextended state, they were unable to access the EXIM Bank's 16% rate, and even if it
were possible, the Bank took long periods of time to make a decision.81
Revaluation of the Jamaican currency in the early 1990s caused much instability
affecting all sectors of the economy. The government's increase of 60% in the national
minimum wage resulted in high labor costs and subsequent high operating costs,




particularly since workers' productivity did not match the increase.82 The export
markets were also experiencing a downturn and this resulted in a loss of contracts, the
scaling down of operations and the loss of new investment opportunities.83
Coupled with these developments, the industry also faced a number of internal
structural problems including the following:
(1) The Labor Force
There was a growing scarcity of trained and trainable labor in the country. To
compound the problem, employers faced high incidences of lateness and absenteeism
particularly on Mondays and after public holidays, despite financial incentives given to
employees who attended the entire week and arrived on time.84 Managers complained
about the lack of work ethic they were observing from the workforce. Companies,
particularly the Far Eastern establishments, cited poor worker attitude as a cause of low
productivity.85
While many of the foreign owned apparel companies are managed by expatriates,
Jamaican owned facilities are owned and managed by mostly family members. In both
cases, there is usually a lack of transfer of management responsibilities to highly skilled
Jamaican nationals.86 There is also generally a lack of middle managers in the country.
82 Report by Kurt Salmon, "A Regional Comparative Analysis," 1.
83 Ibid.
84 Interview with Official ofthe Kingston Free Trade Zone by author (Kingston, Jamaica: May
2000).
85 Jampro Marketing Plan, 1996 -1997.
86 "Second Draft of a Regional Comparative Analysis," Kurt Salmon Associates, 1997.
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Companies cited the high incidence of industrial disputes as reason to question the
viability of operating in such an environment. Training was identified as a need
throughout the companies in the industry, particularly at the middle management level.
The companies also stated that the training provided by the government program,
HEART, was not adequate for firms who preferred in-house training. Other labor
issues that have been identified include the wage and benefits costs which have been
cited as higher in Jamaica than in some other developing apparel exporting country, even
in the Caribbean region.
(2) Transportation
The lack of adequate and reliable transportation has caused a serious problem for
Jamaican garment manufacturers. It was not unusual for workers to arrive late to work
and exhausted after having to wait for buses which were late. Companies were not able
to implement alternate work shifts and offer overtime to workers due to the lack of
transportation. Companies which tried to resolve the problem by purchasing their own
buses to transport their workers, found the added expense costly and complained that the
level of General Consumption Tax (GCT) charged on the buses being imported was too
high.89
87
Jampro Marketing Plan 2000 - 2001.
88 Coopers and Lybrand Associates Ltd., "Jamaica National Export Corporation, Export Garment
Industry Survey" (Kingston, Jamaica: Jampro, 1988).
89 "A Regional Comparative Analysis," Report by Kurt Salmon, 1998.
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(3) Security Issues
Security is a major issue for Jamaica. High incidence of crime and violence affect
the number of workers who are willing to travel to the locations of the factories, usually
the FTZs, to work. In addition, there was a lack of available housing in close proximity
to these locations where factories are set up. In another security related issue, companies
have begun to take measures to combat the problem of contamination of their apparel
shipments with illegal drugs/narcotics. Apparel executives view the need for extreme
security procedures to guard against the inclusion of illicit shipments as a major
detriment to operating in Jamaica.
There have been instances where searches carried out by U.S. customs resulted in
costly delays and cancellation of contracts as a result of narcotics being smuggled among
garment shipments to the U.S. In the mid 1980s, several U.S. importers cancelled 807
contracts with producers after the discovery of drugs within their shipments.90 To combat
this problem, some companies installed elaborate and expensive security systems adding
to the overall operating costs of their business by as much as 8%.91 The shipment
security measures required in Jamaica, within the factories and on the roads, are without
parallel in the Caribbean Basin.92
90 Steele, "The Caribbean Clothing Industry," 122.
91 "The Jamaican Garment Industry," 1.
92 "Second Draft of a Regional Comparative Analysis," Kurt Salmon, January 1997.
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(4) The Cost of Capital
As in most developing countries, the cost of capital is relatively high in Jamaica.
Jamaica's interest rates at times were about five times that of Barbados, for example.93
In addition, many of the smaller companies that needed loans most could not qualify for
them. This was even more crucial for companies which were operating with old and
obsolete machinery and equipment. Many of these companies have found it difficult to
meet required international standards of quality and quantity. It has also constrained their
ability to produce different types of garments.94
(5) Other Operating Costs
Companies have complained about the high utility costs, the large deposit
required and the need for a backup power source, which add to existing high operating
costs. Complaints have also been made about the rental rate of the factory space and the
insurance rates as being somewhat costly. As most of the factories are rented as shells,
some manufacturers feel that the costs of setting up offices and other infrastructure are
too much to allow them to operate profitably. Another problem which had been noticed
was the shortage of factory space in the Kingston area, a location many manufacturers
prefer.95
For the companies engaged in full packaging, importing the necessary accessories
and raw materials were becoming increasingly expensive. High technology machines
93 Jampro Marketing Plan, 2000-2001.
94 Jampro Marketing Plan, 1996 - 1997.
95 Ibid.
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which are not available in Jamaica had to be sourced from overseas, often resulting in
a high incidence of downtime. The lack of backward linkages has impeded the growth
and development of the local, indigenous industry since all raw materials have to be
imported, coupled with the difficulty encountered in acquiring spare parts.
Some companies, particularly the small locally owned establishments, have
complained about the U.S. contractors not paying them on time and sometimes,
withholding payments for obscure reasons. For these small companies, the delay could
mean the closing down of their operations.
(6) Bureaucracy
The processes involved in export administration in Jamaica is extremely complex
and are often considered as a disincentive to exporting. The procedures can be
intimidating to the novice business owners and serve to discourage them from becoming
involved in the process. There are 6 main instruments used to control the system:97
1) Exporter Registration: All exporters are required to register with the trade board;
2) Certificate of Jamaican origin: This requirement was introduced in 1985 as a means
of combating transshipment - to ensure that Jamaican suppliers rather than those from
third countries, received the full benefits of the U.S. import quotas;
3) Visa: The visa and certification system requires that all shipment of products not
falling in 807a categories are certified as correct in category and quantity. This step
96 Interview with owner of Jamaican owned garment company by author (Kingston, Jamaica: May
2000).
97 Steele, "The Caribbean Clothing Industry," 114.
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was introduced to overcome the administrative complexity over the treatment of
807 goods.
4) Customs Clearance: This process involves the physical inspection of garment export
shipments in an effort to stop the practice of concealing drugs and other illegal
substances in export shipments.
5) Bank of Jamaica Compliance Certificates: All export earnings have to be sold to the
Bank of Jamaica at prevailing rates of exchange and compliance certificates secured.
6) Tax Compliance Certificates: These are prerequisites for obtaining many of the
benefits available to exporters.
In addition to this administrative maze, companies have complained that customs officers
are not sensitive enough to the speed with which imported raw materials have to be
cleared. There were instances where garment manufacturers have been threatened with
QO
cancellations as a result of delays.
The mid 1990s saw a number of factories closing down their operations as both
local and foreign owners complained of the rising costs. By 1997, the number of people
employed within the sector was down to 88,900 from 100,400 in 1996." The total value
of exports to all markets in 1996 totaled US$ 538,380,843, representing a decrease of
7.54% over exports for 1995 which amounted to US$582,271,295,100 The value of U.S.
textile/apparel exports to Jamaica also decreased by 9.82% with the greatest effect being
98 Ibid.
99 Economic and Social Survey, The Planning Institute of Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica: 1997).
100 Jampro, "A Regional Comparative Analysis," 1998.
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in the area of 807, which decreased by 28.44%.l01 In 1999, there was a decline in the
industry's production of 3.6%.102 The main reason cited for the decline in exports to the
U.S. were company closures and relocating to areas such as Mexico, Nicaragua, Haiti and
Belize.103
Apparel manufacturers place much of the blame on the government of Jamaica for
many of their problems. They charge that the essential support mechanisms which are
vital to sustained development are inadequate and whatever processes were put in place
earlier such as productivity incentives, marketing and promotion, were not being
sustained or reinforced.104
The trend in the number of companies which closed or scaled down operations
continued throughout the mid 90s causing various interests in the industry to appeal to the
government for assistance to stem the losses that the sector was experiencing. A study
conducted by Kurt Salmon revealed that the reasons given by the companies for taking
such action included industrial unrest, the drug contamination problem, the complexity of
dealing with customs, pilferage, low productivity, criminal activity - murders, stabbings,
breakins - inadequate and unreliable transportation, poor worker attitude and high
101
Ibid.
102 National Income and Product, Preliminary Report 1999, The Statistical Institute of Jamaica
(Kingston, Jamaica: 2000).
103 Ibid.
104 Interview with Jamaican garment manufacturer by author (Kingston, Jamaica: May 2000).
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operating costs.105 Factors contributing to high costs of operations included rental
rates, utility costs particularly for electricity, high interest rates, the additional costs
incurred for security, transportation and other motivational incentives for workers such as
lunch and bonuses.
The study reported that some costs in Jamaica were higher than in other countries
in the CBI, and that the country was experiencing a "progressive deterioration" of its
competitive position vis-a-vis other countries such as Mexico, Dominican Republic,
Honduras and El Salvador.107 The following table shows the difference in costs between
Jamaica and Mexico for selected apparel items:
105 Kurt Salmon Associates, Second Draft ofa Regional Comparative Analysis and
Recommendations on Strategic Initiatives to Increase Apparel Sector Competitiveness and Market
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Full package comparison with Mexico has Jamaica approximately $11.00 per dozen
more expensive in workpants, $16.00 per dozen more expensive in dress shirts, and
$11.00 per dozen more expensive in sweatshirts.
Compounding the problem for Jamaica was Mexico's increasing competitiveness.
Mexico went through a devaluation in the peso in 1994 significantly increasing the
country's competitiveness as a source of manufactured products including textile and
apparel. At the end of 1996, two major foreign owned companies announced they were
ceasing operations in Jamaica citing high operating costs as the reason. In 1997, three
companies that closed in Jamaica relocated to Mexico - Manchester Apparel, Hanes
International and Fruit of the Loom.108
In addition, the U.S. market in 1996 experienced a downturn or softening in
demand for apparel, which caused many major U.S. companies to reduce the volume of
work being sourced from Jamaica and other CBI countries.109 Jamaica's main
competitors in order of importance are Mexico, Dominican Republic, Honduras, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Haiti.110 Most of these countries
produce the same products as Jamaica for the same target market. Besides, they enjoy
certain relative advantages: economies of scale due to the availability of labor and
10* J996-1997 Annual Report, Textile and Sewn Products Division, (Kingston, Jamaica: Jampro,
2000).
109 Ibid.
110 Jampro Marketing Plan 2000 - 2001.
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economies of plant size; access to technology; a developed infrastructure and
proximity to major markets.'''
Jamaica's Main CBI Competitors
Apparel constitutes one of the fastest growing categories of imports from CBI
countries, valued at close to $5.5 billion in 1995. It has ranked as the leading category of
U.S. imports from the region since 1988.112 Since 1983, the top garment assembler
nations in the Caribbean Basin - Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Jamaica, - have accounted for most of all Item
807 imports from that region. By 1989, the major exporters in the Caribbean, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica, accounted for $938 million or two third of all
Item 807 U.S. imports from the region, up from $240 million. The CBI's textile and
apparel industry relinquished considerable market share in 1994.
The Dominican Republic: This country has well established infrastructure in
industrial parks and is the largest 807 apparel exporter in CBI. When the U.S. made the
four leading Asian newly industrializing countries (NICS) ineligible for tariff treatment
of certain imports under the GSP, Korean firms began locating more plants in the
Dominican Republic than in the Eastern Caribbean. Taiwanese firms, on the other hand,
seemed to prefer Central America than the Caribbean.
The Dominican Republic is more wage competitive than other Caribbean
countries. The monthly minimum wage for Dominican Republic workers in the late
111 Ibid.
112 Second Report to Congress on the Operation of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
(Washington, D.C.: USTR).
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1990s was less than the average weekly wage for the Eastern Caribbean counterparts,
including Jamaica. Along with wages, the industrial space in the free zones is cheaper
than in the region. As a global platform, the Dominican Republic is more attractive than
the English speaking Caribbean. In 1999, the Dominican Republic exported a total of
$US2,336.96 million of garments.
Honduras: The foundation of the Honduran apparel industry was created years before
the CBI was implemented and began promoting the industry in the region, when the
country established itself as the traditional exporter to the other Central American
nations. Honduran legislation is one of the most flexible in the region with minimal
bureaucracy exercised in the free trade zones. While customs processing in other
countries may take up to three days, in Honduras the process can take as little as half an
hour.113 The private industry in Honduras contributed to the construction of industrial
parks equipped with advanced technology and up-to-date infrastructure that attracted
investment. Honduras thus distinguished itself in its efforts to increase its apparel
industry productivity. According to the Honduran Maquiladores Association, the country
exported $741 million in assembled garments to the U.S. from January to June 1997.
From June 1996 to June 1997, Honduras exported $1.4 billion in apparel.114 While
113 Mercedes Cortazar, "Honduras Survives Mexican Competition," Apparel Industry




exports from Honduras showed a 15.24% increase in 1999, the value of Jamaica's
exports over the same period declined by 18.37%.11:>
Therefore, by the mid to late 1990s, Jamaica had lost its competitive edge and
was no longer one of the lowest cost options, but one of the highest for apparel sourcing
in the Caribbean Basin. The industry itself had also come to perceive a lack of interest on
the part of the government in its support of the manufacturing sector, in particular the
apparel sector.
Jamaica's Government's Response to Complaints from the Industry
In December 1996, in response to the industry's increasingly vocal concerns, the
government through the Ministry of Industry, Investment and Commerce, instituted a
special Assistance Program to aid the apparel and sewn products subsector in reducing
the rising operating costs for financing, security, factory rental, and to re-tool in order to
increase value added production and stem the decline in employment.116 Special
emphasis was placed on technical assistance, security strengthening, and financial
support. l17 These measures were intended to retain jobs, enhance market entry and
penetration, raise productivity output, and increase competitiveness.118 Some of the
specific aspects of the program included an industry comparative analysis, a public
relations and advertising program, the establishment of a national Export Security
115 Ibid.
116 Economic and Social Survey, 1999.
117 Economic and Social Survey, 1997.
118 Jampro Marketing Plan 1996 - 1997.
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Council, posting of security at Garmex Free Zone, a Special Assistance Financing
Program, dedicated transportation for the industry, increase in the minimum wage, and
increase in the income tax threshold.119
The government also extended the EIEA so that partial exporters could benefit
from the program, lifted the 5% customs duties levied on non-competing capital goods,
and provided : 1) matching grants to firms to assist them in meeting the cost of
specialized technical and marketing assistance; and 2) more creative investment
marketing packaging that would take into account the needs of individual investors.120
The program was due to last for fifteen months beginning in January 1997, and to
provide JA$ 200 million for the sector, with JA$ 40 million to be disbursed in the last
quarter of the financial year ending March 31, 1997. The package was intended to
provide 5% of the overall average operating cost of the industry.121 It provided assistance
in the areas of rental and security for both foreign and locally-owned companies with the
latter also being able to claim for financing charges. The Special Assistance Finance
Program was based on employment figures for the companies,122 as demonstrated in the
following table:
119 Jampro, Textiles and Sewn products Annual Report, April 1996 - March 1997 (Kingston,
Jamaica: Jampro, 1998).
120 Jampro Marketing Plan, 1996 - 1997 .





















The government also incorporated two new policies, The National Industrial
Policy (NIP) and the Single Entity Free Zone Status (SEFZS). The NIP, presented as a
"Strategic Plan for Growth and Development" of the apparel sector by the government,
sought to :
provide a framework within which strategies can be developed to effectively meet
the challenges of the 21st century, and to enhance the competitive position of the
industry in the global marketplace.123
The SEFZS was designed to provide apparel companies within the customs territory, the
same benefits as companies operating in the FTZs. In effect, these companies would not
be required to pay tax on corporate profits, and they would be eligible for duty free
concessions on capital goods and raw materials inputs for the life of the business.
The Special Assistance Program was extended by the Jamaican government from
its initial fifteen month period and was thought to have had some positive results. By the
end of 1998, around fifty three companies were benefiting from the program. The
number of closures for larger factories was reduced showing an improvement in the rate
123 Jampro Marketing Plan, 1996 - 1997.
124 Ibid.
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of net job loss from 2,093 employees in 1997 to 1,060 in 1998. The use of improved
accounting records enabled companies to make better business decisions.
For the 2000 - 2001 period, the government has renewed its efforts to assist the
industry. Among the strategies included in Jampro's Marketing Plan were the promotion
investment opportunities in the sector to local and foreign investors; the advising of
client companies on trade opportunities for items produced in the sector and develop
appropriate marketing strategies for successful market penetration by companies; the
promotion of investment opportunities geared to attract offshore investments and
develop local businesses; and the increasing of Jamaica's presence in the world market
by penetrating untapped markets.126
Despite its problems and challenges, the apparel subsector still remains one of the
key contributors to the manufacturing sector in terms of foreign exchange earnings and
employment. Jamaica is considered to possess certain features which the island can
utilize to its advantage to promote the sector. The country has a track record as an
apparel producing source with a number of internationally recognized apparel companies
having wholly-owned operations and in some cases, contractural arrangements in the
country. Some of these enterprises together with Jamaican companies, continue to win
international awards for quality, output and packaging.
Jamaica is also considered to have a mature apparel sector with a good
communication infrastructure - the network of roads, frequent and reliable air and sea
125 Economic and Social Survey, 1997.
126 Jampro Marketing Plan 2000 - 2001.
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transport and efficient telephone system. The electric and potable water supply is also
adequate. The country's social and entertainment facilities are also important assets. They
continue to play a vital role in promoting the country as an offshore investment location.
However, the sector has not yet demonstrated its potential as a catalyst for the
development of other segments of the manufacturing sector, as seen by the lack of
backward and forward linkages.
CARICOM's integration into a single market and economy, which will allow for
duty free trade among member states, can provide opportunities for Jamaica's industry to
expand its exports. There are indications that some of the investors who moved to
Mexico are now experiencing serious difficulties with labor disputes and constantly
changing rules of operation,127 and thus may look for better opportunities elsewhere.
Jamaican industry officials are hoping that these companies have left the option open of
returning to the island.
The government through some of its efforts, is attempting to maintain the status
quo of the industry through trade negotiations such as CBI Enhancement for continued
market access, management of free zones, incentive programs for firms and employees,
security controls on illicit drug trafficking, and efforts to improve the industrial relations
climate.128 The government's objectives for the industry include creating more jobs,
assisting with start-up of investment projects, maintaining export earnings and increasing
127 Ibid.
128 Jamaican Government, National Industrial Policy: A Strategic Planfor Growth and
Development (Kingston, Jamaica: April 25, 1996).
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export earnings to the Caribbean.129 The government has utilized the National
Training Agency, HEART, and the marketing/promotion agency, Jampro, to train
workers and promote the industry quite extensively. Both agencies have recently jointly
acquired computer aided design equipment to give access to Jamaican manufacturers who
may not have the resources for their own computers.
The Next Steps for Jamaica and its Industry
The apparel industry in Jamaica is dependent on the needs and demands of, and
level of activity in the U.S. apparel market This reliance on the U.S. market places
Jamaica's economy in a very vulnerable position. The country also has the opportunity,
though extremely limited, to export to the European Union's market which is very diverse
and fragmented.130 The following table shows the various markets for Jamaican garment
exports for 1994 and 1995:
TABLE 6.11
Direction of Jamaican Garment Sector Exports: 1994 -1995 ($US Millions)






Source: Jampro, International Trade Division
129 Jampro Marketing Plan, 2000 - 2001.
130 "Second Draft of a Regional Comparative Analysis," Kurt Salmon Associates, 1997.
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While Caribbean states make use of trade benefits with the EU, under the new
Partnership Agreement, similar arrangements between the EU, its members and other
non-member countries having low wage costs are also in operation. Countries such as
Portugal, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Malta and Cyprus all have a developing
apparel and textile sector which serves the EU market. Therefore, apparel manufacturers
such as those in Jamaica that were historically cost competitive because of their supply of
cheap labor now find that they can be at a disadvantage if lower labor costs are not
combined with high levels of productivity and technology.131 Manufacturers that had
previously operated inefficiently in protected markets will now find themselves non-
competitive as a result of freer trade. Thus, in order to make a significant dent in the
European market, Jamaica, like other Caribbean exporters, will need to become more
efficient and cost competitive producers.
At the end of the 1990s, a number of global developments gave the indication that
the apparel industry in Jamaica and some other CBI beneficiaries would face tough times
ahead. The increased push by the WTO towards trade liberalization and the enacting of
the ATC are certain to have some profound impact on the global trade in textile and
apparel. One development that Jamaica along with other regional exporters are placing
their hopes on is the CBI Enhancement Bill, otherwise known as the CBTPA, that the




IS NAFTA RESPONSIBLE FOR JAMAICA'S TEXTILE/APPAREL
INDUSTRY WOES?
Caribbean Basin countries with sizable textile/apparel industries were elated when
the U.S. Congress finally passed the Caribbean Basin Partnership Trade Act. Some of
the countries are pinning their hopes on the Act to reinvigorate their textile/apparel
industry and consequently their economies. Officials in Jamaica, for example, are of the
opinion that the Act is exactly what their country needs in its efforts to rebound after
years of economic decline. Jamaica's Ambassador to the U.S. stated that the Bill is " a
good first step towards restoring Jamaica's competitiveness in a critical sector which has
traditionally been a reliable base of employment for thousands of Jamaicans, with our
women being the major beneficiaries of opportunities in this industry."1
The industry in Jamaica has experienced both growth and decline since the 1980s,
when the government decided to target that sector as a major area for development.
When the problems persisted or re-emerged in the mid 1990s, certain industry officials
declared that NAFTA was partly to blame for the plant closings and subsequent loss of
jobs that seemed to escalate after 1994. However, even Jampro officials admit that it is




difficult to quantify the effects of the implementation of NAFTA on the Jamaican
textile/apparel industry.
In an effort to investigate whether the problems in the industry can be tied to the
implementation of NAFTA, it is important to look at what was occurring in certain key
areas of the sector prior to and after NAFTA, and attempt to determine whether the
pattern in the performance in these areas after 1994 was significantly altered from the pre
1994 years. If the performance in these areas indicates that there were significant
changes after 1994, then a case can be made that NAFTA which came into effect in 1994,
may have played a leading role in affecting those changes that occurred since then. This
scenario is based on the assumption that there were no other significant developments
and that all else within the sector remained relatively unchanged from the pre 1994 years.
The key areas that will be examined will be:
the total number of textile/apparel plants opened
the number ofjobs created by these plants
the total U.S. investment in terms of plants opened
the number of plants closed
the number ofjobs lost as a result of these plant closings
the amount of income lost as a result of the plant closings
reasons given for the plants closures
total textile/apparel exports to the U.S.
As mentioned previously, the focus of these areas being examined will be on the
U.S./Jamaica trade in textile/apparel and the importance of the industry to the Jamaican
economy. This section will also look at U.S./Mexico trade relations as a comparison to
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U.S./Jamaica trade relations prior to and after 1994. since one of the arguments made
is that the industry in Mexico is the beneficiary of the decline in the industries in the
non-NAFTA member countries such as the CBERA states, including Jamaica.
Whatever the results of the study, the general consensus is that the textile/apparel
industry is very important to the overall health of the Jamaican economy, and that steps
must be taken either to stem the decline that the industry has been experiencing in the last
couple of years.
The Importance of the Textile/Apparel Industry to the Jamaican Economy
Employment
The textile/apparel sector has been identified by the government as one of the
largest providers of employment, and the total number ofjobs in the sector can be viewed
as a reliable indicator of the growth in the sector over a period of time.
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FIGURE 7.1


















Total Estimated Employment in the Textile/Apparel Industry
Employment in the industry showed a steady growth from the mid to late 1980s
(figures were not available for years prior to 1984), after which the numbers began to
decline until the early 1990s, when total employment began to increase. By the mid
1990s, the figures showed a consistent decrease. It should be noted that some of the
highest levels of employment in the industry occurred in 1993, 1994 and 1995, even as
some plants were being shut down. The data for total employment in the sector reveals
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that although total employment in the industry began to fall after 1996, this trend was
also noticed in pre 1994 years as in the period between 1989 to 1991.
Exports and Foreign Exchange
FIGURE 7.2
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Textile/Apparel Exports: $US Millions
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Textile /Apparel Exports From Jamaica to the U.S.
Textile/apparel exports from Jamaica to the U.S. increased in the 1980s from
7.293 million square meters in 1980 to 100.061 million square meters in 1989. The
greatest increase in the 1980s occurred between 1984 and 1986. That increasing trend
continued on in the early 1990s until 1995, after which time the volume of exports began
to fall.
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The foreign exchange earned from these exports followed a similar pattern
with export earnings beginning to fall in 1996 after several years of consistent increase in
the 1980s and early 1990s. The highest increase in export earnings occurred between
1984 and 1986. While in 1980, total exports from textile/apparel amounted to $13,506
million, by 1995, the amount increased to $531,934 million, and fell to $422,485 million
in 1998.
FIGURE 7.4
Number of Textile/Apparel Projects Implemented: Total versus U.S.
"8
Projects Started: Total vs U.S.
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Number of Textile/Apparel Projects Implemented: Total versus U.S.
The total number of textile/apparel projects implemented was the highest in the
period from 1984 through 1988, and also in the early 1990s. After 1994, the total number
and the number of U.S. projects both decreased. However, the rate of the U.S. decrease
was greater than that of the total rate.
FIGURE 7.5
Total U.S. Capital Investment in Textile/Apparel Projects : ($JA Millions)
CO
o
Total US. Capital Investment
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Years 1981 -1999
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Total U.S. Capital Investment in Textile/Apparel Projects : $JA millions)
The total U.S. capital investment in textile/apparel projects showed increases
between 1985 and 1993. A complete analysis of the trend cannot be made however, due
to the unavailability of data for several years. Nevertheless, the level of U.S. capital
investment seems to correlate with the number of U.S. plants that was started. There was
a distinct decrease in the level of capital investment after 1994.
FIGURE 7.6
Total Jobs Created bv U.S. Textile/Apparel Projects
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Total Jobs Created bv U.S. Textile/Apparel Projects
Between 1981 and 1999, there is indication of both growth and decline in the
industry during certain periods within that range in terms of jobs created. From 1984
through 1987, there was a growth spurt in the number of projects implemented, and a
corresponding increase in the number of jobs created by these projects. It was also
during this period that the CBI Textile Program was introduced with Jamaica signing a
Bilateral Textile Framework Agreement with the U.S.
The number ofjobs created by U.S. projects decreased consistently after 1989 as
the number of projects also decreased. The data shows that the decrease in both the
number of projects and the number ofjobs created became even greater in the post 1994
period than in the pre 1994 years.
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FIGURE 7.7
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Contribution of Key Sectors to Jamaica's GDP: (%)
While the contribution of export agriculture to GDP in terms of percentage
decreased between 1987 through 1998, the contribution of textile/apparel increased
between 1993 through 1995, surpassing that of export agriculture. There were no figures
available for the contribution of textile/apparel prior to 1993. However, this
contribution began to decrease after 1996, even though it remained higher than that of
export agriculture.
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The contribution of the bauxite/alumina sector increased consistently between
the years 1987 through 1998, remaining one of the highest contributing sectors to the
country's GDP.
FIGURE 7.8
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Impact of Textile/Apparel Plant Closures on Jamaica's Economy
One of the areas to which industry officials point in order to support their case
that NAFTA is luring textile/apparel investment away from Jamaica to Mexico is the
incidence in the number of plants that are being opened and closed since NAFTA came
into existence, and the resulting job creation and job losses.
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Available data show that plant closures reached a peak in 1996 resulting in the
highest number ofjob losses in the industry for the years 1989 through 1999. The years
1994 through 1996 experienced the greatest number of job losses, with the numbers
remaining at a high level through 1999. Overall, the job losses in the mid to late 1990s
were greater than in prior years.
One of the limitations in the study is that data for certain indicators were not
available for a number of consecutive years. Jampro only began keeping statistics on
plant closures beginning in the late 1980s, when the industry started experiencing
problems. Additionally, the International Trade Commission (ITC) in Washington has
not kept statistics on the total number of firms that have invested in Mexico since 1994,
although they report that several have done so.2
2 Paula L Green, "Report: Quota Phaseout to Hurt Caribbean," The Journal ofCommerce
(February 11, 2000) Some of the major companies that have invested in Mexico since 1994 include
Burlington Industries Inc., Cone Mills Corp., and Guildord Mills Inc. all of Greensboro, N.C.; Dan River
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Jobs Lost (due to Plant closings) as a % of Total Employment
The jobs lost due to plant closures as a percentage of total employment also
















Export Income Loss due to Plant Closure: ($ U.S. Millions)
Data available for export income loss due to plant closings were only available for




Origin of Plants Closed
















































































Source: Compiled from data from the Textile/Apparel Division, Jampro
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Origin of Plants Closed
Statistics show that most of the firms closed beginning in 1996 through 1999,
were overwhelmingly from the U.S. and Korea. Local Jamaican firms also made up a









































Source: Compiled from data from the Textile and Apparel Division, Jampro
Reasons for Closures
Available data indicate that of the companies closed in the years 1996 through
1999, the most popular reason given for the closures was high operating costs. Other
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reasons given were lack of work, unaffordable or high costs of financing and the loss
of contract.
FIGURE7.il
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U.S. Trade Balance with Mexico
Years 1983 -1999
U.S. Trade Merchandise with Jamaica
One of the claims that has been made about NAFTA by Jamaican officials is that
Mexico will be the beneficiary of trade diversion between the U.S. and Jamaica.
However, in analyzing trade data among the three countries, the following was shown:
• The U.S./Jamaica trade relations showed that the U.S. has enjoyed an increasing trade
balance with Jamaica from the 1980s through the 1990s. However, beginning in the mid
1990s, U.S. exports to Jamaica increased at a higher rate than U.S. imports from the
country, resulting in a higher rate of increase in trade balance for the U.S.
• Compared with the U.S./Mexico trade relations, data indicates that Mexico enjoyed
positive trade balances with the U.S. between the years 1983 through 1999 (except for
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between 1991 - 1994), with the balance increasing at a higher rate beginning in 1995
through 1999.
The significance of this comparison between U.S./Jamaica trade balance and
U.S./Mexico trade balance is that Mexico had a history of positive trade balances with the
U.S. even before the implementation of NAFTA, while Jamaica had a negative trade
balances with the U.S. in the years prior to and after NAFTA.
While in the case of Mexico, the trade balance with the U.S. after NAFTA
increased at a higher rate than in previous years, in the case of Jamaica, its negative trade
balance with the U.S. after 1994, increased at a lower rate. This data do not support the
assertion that Mexico's trade with the U.S. benefited the former at the expense of
Jamaica's trade with the U.S. as a result of NAFTA.
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FIGURE 7.13
Textile/Apparel Exports from Mexico to the U.S. ($ U.S. Millions)
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FIGURE 7.14











































807 Textile/Apparel Exports from Mexico to U.S.: ($US Millions)
Total 807 Exports
FIGURE 7.17
807 Textile/Apparel Exports from Mexico
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Textile/Apparel Exports from Mexico to the U.S.
The issue of loss of the Jamaican textile/apparel market in the U.S. to Mexican
exports is also analyzed by looking at the U.S./Jamaica textile/apparel trade and
U.S./Mexico textile/apparel trade. As was seen with the U.S./Jamaica textile/apparel
trade (Tables 7.2 and 7.3 and Charts 7.2 and 7.3), the volume of exports in millions of
square meters consistently increased from 1980 to 1995, after which time decreases
began to be recorded. In the case of dollar exports, the same trend was seen.
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In the case of Mexico, there was a consistent increase in the dollar value of
textile/apparel exports from 1987 through 1997 with higher rates of increases occurring
after 1991. While the rate of increases in Mexico's exports to the U.S. grew at a faster
rate after 1994 than prior to 1994, in the case of Jamaica, the volume of exports began to
decrease. It will be difficult to assume that the gain in Mexico's export trade came at the
expense of the decrease in Jamaica's trade since both countries showed an increasing
trade trend prior to 1994.
Also, as was mentioned earlier, companies that were closing down in Jamaica
gave 'increased operating costs' on the island as the most popular reason for their
closures. However, many of those companies did not indicate whether or not they were
relocating their operations from Jamaica to Mexico.
The 807 exports from Mexico to the U.S. showed an increasing trend between the
years 1987 through 1997. However, the percentage of 807 exports of total Mexican
exports to the U.S. remained relatively at the same levels from 1987 through 1997,
actually showing a slight decrease from 1995 through 1997. This is significant since
many of the U.S. companies that were leaving Jamaica were producing 807 exports.
Mexican 807 exports would most likely have risen had these companies relocated there
after closing their operations elsewhere.
Interview with official from the Jamaica Free Zone by author (Kingston, Jamaica: May 2000).
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FIGURE 7.18
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FIGURE 7.19





























807 Textile/Apparel Exports from CBI as a % of














Total Textile/Apparel Exports from CBI to U.S.
807 exports are the category which make up the majority of Jamaican4 and other
CBI exports to the U.S., and which Caribbean officials claim will face the most
competition from Mexico as a result of NAFTA.
In attempting to determine if decreased exports from Jamaica was as a result of
NAFTA, it was noticed that while Jamaican textile/apparel exports to the U.S. markets
began decreasing in the late 1990s, the total from the CBI region to the U.S. continued to
increase, and so did the dollar value of the 807 category. This fact was also
acknowledged in a meeting held in Kingston of industry officials after the signing of the
CBI Parity Bill.5 Not only did the total 807 exports from the region to the U.S. continue
its increase, throughout the 1990s, but the percentage of 807 exports to total exports also
continued to increase, after experiencing a slight decrease between 1988 and 1990.
4 Disaggregated 807 textile/apparel exports for Jamaica for any series of years between the 1980s
and 1990s were not available, but it has been established that the overwhelming majority of textile/apparel
exports to the U.S. is under the 807 category because of the preferential treatment.
5 In a statement by Peter King, Jamaica's chief negotiator on the industry, at a meeting held in
Kingston in May 2000, with industry officials to brief them on the passage of the CBI Parity Bill.
FIGURE 7.21
Jamaica's Rate of GDP Growth : (%)
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Jamaica's Rate of GDP Growth
It has been suggested by Jamaican government officials that the decline in the
textile/apparel industry will affect the entire Jamaican economy - employment, foreign
exchange and thus the overall growth of the economy. However, in analyzing the rate of
GDP growth as a barometer or indicator of growth of the economy, data show where the
rate began to decrease consistently beginning in the early 1990s, continuing its decline
throughout the 1990s. Thus even if the suggestion is made that the decline in the industry
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caused the growth in the economy to decline, the claim that NAFTA is partly
responsible for the decline in the economy cannot be substantiated from the data
available, since the economy began its decline prior to the NAFTA years.
Conclusions Drawn
It is clear from the analysis on the textile/apparel industry in Jamaica that the
sector has played and continues to play an important role in the overall health of the
country's economy. However, what this study is unable to substantiate with the available
data is that NAFTA has had a negative impact on Jamaica's textile/apparel industry,
diverting U.S. trade away from Jamaica to Mexico.
The data show that while U.S./Jamaica trade relations fell in the mid to late
1990s in terms of merchandise trade, capital investments in the textile/apparel industry
and textile/apparel exports, U.S./Mexico trade relations in similar categories increased.
This increase, however, was a continuation of the trend which had occurred in prior
years. Therefore one may tend to agree with the assertion by Anne O. Krueger that
"some part of the increase in Mexico's share of the U.S. market after NAFTA would have
occurred without NAFTA"6, regardless of the possibility of trade diversion.
Mexico's share of trade with the U.S. began a marked increase from the mid
1980s as a result of the liberalization of the country's trade regime. As early as 1980,
almost 70% of Mexico's exports and imports were with the U.S. even before there was
any real plans for a NAFTA. After 1990, the share of Mexico's exports bound for the
6 Anne O. Krueger, "NAFTA's Effects: A Preliminary Assessment," The World Economy 23,
no. 6 (1997).
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U.S. continued rising sharply, reaching 85% by the mid 1990s.7 Therefore, more than
two thirds of Mexico's trade was with the U.S. by the 1990s, although it must be noted
that the rate of increase in Mexico's trade with the U.S. was greater after NAFTA than in
the pre NAFTA years. In terms of Jamaica's textile/apparel industry, analysis of the
available data indicate that the decline in the sector began occurring prior to NAFTA in
the late 1980s as a result of a number of factors that were more internal and of a structural
nature than were due to external developments.
In interviews conducted, it was revealed that companies that were closing down
beginning in the late 1980s and leaving Jamaica cited high operating costs due to a
variety of security issues and high financing and utility costs; inefficient production due
to among other things, constraints in implementing multiple shifts; problems with
workers and other internal challenges.8 Available reports from companies that left the
country failed to give any indication that they were closing down and relocating to
Mexico because of NAFTA. The decreases in textile/apparel exports after 1995 can be
associated with the increased plant closures and reduction in U.S. projects implemented
as a result of the internal problems cited.
One of the problems that was noticed in undertaking the research for this study,
was that the textile/apparel industry in Jamaica has not organized itself as a cohesive and
formidable force. There is no single association that represents the industry and brings
members together for strategic planning. Manufacturers, retailers and other stakeholders
7 Ibid.
* See interviews with industry executives and government officials in Appendix 1.
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do not meet regularly to plan strategies for dealing with internal and external
developments that may have an impact on the sector. It appears that stakeholders in the
industry are apt to place the blame for the decline at the feet of the government, claiming
that the government has not done enough. There were accusations that the sector faced
neglect by the government once it was developed to a certain level, and few efforts were
made to sustain the growth that had been achieved in prior years.9 However, one may be
pressed to ask the question how much more can and should the government do to sustain
and develop the industry, after looking at the number of programs that were implemented
by the government in support of the industry.
The problem that the Jamaican textile/apparel industry has is not one of being
unable to find a market in the U.S. for its exports. On the contrary, the country is able to
export most of its textile/apparel products to the U.S. market at the present time. The
production capacity on the island can barely fulfill the quota allotments under the present
trade agreement because companies are leaving and production is decreasing. Increased
quota allotments allowed under the CBPTA will therefore not solve the problem. The
country needs to come up with some strategies and programs to fix the maturing
problems that have been hatching for a number of years in order to attract new
investments and dissuade long established companies from leaving.
The sector also needs to embark aggressively on its plans to seek out new
markets, and develop its full package production capabilities so that the country can reap
9 Interview with an executive with Jamwear, a Jamaican subsidiary Sara Lee (Kingston, Jamaica:
May 2000).
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more of the value added benefits than what the 807 production permits. The
CARICOM market is one that may well offer growing opportunities for Jamaica, and
one that has not been fully explored in the past.
The country must also remain mindful of fact that the liberalization of the
textile/apparel sector in the world market is due to be completed by 2005, and understand
how that will affect its trade with the U.S. and the rest of the world, as it will most
certainly face increased competition from other textile/apparel producing nations.
Jamaica cannot afford to put all its hopes on the CBPTA, which, if the country is not
careful, will only serve to delay necessary changes that must take place in order to
improve the island's competitiveness for future survival.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
At the dawn of the twenty first century, developing countries are being confronted
with the challenge of adopting suitable policies and reorienting their way of thinking to
deal with the changes that have begun to surface as a result of the evolving economic
environment. These changes brought about largely by the shift towards fast paced
globalization and liberalization are affecting the entire global community, and it is now
widely realized that no country is immune from these developments. The manner in
which governments, particularly in the least developed nations, choose to adapt to these
turn of events will to a large extent determine their progress in moving their nations
towards a higher level of socioeconomic development, with accompanying levels of
peace and political stability.
The new economic and trade environment dictates that countries adopt trade
liberalization practices based on the classical model of free trade, which is geared
towards generating export and economic growth. Proponents of free trade argue that
trade liberalization - export promotion, currency devaluation, removal of trade
restrictions - generates rapid export and economic growth, as a result of the benefits, both
dynamic and static, that can be derived from the process.1 These benefits include among
1 Michael Todaro, Economic Development (New YorK: Longman Press, 1994), 506.
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other things, equal access to scarce resources and improvement in the overall allocation
of these resources.2 Although trade liberalization following World War II contributed to
rapid economic growth which facilitated further trade liberalization primarily in the more
industrialized economies, the same cannot be said for the process in the case of the
majority of the LDCs. These countries experienced stagnating rates of growth even with
increased exports to developed countries in the past three decades.
This outward looking free trade model, based on the premise that the benefits to
be derived are those of higher growth rates and an "enhanced capacity to adjust to
external shock" 3, in many cases has not lived up to its expectations. The resulting
"export pessimism" led many developing countries to experiment with a number of
competing models for economic development, none of which offered any long lasting
solution to the problems with which these countries were grappling. However, one
model which many developing countries continued to pin their hopes on involved the
incorporation of preferential trade arrangements with the more developed economies as
part of the free trade system. Although these arrangements were meant to be temporary
"doorstops" to give LDCs the breathing room to develop their economies, many of the
latter became dependent on the agreements for their economic survival, and failed to
adequately plan for the possibility that these programs will no longer exist.
Ibid.
3 George A. Dalley, "A Post NAFTA US Trade Policy for the Caribbean," The Repositioning of
U.S. Caribbean Relations (Westport, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 169.
287
Critics of these types of preferential trade arrangements argued that
preferences tend to promote and perpetuate economic inefficiency and may limit rather
than help developing countries in their efforts to increase exports, by giving the more
developed countries reasons to implement restrictive legislation.4 With the expansion or
creation of large trading blocs such as the EU and NAFTA within the last decade, and the
formation of the WTO, as the main driving force behind globalization and trade
liberalization, developing countries have been forced to come to grips with the real
likelihood that preferential arrangements can no longer be considered a viable alternative,
or as a solution to economic development. One group of LDCs that has been confronted
with such a reality is the CARICOM nations. In the case of their main preferential
agreement with the U.S., the CBI, some critics argued that while the arrangement
continues to provide value in allowing duty free access to the U.S. market, it has failed to
realize expectations as an instrument for development.
Added to this, the implementation of NAFTA has been viewed by the CARICOM
nations as providing a threat to the benefits they enjoyed under the CBI - that the
inclusion of Mexico under this free trade agreement will erode many of the benefits that
the CBI provided to them. The industry that has been cited as the one to suffer the
greatest challenge on account of NAFTA is the textile/apparel industry, which realized
some benefits as a result of the CBI. However, as results indicated from research
4 John Pincus, Trade. Aid and Development: The Rich and Poor Nations (New York: McGraw
Hill Book Company, 1967), 198.
5 Lloyd Searwar, "The Dilemmas of Being Small: Some Thoughts on the CARICOM Approach to
the North American Free Trade Area and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative " (Georgetown,
Guyana: May 16, 1991).
288
conducted on the industry in Jamaica, (one of the main beneficiaries of the CBI in as far
as the textile/apparel industry is concerned) there was a paucity of facts showing that
countries were being negatively impacted by NAFTA.
Nevertheless, the countries continue to exhibit a strong desire to hold on to such
preferential arrangements. This was manifested in their vigorous lobbying efforts that
supported the passage of the CBTPA in May 2000. The CBTPA extended preferential
access benefits to the CARICOM countries in line with the benefits Mexico received
under NAFTA.
It can be argued though, that trying to maintain preferential arrangements' benefits
with the U.S. and with other developed countries is not the answer. The CBTPA, for
example, may well be a "band aid" and may delay the CARICOM governments from
taking serious action to devise alternative strategies to deal with the future loss of
preferential access to developed countries' markets in this fast evolving environment of
globalization and trade liberalization. This may turn out to be a diversion for the
countries from what needs to be a monumental effort to deal with the emerging
environment. The EU, which is the other industrialized bloc with which the CARICOM
countries have a preferential arrangement, has already renegotiated the longstanding
Lome Agreement into a New partnership Agreement which is designed to gradually
phase out preferential benefits over a number of years to the beneficiary countries.
What therefore, can the CARICOM countries do in the face of the inevitability
that preferences they have previously enjoyed, would be eliminated in the near future? It
is imperative that the economies strengthen their intraregional ties and trading
arrangements and pursue vigorously the proposed Single Market and Economy that has
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been on the agenda for some time. The prospect of them becoming a more cohesive
economic unit will serve them well in terms of future negotiations with extraregional
partners, and provide them with much needed economies of scale, not only in production
capacity, but also as a "political voice".
CARICOM nations must look to cultivating markets within the region for one
another's exports. The countries cannot and must not shy away from engaging in healthy
competition in production among themselves, since this will allow them to become more
efficient producers and therefore stronger competitors to extraregional producers. They
must also continue to pursue production sharing arrangements, so that the smaller
economies can participate in a manner that would be beneficial to all members of the
bloc.
The countries have already began taking steps to engage in trade arrangements
with other regional economies such as Venezuela, Colombia and the Dominican
Republic. However, these efforts need to be expanded to include extraregional partners
in Africa and Asia, and with the South American economies of Mercosur. Partnerships
arrangements with the Central American economies should also be more vigorously
pursued.
The challenges that the region faces are indeed daunting. However, if the
governments in the region are able to muster up the political will as a group to confront
these challenges, the task will become a less difficult one than if the countries were to
confront them individually. CARICOM countries will need to begin building stronger
economic and political bridges within their own region to confront the global challenges
that lay ahead.
APPENDIX 1
INTERVIEWS, STATEMENTS, QUESTIONS, AND COMMENTS
Interviews conducted with: high level personnel from the Ministry of Industry,
Trade and Commerce in Kingston, Jamaica; with an executive of the Kingston Free
Zone; with an official of a U.S. subsidiary of a major textile/apparel company in
Kingston, and with an owner of a Jamaican owned Textile/apparel company in Kingston.
Interview 1
Interview with High Level Official of the Kingston Free Zone: May 17th . 2000.
Kingston. Jamaica.
Researcher:
How did the government view the textile/apparel industry's role in the economy ?
Official:
The government saw the textile industry as a potential solution or help for the
unemployment situation and for foreign exchange flows. The quota capacity dictated
from the US/Jamaica Bilateral Trade Agreement was very generous, and the Jamaican
government decided one way to meet the quotas was to attract companies to the country
to meet the quota production capacity.
Researcher:




• Up until the late 1980s, the industry was doing quite well. Hurricane Gilbert in
1988 caused damage to some companies in the Kingston Free Zone, which caused some
companies to close down, and decreased the amount of space utilization at the Zone.
• Another challenge faced was the decline in the late 1980s of the stock market in
the U.S. which also precipitated plant closures in the Zone.
• In the 1980s, transshipment from mostly Asian companies created problems.
These Asian companies were bringing in products which were almost already wholly
made; however, they were adding small value in Jamaica such as a label "made in
Jamaica", and shipping them as Jamaican made products. This violated the Bilateral
Agreement and the U.S. Customs began clamping down on these companies. As a result,
many companies left or shut down, some even leaving equipment behind. This as an
indication that these companies were not moving to Mexico. Many of these companies
seemed to be notable for this type of operation - transshipment.
Researcher:
What effect do you think NAFTA has had so far on the industry in Jamaica?
Official:
NAFTA does not seem to be a factor in the decline of the industry which began before
the Agreement was implemented. Other CBERA countries have not experienced the
same problems as Jamaica, thus NAFTA may not have been the cause. In a study
commissioned by the government employing Kurt Salmon Associates, it was found that:
• Jamaica no longer had a large presence as a location in which to operate;
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• The government's marketing efforts for the industry had slowed down to a
minimum;
• Jampro, which had been charged with marketing the industry and the country as a
place to locate a business, went through some changes and cutbacks. A number of their
offices were closed.
• Maybe it was complacency, but the island seemed to depend on the marketing
efforts of prior years and did not put forth much effort;
• It was also found that the costs of operations were high, about the 3rd highest in
the region. Besides, productivity rates were not competitive. Hours of operation in the
industry were limited to one shift leaving the machines idle for many hours. Only one
shift could be operated because of the security problems facing workers, transportation
issues and the Jamaican work culture. It was almost impossible to implement 2nd and 3r
shifts.
• Punctuality and attendance were also problems causing low productivity. Many
workers were absent on Mondays because they partied on Sunday nights.
• Utility rates were also very high, since the island imports all fuel and energy in
contrast to some other countries such as Belize or Honduras which can use hydroelectric
power.
• The problems with security involved the storage of illegal drugs in apparel
shipments to North America. It also involved crime and violence .
• Another major issue was that solutions and recommendations given were never
implemented.
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Most 807 companies that had been in the FTZ have left. One of the biggest
companies closed after many years in Jamaica because the company wanted to move
from low end to full package operations. They felt that the workforce could not adapt to
the new way of operating.
Researcher:
How will NAFTA Parity help the industry?
Official:
Unless certain recommendations are adopted, problems will not be resolved by NAFTA
Parity. The government no longer wants to put more resources into supporting the
industry. The companies which have left the KFZ have not relocated to Mexico, as has
been reported. Many have not given NAFTA as the reason for their closing.
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Interview 2
Interview with an Official with the Ministry of Industry. Commerce and
Technology. May 15'. 2000. Kingston. Jamaica.
Researcher:
How will NAFTA Parity affect the textile/apparel industry in Jamaica.
Official:
NAFTA Parity would not benefit the industry significantly because of the internal,
structural problems which began maturing in the 1990s - security issues, high interest
rates, high utility bills, poor workers' attitudes, low productivity.
Researcher:
When you refer to workers' attitude, what exactly are you referring to?
Official:
The militancy of Jamaican workers affect productivity. Workers will not work any more
than they have to.
Researcher:
What are some ofthe major challenges facing the Jamaican economy at the present time?
Official:
Globalization and liberalization - they have negatively affected the agricultural sector.
Cheaper imports of fruits and vegetables are crowding out the local domestic
fruit/vegetable production. Jamaica lacks the economies of scale to compete with the
Central American countries.
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Jamaica and the rest of CARICOM need the political will to further regional




Interview with a High Level Official in the Ministry of Industry. Commerce, and
Technology. May 16th. 2000. Kingston. Jamaica.
Researcher:
What has been the government's policies and role in the promotion of the textile/apparel
industry?
Official:
The government gave special importance to the industry because of the potential for
utilization and employment of women, and for technology transfer. The government
thus instituted a number of programs including the Special Assistance Loan Program
when the industry began showing signs of decline; the Stand Alone Free Zone, where
companies do not need to establish operations in the Free Zone areas to take advantage of
the incentives.
Also to level the playing field, the government has also provided some incentives to the
customs territory plants, for example, accelerated depreciation, and reduced taxes on
primary goods that are utilized in production.
Researcher:
The government's policies offer many incentives to the companies in the Free Zone,
which are primarily foreign entities. How have the Customs Territory firms which are




There has been some nervousness about the situation. While the Free Zone products are
supposed to be exclusively for export, the Customs Territory firms are not bound by that
limitation. However, an amendment to the Free Zone Act allows the Free Zone
companies to export up to 15% into the domestic market. This has also been quite
unsettling to the Customs Territory firms.
Researcher:
What would you say are some of the biggest challenges facing the industry?
Official:
The Jamaican industry faces stiff competition from other CBI nations such as the
Dominican Republic where labor costs are cheaper.
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Interview 4
Interview with Owner of Jamaican Textile Company/Manufacturer; May 24th,
2000. Kingston. Jamaica.
Researcher:
What are some of the major problems facing the domestic companies and the industry as
a whole.
Owner:
• For Jamaican owned products, the rules are very stringent. Purchasing textiles
from the U.S. is very expensive making it difficult for smaller companies to penetrate the
U.S. market. Therefore, Jamaican companies are not able to service large U.S.
companies.
• When importing textiles from the U.S., Jamaican companies have to pay higher
freight rates sending the goods back to the U.S. after assembly. While a large amount of
goods are being imported into the country, less products are exported, therefore is not
much economies of scale for exporting causing cost per unit of export to be high. Local
companies have to streamline their operations to keep costs down and work with tight
margins.
• Lost production due to down-time from holidays, hurricanes, bad weather, delays
in the receipt of accessories, and delays in clearance from customs, all add to the
problems for Jamaican producers.
• The industry in Jamaica has an indigenous stigma - women are associated with
the industry. Men look at it as a "women" sector, and thus holds no appeal to the men,
since they would have to compete with the women for the jobs. Men only began coming
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into the industry with the establishment of companies from the U.S. and Asia, for
example, Jockeys, Sara Lee, Hanes, East Ocean Textiles. Men were used to being in the
industry in those countries. In Jamaica, they had to learn the skills which took about 10
years of training.
• Many companies, even the big ones, have gone out of business. For those
companies, CBI Parity is tool little, too late. The problems which have included high
interest rates, and delayed payments from U.S. companies were just too much. Some
Jamaican companies were often never paid or were paid less than they were supposed to
be.
• This company now produces strictly for the local market. We had entered into
807A production from 1983 to 1989. We fronted for about eleven other local companies
to produce 807A goods. However, out of the original eleven, only three companies are
still in business.
• The government encouraged foreign companies in the early 80s with 807
production to get into the business. However, the local companies were somewhat
ignored since they regarded the industry more as a cottage industry up until 1985 to 1986.
In the mid 1980s, the PNP encouraged the government of the Netherlands to provide
training for the local industry. The U.S. government through USAID also assisted the
government with HEART program to provide training (GARMEX), for positions such as
supervisors and middle management. The industry progressed well.
• This company has been in business for twenty five years with fifty two
employees. It is considered a model for small companies. However, small companies
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such as ours will not benefit form the new legislation. The larger American
companies such as Hanes and Jockeys with vertical integration, will benefit more.
• The 807 program was partially responsible for the closure of 6 textile mills which
were operating in Jamaica in the early 1980s, because they could not be utilized for
providing textile for 807 production. There were strict controls as far as the origin of
fabrics were concerned. The Jamaican government strictly abides to the rules - they are
afraid to upset the U.S. government, afraid that aid will be cut off.
• East Asian companies closed their operations here because they could not get the
quota allotments since they had to use their own fabric. If they had operated here in
Jamaica using U.S. fabric, that would have been acceptable. However, they had to use
their own fabric and there was no quota provided for that.
• The closing of factories affected not only unemployment, but many other business
- packaging, warehouses, accessories, supermarkets, school fees, uniform makers.
• It is cheaper to buy fabric from elsewhere, for example, Colombia than to import
U.S. fabric.




Interview with Executive at Jamwear. Maker of Stockings, and a Subsidiary of Sara
Lee; May 24th, 2000. Kingston. Jamaica.
Researcher:
What is the main challenge facing the industry?
Executive:
To be cost competitive
Researcher:
What are some of the factors affecting the industry?
Executive:
• Utilities: The industry is a major user of electricity and is therefore very costly.
Although this company has its own generator, the contingency fee alone is horrendous if
the service fails. The company therefore does not utilize it. A possible solution will be
direct legislation that makes concessions.
• The wage factor: The law indicates that after forty hours, the pay should be time
and a half. However, when employees work overtime, there is no major increase in
efficiency, productivity. People do not feel that it is worth it when they have to pay the
extra tax on the overtime.
• Public Transportation: Companies have to incur additional costs for workers
particularly on the second shift that ends at ten thirty by engaging their own private
transportation. Public transportation does not run after a certain time.
• Security: This is time consuming and costly. Companies have to engage the
canine division to sniff for drugs. They also have to purchase electronic monitoring
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equipment which is very expensive. Customs engage in the manual selection of
containers at random which is very time consuming and costly.
• The industry could be more forceful at lobbying. It also needs to be more cost
competitive.
• Another problem with the industry is the migration in the cities. Businesses
should be encouraged to locate in various locations to provide employment in those areas,
and discourage migration.
• The Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Technology is now concentrating on the
technology/information sector. It is trying to attract these companies to Jamaica.
• Industries such as food processing, for example, banana chips, need to be
encouraged and developed.
• The culture does not encourage joint ventures, networking, and associations.
• Jampro is not doing enough. It should be involved in working with agencies such
as the utility companies to broker better rates, with transportation companies to offer
services at alternative hours for workers so that they can work different shifts, and with
banks to offer better financing deals.
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The following were statements, comments, and questions made by various parties
in attendance at an Industrial Advisory Council meeting held in Kingston, Jamaica
on May 18th, 2000. The meeting was called in response to the passage of the CBI
Enhancement Bill, and was attended by textile/apparel manufacturers, retailers and
exporters, government officials, and other industry personnel.
Statement by Philip PaulwelK Minister of Industry. Commerce and Technology;
• Around 80% of Jamaica's textile products goes to the U.S., and is subject to
provisions outlined in the Bilateral Treaty.
• The industry in Jamaica is as profitable as anywhere else. It is still viable. The
government will be launching a new marketing plan in June, 2000.
• The industry can be profitable for both the local and export market.
• The government will be trying to lure some companies back to the island,
particularly now with the passage of the CBI parity Bill.
304
Statement by Peter King, Jamaican Government lobbyist for the Textile/Apparel
Industry
• Although there is a 50% drop in employment in the industry, there is only a 20%
drop in volume.
• NAFTA did not affect other Caribbean countries
• There needs to be an effective association for the industry in Jamaica.
• That the domestic companies need to come up with a way to buy more fabric
from the U.S. to meet the new opportunity. One possible solution is to form a
cooperative.
• Jamaican manufacturers should begin looking to form partnerships with their
African partners in order to benefit from the Bill.
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Comments, Questions and Concerns of Various Manufacturers and Exporters;
• Taxation hampers employees from working more hours and overtime. The
government needs to address this problem.
• The industry needs an association to lobby for such issues as productivity
incentives schemes, longer work week, security issues, tax free overtime.
• It is difficult for employees to be rewarded with higher pay when security costs
are increasing.
Questions:
• We have been waiting for the Bill for a long time, now what?
• Do the Jamaican government agencies have a plan of action for marketing?
• As far as marketing the Jamaican industry in the U.S. is concerned, what states in
the U.S. will be targeted.
Concerns:
• The industry is too fragmented; need to coordinate efforts
• What is being done about dumped goods, for example, unlabeled or falsely
labeled goods.
• The Jamaican industry has always lagged in Marketing - the need to step up
marketing efforts.
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Comments from HEART (the Agency that Provides Training for Workers in the
Industry) Representative:
• The agency needs guidance on the type of training required to enhance the
industry.
• There is a need for more supervisory/management training to remain relevant and
competitive
• The agency hopes to provide more specialized services for small and medium
sized companies, and training for the labor force.
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Message bv Ambassador Richard Bernal. Jamaica's Ambassador to the U.S.. via
Conference Call
• The Bill is an opportunity; move as quickly as possible
• The industry in the region will need to decide how to proceed as far as quotas are
concerned
• Jamaican industry officials needs to come up with a proposal that reflects the peak
performance levels as opposed to the last three years to present for how the quotas should
be awarded.
• The domestic problems at the systemic level - that of the firm and of the
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Table A4
Number of Textile/Apparel Proiects





























































Source: Compiled from data from the Textile and Apparel Division, Jampro
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Table A5
Total U.S. Investment in Textile/Apparel Projects in Jamaica
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Table A6
Total Jobs Created bv U.S. Textile/Apparel Projects
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Source: Compiled from official statistics of U.S. Dept. of Commerce, ITA Division
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Table A13
Total Textile and Apparel Exports





















































































































Source: Compiled from statistics from the USITC
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Table A15
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Table A17
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